This Mighty Scourge

Today marks the start of the Battle of Second Manassas.  Fought on the same ground as the opening battle of the Civil War, thirteen months earlier, Second Manassas was a sanguinary battle.  To read more about the battle check out the article I wrote last year:

Battle of Second Manassas – The Fields Again Turn Red

The United States Military Academy at West Point is steeped in tradition.  Originally established as headquarters for General George Washington in 1779 it was quickly recognized as a strategic position for the Colonial Army as it provided a commanding view of the Hudson River.  Fortress West Point would never be captured by the British.

As the oldest continuously occupied military post in America, West Point has seen its share of famous officers walk its halls.  President Thomas Jefferson would sign legislation in 1802 establishing the United States Military Academy.  Many of the most able general officers of the Civil War would graduate from the academy including Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, James Longstreet, Thomas J. Jackson and William T. Sherman.

Often referred to as Post Cemetery, West Point Cemetery graces the Hudson River Highlands.  Beautiful views of the Hudson River can be seen from the rolling grounds.  Established in 1817, West Point Cemetery is the final resting place for over 8,000 soldiers and family members.  Within the confines of the cemetery are soldiers from the Revolutionary War, War of 1812, Mexican War, Civil War, Spanish American War and both World Wars.

I had the opportunity to visit West Point Cemetery several weeks ago.  For someone with an interest in Civil War U.S. Army officers a visit to this cemetery is amazing.  Many of the Civil War officers are buried in Section 26.  The graves are nearly on top of each other with John Buford and George Sykes buried within feet of each other.  The weather for my visit was a beautiful, but incredibly hot.  With an intense sunshine back-lighting much of the cemetery, it was a challenge for me to get quality pictures.  I wished I had brought my stronger flash as I could have used flash fill to improve some of the shots.  To view my photo essay on West Point Cemetery click on the following link:

Mike’s West Point Cemetery Photo Essay at Flickr

OK.  I admit it.  I am always enthralled by a conspiracy theory.  I am also a Stonewall Jackson student four generations removed from one of the most venerated of  Confederate commanders.  I recently came upon the linked article about Jackson’s famous missing arm and was immediately intrigued by the possibility that I might learn the location of this most famous “arm without a body.”  I will not give you the details of the articles, but encourage you to read more.

Trail and tale of Jackson’s Arm, Part 3: apologies to conspiracy theorists

Today marks the 149th  anniversary of the First Battle of Bull Run.  With two months having past since the Confederate firing on Fort Sumter, President Lincoln had become impatient for action.  Having appointed US Brigadier General Irvin McDowell to command the “green” Federal Army of Northeastern Virginia, Lincoln ordered him from the environs of Washington City to attack CSA Brigadier General Pierre Gustave Tutant (P.G.T.) Beauregard’s Army of the Potomac camped near Manassas, Virginia.  Most people, north and south, believed there would be one deciding battle of the war.  No one, however, was prepared for the blood that would be shed in Northern Virginia or the ferocity of the upcoming fratricidal war.

To read my narrative of the First Battle of Bull Run, that I wrote for last year’s anniversary, click HERE.

I also have a collection of pictures, from the Manassas National Battlefield Park, which can be viewed by clicking HERE.

I had the opportunity to visit Lexington, Virginia in May 2010.  Lexington is a beautiful town located in the upper (southern) Shenandoah Valley.  Home of Washington and Lee University, Lee Chapel, Lieutenant General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson‘s home and the Virginia Military Institute it is well worth the drive if you find yourself in western Virginia.  While no major Civil War battles were fought within Lexington, it did witness much destruction when US Major General David Hunter was raiding the upper Shenandoah Valley during the summer of 1864.  During his raid, he would burn much of the Virginia Military Institute – the military academy Jackson was a professor prior to the Civil War.

I was fortunate that the weather was fantastic for my visit to historic Lexington.  I visited Jackson’s home, Stonewall Jackson Memorial Cemetery, Washington and Lee University, Lee Chapel (Robert E. Lee‘s final resting place) and the Virginia Military Institute.  Unfortunately, photography is not allowed in the Jackson home, or Lee Chapel.  I did bend the rules slightly and took a couple of pictures in Lee Chapel.  Check out the pictures by clicking on the following link.

Mike’s Photo Essay on Lexington, Virginia

Enjoy!

Today is the 146th anniversary of the Battle of Yellow Tavern – and the mortal wounding of Confederate Major General James Ewell Brown “J.E.B.” Stuart.  Stuart, whom historian Eric J. Wittenberg considers the “best cavalry commander ever sired in the United States,” had commanded the Army of Northern Virginia’s mounted arm since the Peninsula Campaign.  Commanding general Robert E. Lee would rely on Stuart to provide accurate intelligence on the Federal Army of the Potomac and to screen the movements of his army.  His death would be produce mourning in the Confederacy not seen since the death of Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson nearly a year earlier.

With the promotion of Ulysses S. Grant, to lieutenant general commanding all U.S. ground forces, in March 1864, the complexion of fighting in the east would drastically change.  Grant would replace his cavalry corps commander, Major General Alfred Pleasanton, with Major General Philip H. Sheridan.  Sheridan had earned his “stars” commanding infantry in the western theater and was a hard fighter.  Grant’s command structure would have his new cavalry commander reporting to Major General George Gordon Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac.  During the Overland Campaign, Sheridan would struggle with Meade who was accustomed to using his cavalry to guard his supply train and on scouting missions.  Wanting to be used in an offensive capacity, against his Confederate adversary, Sheridan would appeal to Grant to turn him loose behind Lee’s lines.  Grant would acquiesce, much to Meade’s dismay.  While Grant was battering Lee at Spotsylvania Court House, Sheridan would ride south with his cavalry corps in search of Stuart.  He would find him on the afternoon of May 11 at the abandoned inn at Yellow Tavern – approximately six miles north of Richmond.  While Sheridan had over twice as many troopers, Stuart’s three cavalry brigades made a valiant effort to prevent the Federals from breaking through their lines.  During the fight the 1st Virginia Cavalry would charge the Federal lines causing Colonel Russell Alger’s 5th Michigan Cavalry to bolt for the rear.  Stuart, always leading from the front, would be shot a close range by John A. Huff, a former sharpshooter.  Shot through the side, with the bullet tearing through his stomach, Stuart would be removed to Richmond where he would die on May 12.  The fight at Yellow Tavern would continue for an hour after Stuart’s wounding with CSA Major General Fitzhugh Lee taking command.  Sheridan’s numerical superiority would prove too much and he push south towards Richmond, never piercing the city’s outer defenses.

The Battle of Yellow Tavern permanently changed the complexion of the Confederate Cavalry.  No longer would they out soldier their Federal adversary.  With J.E.B. Stuart’s death the fighting elan of the Confederate mounted arm was diminished, depriving Robert E. Lee of arguably the best cavalry commander to ever fight in America.  Stuart is a true American HERO.

James Shields was born in Altmore, County Tyrone, Ireland on May 10, 1810.  He would immigrate to the United States in 1826, settling in Randolph County, Illinois.  He would study and practice law in Kaskaskia, Illinois.  At the age of 26, Shields would be elected state representative as a Democrat.  He would later serve as an Illinois Supreme Court justice and as state auditor.  In 1842, Shields would become upset with an inflammatory letter written about him by none other than Abraham Lincoln, who was a staunch Whig.  Wanting satisfaction, Shields would challenge Lincoln to a duel.  Lincoln would take responsibility for the letter and meet Shields on an island on the Missouri side of the Mississippi River, opposite Alton, Illinois.  Fortunately their seconds intervened, before the duel, negotiating a peace between the two men.

With the outbreak of the Mexican War, in 1846, Shields would be appointed brigadier general of volunteers.  He would be wounded while leading the third brigade of the volunteer division, in Zachary Taylor’s army, at the Battle of Cerro Gordo.  He would participate in the battles of Contreras, Churubusco and Chapultepec, the latter of which he was wounded a second time.

After the war he would be appointed governor of the Oregon Territory by President James Polk.  After being confirmed by the senate Shields would decline the nomination and return to Illinois.  He would be elected to the United States Senate in 1848 but the election was voided by the Senate as Shields had not been a naturalized citizen for the minimum nine years required by law.  He would campaign again for the Senate seat in a special election to replace himself.  Duly elected a second time, and having met the minimum time as a naturalized citizen, Shields would be seated in the Senate on October 27, 1849.  Running as an incumbent, in 1855, he would not be re-elected.  Moving to the newly formed state of Minnesota, Shields would be elected as one its first senators, serving from 1858–1859.  Once again he would not be re-elected.  After his failed bid to for re-election he would move to California.

With the outbreak of the Civil War, Shields would be appointed brigadier general of volunteers.  He would lead a division of the Army of the Potomac’s V Corps during Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s 1862 Valley Campaign.  Wounded at the Battle of Kernstown, on March 23, 1862, his division would inflict the only loss Jackson would sustain, during his Valley Campaign, on the fields of Kernstown.  Shields would be promoted to major general of volunteers, following Kernstown, but the appointment would eventually be rejected based on Federal fortunes in the Shenandoah Valley.  Shields would continue to lead his division it was badly beaten at the Battle of Port Republic on June 9, 1862 – a battle which Shields was not present.  With his reputation tarnished, Shields would resign from the army with no resistance being offered by the Federal government.

After his resignation, Shields would move to Mexico, where he was engaged in mining ventures, Wisconsin and finally Missouri, in 1866.  He would be elected to the Missouri House of Representatives and in 1879 he would be elected to fill the rest of the term of U.S. Senator Lewis V. Bogey (Shields is the only person to be elected to the U.S. Senate from three different states).  After serving three months he would decline to run for re-election.  Shields would die less than three months later, on June 1, 1879, in Ottumwa, Iowa.  He is buried in St. Mary’s Cemetery in Carrollton, Missouri.  Interestingly enough, James Shields represents Illinois in the National Statuary Hall in Washington, D.C.

Having served his adopted country twice, in two different wars, Shields is a true American HERO.

On this day, one hundred forty-seven hears ago, US Major General Joseph Hooker put his Army of the Potomac in motion.  With flowering trees in full bloom, and spring temperatures warming the days, the 1863 campaign season had opened.  After assuming command of the Army of Potomac, in January 1863, Hooker had implemented many changes to his army.  While in winter camp near Falmouth, Virginia Hooker worked diligently to raise the morale of his men, granting much needed furloughs and instituting badges for each army corps so the soldiers could proudly be identified by their corps.  By March the morale in the Army of the Potomac had been significantly improved.

Hooker’s operational plans for the upcoming campaign were well devised and provided a terrific opportunity for success against CSA General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  Leaving US Major General John Sedgwick’s VI Corps at Fredericksburg, to deceive Lee of his true intentions, Hooker planned to march his remaining six infantry corps northwest of Fredericksburg, crossing the Rappahannock River at U.S. and Ely’s fords.  From there he would push south falling on Lee’s left flank and rear, preventing him from escaping towards Richmond.  Additionally, Hooker sent his cavalry corps, commanded by US Brigadier General George Stoneman, on a long circuitous route around Lee’s army to destroy his communications and provide an additional layer of of support to prevent Lee from escaping south.  According to Civil War scholar, Ernest B. Furgurson, “Hooker had sent most of his cavalry away from the battle; what was left was misused, and ignored when it did show initiative.”(i)  This would prove to be the undoing of Hooker.  While his plan confused Lee to his true intentions, Hooker was operating blindly.  Lee, in perhaps his best performance as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, would split his smaller army not once, but twice, in front of an army that had a two to one numerical advantage.  On May 2 Lee sprung his own trap sending CSA Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s 2d Corps on a long flanking march to fall on the right flank of Hooker’s army.  The surprise was complete, pushing US Major General Oliver O. Howard’s XI Corps more than two miles towards Chancellorsville.  On May 3 Hooker consolidated his position around the Chancellor tavern giving up the high ground held by US Major General Daniel Sickles’ III Corps at Hazel Grove.  This also proved disastrous as Lee’s artillery would use the high ground to pound the Federal position. 

Meanwhile, Hooker had ordered Sedgwick to dislodge CSA Major General Jubal A. Early’s 2d Corps division from Marye’s Heights at Fredericksburg.  While Early’s division was significantly outnumbered, he was able to delay Sedgwick’s advance long enough for CSA Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox to establish a trap at Salem Church, just east of Chancellorsville.  Arrayed in the woods, along the Orange Turnpike, Wilcox would halt Sedgwick’s VI Corps in their tracks as they were marching along the pike.  After the bloody fight at Salem Chuch, Sedgwick, like Hooker, consolidated his corps along the Rappahannock River at Scott’s Ford.  Having left Fredericksburg uncovered, Early marched his division back to his trenches on Marye’s Heights cutting off Sedgwick’s retreat route.  This essentially ended any opportunity Hooker had to defeat Lee.  No longer willing or able to take the offensive Hooker would retreat across the Rappahannock River in the overnight hours of May 5.

Chancellorsville would prove fatal to Hooker’s ambition.  He would be removed from command of the Army of the Potomac in June.  Suffering nearly 14,000 casualties at the Battle of Chancellorsville it be one of the worst defeats the Federal army would suffer in the eastern theater.  Lee’s army was also badly mauled, suffering approximately 10,000 casualties.  However, Lee’s most significant loss was Thomas Jackson.  The great Stonewall would be wounded during the May 2 flank attack.  Scouting between the lines, Jackson would be shot by one of his own soldiers while returning to his lines.  The wound, in itself not fatal, would require the amputation of his left arm.  While recovering, at Guinea Station, Jackson would contract pneumonia and die on May 10, 1863.

For a more complete narrative on the Battle of Chancellorsville, refer to the article I wrote last year: The Battle of Chancellorsville – Joe Hooker’s Legacy.

(i) Furgurson, Ernest B., Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave, published by Vintage Civil War Library in 1993, Pg. 161.

147 years ago this week, US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s Army of the Potomac fought Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in one of the most bloody, one sided engagements, of the entire American Civil War.  This was Burnside’s first major engagement as commander of Abraham Lincoln’s largest army.  It would also be his last full scale battle.  To say that Burnside was a reluctant commander is an understatement.  When Lincoln decided to relieve US Major General George B. McClellan from command, after failing to arrest Lee’s retreat into Virginia, after the Battle of Antietam, he had few choices.  It came down to Burnside or US Major General Joe Hooker – a behind the scenes schemer of the first order.  Burnside would have turned down the command if Lincoln’s second choice had been anyone other than Hooker.  The following short narrative is the story of Burnside’s first foray in command of the Army of the Potomac.  I wrote this a couple of years ago, for my other website, Battlefield Portraits and it is reprinted here in its entirety.

Battle of Fredericksburg

Location: Fredericksburg, VA
Dates: February 11-15, 1862
Union Commander:  Ambrose Burnside, Major General
Confederate Commander:  Robert E. Lee, General

Battle Summary:
In late September, 1862, the Union’s Army of the Potomac, commanded by US Major General George B. McClellan, expelled Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia from Sharpsburg, Maryland.  On September 17 these armies engaged in what would become the bloodiest single day in United States history -a battle that would be named after a lazy creek that runs through Sharpsburg – Antietam. While the battle was essentially a draw, it was greeted in the north as a resounding victory, prompting Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

Lincoln’s excitement turned to despair, however, as he tried to nudge McClellan into the offensive, while Lee’s army was most vulnerable to attack.  Finally, in late October, 1862, McClellan put his army in motion, entering into Virginia, skirting the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains.  Unfortunately, he moved very sluggishly.  Lincoln, in an effort to speed McClellan, wired his commander that his army was closer to Richmond than Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  At the same time, Lincoln made private vow to remove “Little Mac” if he let Lee’s army get between him and Richmond.  On November 7, Lincoln had had enough.  He sent US Brigadier General C.P. Buckingham to McClellan’s headquarters, at Rectortown, with orders to remove McClellan.  The same orders placed US Major General Ambrose Burnside in command of the Union’s Army of the Potomac.

Ambrose Burnside, was a reluctant commander.  Friends with McClellan, he preferred to have a supporting role in the east, rather than overall command.  Fearing the commanding role would devolve, upon his nemesis, Joe Hooker, Burnside accepted the new position.  Burnside would be the third commander of the Army of the Potomac, and was an 1847 graduate of West Point.

Burnside wasted little time.  By November 15, he had his army in motion.  His plan was to flank Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, crossing the Rappahannock River above, and below, Fredericksburg.  By choosing Fredericksburg as his point to launch into the Rebel army, he would only have to cross the Rappahannock River.  If he were to take the more direct route, he would have two formidable rivers to cross – the Rappahannock and the Rapidan.  A quick movement would assure surprise and would catch the Army of Northern Virginia in a vulnerable position - as it was falling back to protect Richmond.

Burnside also changed the organizational structure of his army.  While retaining the overall Corps structure, he organized his Corps into three grand divisions.  The Right Grand Division, commanded by US Major General Edwin Sumner, would include the II Corps, commanded by Major General Darius Couch, and the IX Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Orlando Willcox.  The Center Grand Division, commanded by US Major General Joseph Hooker, would include the III Corps, commanded by Brigadier General George Stoneman, and the V Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Daniel Butterfield.  The Left Grand Division, commanded by US Major General William Franklin, would include the I Corps, commanded by Major General John Reynolds, and the VI Corps, commanded by Major General William F. “Baldy” Smith.

By November 17, the flanking move seemed to be working.  Sumner’s Grand Division had arrived on the east bank of the Rappahannock and were at Stafford Heights, immediately opposite Fredericksburg.  The rest of Burnside’s army arrived shortly afterwards.  Unfortunately, a mix up at the war department slowed the arrival of the pontoon bridging equipment necessary to ford the Rappahannock.  Burnside would wait a week for his pontoons to arrive.  It was at this same time that Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was also arriving at Fredericksburg.  This effectively made Burnside’s plan, for an unopposed crossing of the river, impossible.

The mighty Army of Northern Virginia was clearly arrayed behind Fredericksburg.  Facing Burnside was the powerful 1st Corps of CSA Lieutenant General James Longstreet.  His Corps was occupying the high ground, beyond Fredericksburg, known as Marye’s Heights.  Fearing a feint at Fredericksburg, and a general movement downstream, Lee had positioned much of his 2d Corps, commanded by CSA Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, 20 miles downstream.  Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was close to 80,000 troops strong, facing a very impressive Union army of over 110,000 troops.

During the overnight hours of December 11, Burnside deployed his engineers to build pontoon bridges at three crossings: the Upper, Middle and Lower.  Work went smoothly until the first rays of sun started to burn through the fog.  Once the engineers were visible, they became easy targets for the single brigade assigned to guard against such a crossing.  CSA Brigadier General William Barksdale’s Brigade, comprised of soldiers from Florida, and Mississippi, was posted in the lower downtown area.

After Barksdale’s Brigade started its deadly shooting, Burnside determined to use his heavy artillery, posted at Stafford Heights, to force them out of town.  For over an hour, the big Union guns fired into the town of Fredericksburg.  All told, over 7,000 shells were fired, by 150 heavy guns, into the town of Fredericksburg.  Unfortunately, Barksdale’s Brigade was unharmed by the massive bombardment.  When the engineers went back to work, they were picked off easily by the Rebel infantry.  Finally, it was decided that Federal infantry would use the pontoons as boats, to storm the opposite bank.  The small “shock” force quickly dislodged Barksdale’s Brigade, pushing them through the streets of Fredericksburg in some of the only urban street fighting during the Civil War.  Burnside’s engineers quickly finished the pontoon bridges, allowing Federal infantry to occupy Fredericksburg on the evening of December 11.

In the meantime, Lee, recognizing that there would not be a crossing further downstream, recalled Jackson’s 2d Corps, assigning them to an area due south of Longstreet.  This line, stretching south of Fredericksburg, was naturally strong as Jackson’s troops could dig into the hillside of a long bluff, Prospect Hill, under the cover of trees.  Jackson was confident that his position would be very strong.

On December 12 the majority of the Army of the Potomac crossed into Fredericksburg.  Unfortunately, the abandoned town was too much for the men with looting, vandalism and drinking commonplace throughout the streets, parlors and homes of Fredericksburg.  After the main battle, when questioned about how he would handle the Union debauchery, Stonewall Jackson said, “Kill them, sir, kill every man!”

On the unusually warm, and foggy morning, of Saturday, December 13, US Major General William Franklin’s Left Grand Division was tasked with assaulting the heights, south of town, held by Jackson’s 2d Corps.  Due to rather ambiguous language in Burnside’s orders, Franklin was given discretion on how he would feed his grand division into battle.  With close to 60,000 soldiers at his disposal, he determined to send in only one division, commanded by US Major General George G. Meade.  Later in the battle he would receive support from two other divisions, commanded by brigadier generals Abner Doubleday, and John Gibbon.  Moving into position, to attack Jackson’s line, Meade’s division was enfiladed by one battery of Rebel cannon, commanded by CSA Major John Pelham.  The fire from the guns was very accurate, and destructive.  Gibbon would dispatch one brigade, of Wisconsin and Indiana troops, to silence Pelham’s Horse Artillery.  These troops, the only all Western brigade in the Army of the Potomac, had earned the well deserved moniker, “Iron Brigade,” during their action at the Battle of South Mountain.

After dislodging Pelham’s artillery, Meade sent his troops against Jackson’s entrenched infantry and artillery.  The area they struck was a sliver of woods that crossed the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad tracks.  While they had heavy casualties in crossing the open ground, to these woods, they did enjoy a breakthrough near the tracks.  In this area the Confederates would forever lose the services of CSA Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg.  He would be mortally wounded during Meade’s breakthrough.  Jackson immediately funneled new troops into the area of Meade’s breakthrough, and having very little support, Meade was forced to pull back beyond the tracks, and the Richmond Stage Road.

The second phase – and the better known phase of the Battle of Fredericksburg – against Longstreet’s 1st Corps started when Burnside observed Meade’s repulse.  Originally designed to start when Franklin’s Left Grand Division had started to roll up Lee’s right flank, Sumner’s Right Grand Division was to assault Longstreet’s Corps, approximately 1/2 mile beyond Fredericksburg, on Marye’s Heights.  Wave, after wave, of Union soldiers marched through Fredericksburg, across the open fields, the Canal Ditch and up the hill, only to be annihilated before they reached the stone wall, beyond which was a sunken road.  Here CSA Brigadier General Thomas R.R. Cobb’s Georgia brigade poured out a withering fire.  While Cobb would be mortally wounded by an artillery shell, his brigade would mow down successive waves of divisions and brigades.  Even the vaunted Irish Brigade would be chewed up trying to reach the Sunken Road.

By sunset, the fighting had sputtered to an end.  The weather, however, changed for the worst.  Soldiers who had thrown aside their jackets, and blankets, in the balmy weather of December 13, were greeted with sub-freezing temperatures overnight.  The area between Marye’s Heights, and Fredericksburg, became a “no man’s land,” where the slightest movement by a Federal soldier would illicit a shot from the Confederates.  Besides dying from their injuries, Union soldiers also froze to death where they had fallen.  On December 14, CSA Sergeant Richard R. Kirkland, of the 2d South Carolina Infantry regiment, asked CSA Brigadier General Joseph Kershaw if he could aid the wounded Federal soldiers begging for water.  At first Kershaw declined Kirkland’s request, but later would allow him to move into the “no man’s land.”  However, he refused his request to carry a white flag, which would have protected him.  Nineteen year old Kirkland gathered as many canteens as he could, filling them with water, and stepped out over the wall.  Sporadic musketry failed to hit him and when the Federal soldiers understood his humanitarian intentions they, along with many Confederate soldiers, cheered him.  He walked among the wounded soldiers giving them water and helping those he could.  After his canteens were emptied, he returned back to his post and his duties as an infantryman.  Known as the “Angel of Marye’s Heights,” Kirkland would continue to fight with the 2d South Carolina until he was killed charging Snodgrass Hill, during the Battle of Chickamauga.

During the Battle of Fredericksburg, Robert E. Lee was quoted, “It is well that war is so terrible – lest we should grow too fond of it.”  How right he was.

While Burnside was determined to make additional attacks against Marye’s Heights, even stating he would lead them himself, he would decide to heed his lieutenants’ advice against doing so.  While the two armies held their positions through the day of December 15, Burnside would retreat across the Rappahannock River during the early morning hours of December 16.  Thus ended the horrific battle of Fredericksburg, an unequaled rout of the Army of the Potomac that ultimately provided no benefit to the Union arms.

Campaign: Fredericksburg

Outcome: Confederate victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 115,000
Confederate: 78,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 12,600 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 5,300 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
The butcher’s bill for Fredericksburg was very high.  The north was appalled at the waste of life that ultimately provided no advantage to the Union war effort.  On January 20, in an effort to resuscitate his career, Burnside tried one more flanking movement, this time against Lee’s left flank.  What would become known as the “Mud March” would further demoralize his army, and lead quickly to another change in commanders for the Army of the Potomac.  Both armies would remain in their relative positions for the remainder of the winter, before they would meet again, just a few miles west, at a sleepy crossroads called Chancellorsville. 

While Abraham Lincoln was not willing to lose the services of Burnside, he was compelled to remove him from the Eastern Theater.  Burnside, along with his IX Corps, would be transferred to the Department of the Ohio, which Burnside would command through 1863.  In early 1864 he would return to the Army of the Potomac, where he would continue to command the IX Corps through the Overland Campaign.  In front of Petersburg, in July 1864, Burnside would approve the explosion of the Crater on July 30.  Proving a debacle, US Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant would relieve him of command on August 14, 1864.  He would not command another field army during the Civil War.  On April 15, the day Lincoln would fall to an assassin’s bullet, Burnside officially resigned his army commission.  After the Civil War, Burnside would take executive positions with several railroads.  He would be elected to three one year terms as Governor of Rhode Island.  From 1871–1872 he would be the commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the Republic.  Burnside would serve as the first president of the National Rifle Association when it was formed in 1871.  His service to his country was still not concluded.  In 1874 Rhode Island would elect him U.S. Senator.  He would be re-elected in 1870 and would serve until his death on September 13, 1881.  He is buried in Swan Point Cemetery, in Providence, Rhode Island.

###

After CSA General Robert E. Lee pushed US Major General George B. McClellan from the peninsula, at the conclusion of the Seven Days, he pushed quickly after US Major General John Pope’s Army of Virginia.  The two adversaries would clash at Second Manassas from August 28–30, 1862.  While Pope had a numerical advantage for much of the battle, he failed to take advantage of it.  With the arrival of CSA Major General James Longstreet’s Right Wing, on the afternoon of August 29, Lee was able to completely defeat Pope, pushing him back towards the Washington City defenses.

After resting and resupplying his Army of Northern Virginia, Robert E. Lee set his sights north of the Potomac.  Northern Virginia had been ravaged by the Civil War for over a year.  The citizens of the commonwealth had been punished by the marauding armies – with their crops, livestock and other foodstuffs having been depleted.  Lee’s army, while achieving its goal of pushing McClellan from the Richmond area, and defeating Pope, had suffered significant casualties during three hard campaigns.  Lee believed there was widespread Confederate sympathies in Maryland, a slave state.  By invading Maryland Lee could find ample food for his army and recruit new soldiers for his army.  Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, believed a victory in Maryland would provide the impetus for England and France to recognize his fledgling country.  A victory would also hurt Lincoln’s Republican party during the midterm elections making it difficult for them to pursue the war against the South.  With the approval of the civilian government, Lee crossed the Potomac River, entering Maryland, on September 3.

The Armies Gather

Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia would cross the Potomac River using White’s Ford and Cheek’s Ford, after pushing through Dranesville and Leesburg, Virginia.  Pushing north to Frederick, Maryland Lee quickly learned that Confederate sympathies were not what he expected.  Writing Jefferson Davis on September 7, Lee stated, “I do not anticipate any general rising of the people in our behalf.”  While there were some kind acts, such as civilians giving the shoe less Confederate soldiers their shoes, or a drink of water, Lieutenant William Johnson summed it up well, “We were not received with cheers or songs or other evidences of approbation, but instead they looked at us in self-evident pity.”(i)

On September 9, Lee issued Special Orders No. 191, which detailed the operational plans for the upcoming campaign.  CSA Brigadier General John Walker’s two brigade division would turn around and counter march to Harper’s Ferry, while CSA Major General Lafayette McLaws would push through South Mountain with two divisions and take position on Maryland Heights.  Meanwhile, CSA Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s 2d Corps would approach Harper’s Ferry from the west, after the three divisions crossed the Potomac River into the Shenandoah Valley.  This three pronged attack would trap the Federal garrison without an escape route.  The rest of Lee’s army would leave Frederick, cross South Mountain and maintain a position at either Boonsboro or Hagerstown, Maryland.

George B. McClellan, now commanding an expanded army of over 100,000 soldiers, took the field on September 5 with approximately 75,000 men.  Using three roads to move his large army, he was able to move more efficiently.  Portions of the army pushed along the north bank of the Potomac River, through Poolesville, others pushed through Rockville and Gaithersburg, while the remainder pushed further north through Brookeville and New Market.  The destination was Frederick County, Maryland.  McClellan’s Army of the Potomac stretched from Frederick on the north, through Buckeystown, to Licksville on the south.  In the environs of Frederick were US Major General Joseph Hooker’s I Corps, US Major General Edwin Sumner’s II Corps, US Major General Joseph Mansfield’s XII Corps, US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps (under the command of Jesse Reno) and a division of US Major General Fitz John Porter’s V Corps commanded by US Brigadier General George Sykes.  Further south, at Buckeystown was US Major General William Franklin’s VI Corps.  Holding the Federal left flank was a division of the IV Corps commanded by US Major General Darius Couch.(ii)

On September 13, a copy of General Lee’s Special Orders 191 was found wrapped around three cigars along a fence row near Frederick (today this spot is marked across from the Monocacy National Battlefield’s Visitor’s Center on Urbana Road).  According to an examination by Stephen W. Sears, in his book “Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam,” the “Lost Orders” were found by Corporal Barton Mitchell of Company F 27th Indiana Infantry.  They would be sent by US Brigadier General Alpheus Williams through the XII Corps headquarters to McClellan, who received them by 12:00 p.m.  The copy was destined for CSA Major General Daniel Harvey (D.H.) Hill commanding a division in Jackson’s 2d Corps.  Hill claims to have never received the order and there was never any written evidence that he, or his adjutant, Major J.W. Ratchford, ever signed for the order.  Regardless of whether Hill received Special Orders 191 or not, the controversy still swirls today.  With the intelligence the “Lost Orders” gave McClellan - that Lee’s army was scattered from Harper’s Ferry to Boonsboro and possibly as far away as Hagerstown - McClellan had an opportunity to attack the Army of Northern Virginia and defeat it piecemeal before they could consolidate their commands.  Unfortunately, McClellan acting in his usual deliberate fashion did not put his army in motion for a full eighteen hours – truly missing an opportunity to completely defeat Lee.  So, in this author’s opinion, the real controversy is not whether Hill received the orders, but why McClellan waited so long to take advantage of the intelligence they offered.  For a detailed analysis of the controversy of the “Lost Orders” see Appendix I in Sears’ book.(iii)

On September 14, McClellan finally put his Army of the Potomac in motion.  Marching west on the National Road to Fox’s and Turner’s gaps were Hooker’s I Corps and Reno’s IX Corps.  Further south, Franklin’s VI Corps pushed west towards Crampton’s Gap.  In what would be called the Battle of South Mountain, they would be opposed by three divisions of Longstreet’s 1st Corps (McLaws, Hood and D.R. Jones), and Hill’s Division of Jackson’s 2d Corps.  The fighting would be in very close quarters, as the gaps were narrow, and would end with a Confederate withdrawal leaving the Federal forces in command of all three passes.  The battle would be costly, with the Federals suffering 2,300 casualties and the Confederates suffering nearly 2,700.(iv)

Robert E. Lee would move to consolidate his forces on the west side of Antietam Creek, around the village of Sharpsburg, Maryland.  Having captured Harper’s Ferry, Jackson would reunite with the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia by September 15.  Lee would create a fairly defensible position at Antietam.  His biggest weakness being that he was backed up against the Potomac River with one ford to cross his army if he needed to retreat. 

On September 15, McClellan would push after Lee, arriving on the east bank of Antietam creek.  He would have his entire army in place on September 16.  If he had attacked immediately, he would have had a numerically superior force.  Unfortunately, McClellan would continue to operate very deliberately. 

McClellan could easily see the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia from his headquarters at the Pry house.  Having lost the advantage of attacking Robert E. Lee’s army while it was separated, he would be forced to attack Lee where he was.  His plan was to attack Lee’s left flank with two corps (I and XII), rolling it up and allowing him to trap Lee against the Potomac River.  He would demonstrate against Lee’s right flank, at the lower bridge, with Burnside’s IX Corps, to keep him from reinforcing his other flank.  Additionally he would hold Franklin’s VI Corps in reserve, utilizing it where necessary.  In preparation for his attack, McClellan had ordered Hooker’s I Corps to cross Antietam Creek, utilizing the upper bridge, late on September 16, probing the Confederate defenses.  The stage was set for the bloodiest single day of fighting in American history. 

The Battle Opens – 5:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. – September 17

Hooker’s I Corps pushed down the Hagerstown Pike early on September 17.  Crossing through the North Woods they would enter a field of brown corn, ready for harvest.  US Brigadier General Abner Doubleday’s division was on the right flank, US Brigadier General James Rickett’s Division was on the left flank and US Brigadier General George Meade’s Division was behind them.  As the made their way through the Corn Field, the waiting Confederates could see them coming – their muskets glistening above the corn in the early morning light.  Facing them were CSA Brigadier General John Jones’ division from Jackson’s 2d Corps and CSA Brigadier General John Bell Hood’s division from Longstreet’s 1st Corps.  As the Federals exited the Corn Field they were met with a terrific blast of musketry from the two Confederate divisions.  The battle would rage back-and-forth for close to three hours with control of the Corn Field changing hands several times.  McClellan would order Mansfield’s XII Corps to support Hooker with the corps pushing through the East Woods towards the fighting in the Corn Field.  They would engage Hood’s Texans as they approached the southeast corner of the Corn Field.  During this action Mansfield would be killed and command of the XII Corps would pass to the senior brigadier, Alpheus Williams.  US Major Rufus Dawes, of the 6th Wisconsin, would pick up their regimental colors after four color bearers had fallen, urging his men forward.  The 6th Wisconsin was part of US Brigadier General John Gibbon’s Iron Brigade and was in the thick of the fighting at the Corn Field.  Dawes described the action that morning, “When I took that color in my hand, I gave up all hope of life.  It did not occur to me as possible that I could carry that flag into the deadly storm and live.  I felt all that burning throng of thoughts and emotions that always comes with the presence of Death.”(v)

The Corn Field was strewn with the dead and wounded.  Each side fought to control the small parcel of ground.  The corn would be mowed down from artillery and musketry fire.  While none of the Federal divisions gained much ground, Gibbon’s Iron Brigade would have some success on the far right flank.  Pushing south astride the Hagerstown Pike, they would enter the West Woods where they would encounter Jackson’s troops.  Pushing them aside the Iron Brigade would continue to push towards the Dunker Church.  With two Confederate brigades, commanded by CSA Brigadier General William E. Starke, arriving to reinforce Jackson’s 2d Corps, the Iron Brigade received a fierce volley from over 1,100 men.  While Gibbon’s soldiers were halted, they returned such a withering fire that Starke was killed and his brigade was forced to retreat.  A Confederate war correspondent, Felix de Fontaine would write about this action, “The fire now became fearful and incessant, (it) merged into a tumultuous chorus that made the earth tremble.  The discharge of musketry sounded upon the ear like the rolling of a thousand distant drums…”(vi)  Gibbon’s brigade was again pushing towards the Dunker Church, tearing a wide gap in Jackson’s reeling lines.

With continuing pressure from Hood’s Division, the battle for the West Woods and Corn Field continued to sway back-and-forth.  By 10:00 a.m., with US Brigadier George S. Greene’s XII Corps’ division arriving, between the Corn Field and the West Woods, the Federals were able to gain a solid footing near the West Woods.  In the melee of fighting, Hooker would be shot through the foot and command of the I Corps would be passed to the senior division commander, Brigadier General James Ricketts.  This would end the morning phase of fighting in the Corn Field and the West Woods.  While stalled, the Federal offensive had gained ground and placed Jackson’s 2d Corps in a tenuous situation.  The gains came at an extremely high price for the opposing forces.  Total casualties in this sector approached 13,000 men.

For a map of the late morning fight for the West Woods and Corn Field click HERE.

Battle for the Sunken Road – 10:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. – September 17

George B. McClellan recognized the dangerous nature of the battle waging near the Corn Field.  He was able to clearly see the battle from his headquarters at the Pry house on the east bank of Antietam Creek.  Having already committed the I Corps and XII Corps to the battle, he ordered US Major General Edwin V. Sumner’s II Corps into the fray at 7:30 a.m.  Riding with US Major General John Sedgwick’s division he pushed towards the action near the West Woods.  Sedgwick would be injured in the fighting there and ultimately the division would be pulled back by Sumner.  Inexplicably, his other division detailed to the attack, commanded by US Brigadier General William French, would lose contact with Sedgwick’s division and veer towards the southeast.  Sumner’s last remaining division, commanded by US Major General Israel Richardson, was to follow the first two divisions, providing support where necessary.  Following closely behind French, Richardson’s division would also veer away from the fighting raging near the Dunker Church.

French’s division quickly ran into enemy skirmishers from D.H. Hill’s division.  Hungry for a fight, the ever aggressive French pushed after the skirmishers pushing them back to their lines.  Hill’s 2,500 man division was posted on a slight rise just past a road that was sunken from years of wagon traffic.  Their position, while below the rise of ground the Federals would have to cross to reach them, was defensible.  Dressing their lines, French’s division, followed by Richardson’s division on the left, left the sheltered confines near the Roulette Farm.  Marching across a field, they would quickly begin climbing a rise.  As they approached the crest of the rise, they became silhouetted for Hill’s Rebels at the Sunken Road, below them.  Unleashing a withering volley into the Federals, CSA Brigadier General Robert Rodes Brigade slowed French’s Union soldiers.  On the left side of the Federal line, Richardson’s division, being led by US Brigadier General Thomas F. Meagher’s famed Irish Brigade, reached the crest and were also slowed by a musketry volley from CSA Brigadier General George B. Anderson’s North Carolina Brigade.  As the Federal troops pushed down the hill, towards the Sunken Road, additional Confederate reinforcements arrived to stabilize D.H. Hill’s line.  CSA Major General Richard Anderson’s 1st Corps division arrived from the direction of the Piper farm and provided relief for Hill’s battered division which had begun to pull back.  Under intense fire from the reinforced Rebel line, Richardson ordered Meagher’s Irish Brigade forward.  Armed with smoothbore muskets, Meagher’s Fenians unleashed a terrible blast from the crest of the hill.  Encouraging his brigade forward, Meaher yelled to his men, “Boys!  Raise the colors and follow me!”(vii)  With a yell the Irishmen poured down the hill and into the Sunken Lane.  The fighting was often hand-to-hand and the Irish Brigade would eventually have to pull back for additional ammunition.  Richardson’s last brigade would arrive as the Irish Brigade was pulling back.  Commanded by US Brigadier General John Caldwell, they provided the necessary reinforcements for the Federal line to not just hold, but defeat the Rebels in near the roadbed.  Approaching from the left side of the Federal line, Caldwell’s men were able to position themselves to enfilade the entire length of the Confederate line, making the Sunken Road untenable for the Rebels.  They would be forced to pull back to the Piper Farm around 12:30 p.m.  CSA Captain John Gorman of Company B 2d North Carolina described the fighting, “(the) lead was flying thick (making it) too hot (for reinforcements to come up).”(viii)

As the smoke cleared from the air along the Sunken Road, it became clear that the cost in life was terrible.  Besides nearly 5,600 combined casualties, each side would lose experienced commanders while fighting for the Bloody Lane.  Federal Division commander General Israel Richardson would be mortally wounded – the second Federal general officer that would die from his wounds at Antietam.  On the Confederate side, things were worse.  Major General Richard Anderson was wounded, Brigadier General George B. Anderson would be killed and his senior regimental commander, Colonel C.C. Tew, would be instantly killed moments after taking over brigade command.  Brigadier General Ambrose R. Wright would be seriously wounded and a rising star in the Army of Northern Virginia, Colonel John B. Gordon, would be seriously wounded.  As on the Federal right, the Union forces were able to move forward and capture ground held by the Confederates.  Robert E. Lee’s position was tenuous at best.  He was significantly outnumbered and his left and center were under brutal attack.  If matters were not bad enough for Lee, his right flank was beginning to be attacked at the lower bridge.  The entire outcome of the Battle of Antietam would be determined by the results of the fighting on his right.

Burnside’s Attack on the Confederate Left – 10:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. – September 17

McClellan’s battle orders for Burnside called for his IX Corps to divert attention from the fighting on the right flank (the Corn Field fight) to keep Lee from sending reinforcements from this sector to Jackson’s 2d Corps.  However, Burnside was told to wait for orders before he attacked.  These orders did not arrive until 10:00 a.m. – four full hours after the Hooker launched his attack.  By this time Lee had already pulled a significant amount of troops from his right flank to support Jackson.  With nearly 13,000 men, Burnside held a significant numerical superiority to the Confederates on the opposite bank of Antietam Creek.  By this time only two Georgia regiments held the opposite bank – the 20th and 2d infantry regiments.  Unfortunately, these regiments held a commanding position 100 feet above Antietam Creek.  This position allowed them to pour a deadly fire into Burnside’s troops as the moved towards the south bridge along Rorhbach Bridge Road.  The Federal troops would be under Confederate artillery and musket fire for several 100 feet along the road, and then have to cross the 125 foot bridge – all the while under heavy fire.

US Brigadier General George Crook’s brigade, from the Kanawha Division, was ordered to cross the bridge first, followed by two divisions commanded by US brigadier generals Samuel Sturgis and Orlando Willcox.  Burnside’s last division, commanded by Brigadier General Isaac Rodman were ordered to cross the Antietam at Snavely’s Ford, approximately two miles further downstream.

Crook had his brigade in motion shortly after McClellan’s orders arrived at 10:00 a.m.  He sent skirmishers from the 11th Connecticut to seize the bridge.  Within about 15 minutes time they would be roughly treated and forced back, suffering 139 casualties.  Unfortunately, Crook’s primary assault never materialized as he had led his men to a position nearly a 1/4 mile upstream.  By 11:30 a.m., with Rodman’s division attempting to cross at Snavely’s Ford, Burnside would send US Brigadier General James Nagle’s brigade forward to take the bridge.  These soldiers would also be turned away by the Confederate fire from the far bank.  At 12:30 p.m., under increasing pressure from McClellan to take the bridge, Burnside sent Sturgis’ other brigade, commanded by US Brigadier General Edward Ferrero to take the bridge.  These men, motivated by a promise of whiskey, quickly established a hold on the east bank of the creek and began shelling the Georgians with double canister.  CSA Brigadier General Robert Toombs, in overall command of the Georgians, knew his situation was bad.  He was running low on ammunition and at 12:30 p.m. had received word that Rodman’s Federal division had crossed Snavely’s Ford.  CSA Colonel Henry Benning described the situation, “The combined fire of infantry and artillery was terrific.”(ix)  With little ammunition left, and an entire Federal division on their flank, they were forced to withdraw.  The Federals cheered when they saw the Georgians retreat.

With the bridge open, and no Rebels in their front, Burnside now had another problem to contend with.  While his soldiers were bottle necked trying to cross the bridge, it became known that staff officers had not brought adequate ammunition forward.  This would cause another two hour delay as Burnside waited to get ammunition – and men – across the narrow bridge.  It was approximately 2:00 p.m.  Meanwhile, Lee could spare no men to shore up his crumbling right flank.  Burnside’s ammunition shortage could not have come at a better time.  At 2:30 p.m., A.P. Hill had reached Lee and advised him that his 3,000 man division would be on the field in the next hour.  Lee ordered Hill to place them on his right flank.  Burnside, planning for an attack west towards Sharpsburg, was unaware that Lee was being reinforced.  At 3:00 p.m., leaving Sturgis’ division to guard the bridge, Burnside pushed west with close to 8,000 troops and 22 heavy guns.  With only D.R. Jones small division separating Burnside from flanking the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, the situation was bleak.  Additionally Rodman’s division was pushing towards Jones’ flank from the south.  The residents of Sharpsburg were panic stricken.  Burnside’s troops had pushed the Confederate flank back to within a couple hundred yards of town.

Things changed rapidly.  At 3:30 p.m., A.P. Hill arrived with his light division.  Having marched at the double quick for 17 miles, they were worn out.  However, they became energized when they heard the sound of battle.  Separating his command in two columns, he would detach two brigades to protect his flank.  The remaining 2,000 soldiers marched quickly to the right of Jones’ shattered division.  Burnside was unprepared for the vigorous assault by A.P. Hill’s Division.  Some of the heaviest fighting would occur in John Otto’s corn field where CSA Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg’s South Carolinians attacked the 16th Connecticut of Rodman’s division.  These young men had barely been in the Federal service three weeks and were immediately routed, leaving 185 casualties on the field.  Lieutenant B.G. Blakeslee of the 16th described the initial contact with Gregg’s Brigade, “(the order to move on had just been given) when a terrible volley was fired into us from behind a stone wall about five rods in front of us….In a moment we were riddled with shot.”  Blakeslee added, “Orders were given which were not understood.  Neither the line-officers nor the men had any knowledge of regimental movements.”(x)  While the 16th Connecticut was receiving its baptism of fire, the 4th Rhode Island came up on their right.  They were confused as many of the Confederates were wearing Federal uniforms captured at Harper’s Ferry.  They quickly broke and ran leaving only the 8th Connecticut in Otto’s field.  They also were quickly driven from the field and towards Antietam Creek.  Other than one last counterattack by the Kanawha division, which was unsuccessful, the fighting was over.

For my photo essay on the Battle of Antietam click HERE.

Battle Summary

Campaign: Maryland

Outcome: U.S. Victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 75,000
Confederate: 38,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 12,410 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 10,300 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
While the battle was a technical “draw,” the North considered it a victory since the Army of the Potomac held the field, after Lee retreated.  After having written the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln held it, waiting for a victory on the battlefield.  Using Antietam as the victory, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862.  This proclamation is widely considered to have changed the North’s war goals of reunification of the Union, to a battle to eradicate slavery in the United States.  The South’s goals to receive European recognition, and fresh recruits, was never realized.  US Major General George McClellan, a model of deliberate action, did not pursue Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia quickly enough for Lincoln and was removed from command on November 7, 1862.

Recommended reading on the Maryland Campaign
 
Details about “The Landscape Turn Red: The Battle of Antietam”
Written by: Stephen W. Sears
Paperback: 464 pages
Publisher: Mariner Books
Date of First Edition: June 3o, 2003
ISBN-10: 0618344195

Details about “Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle”
Written by: John M. Priest
Paperback: 424 pages
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date of First Edition: January 20, 1994
ISBN-10: 0195084667

Details about: “Guide to the Battle of Antietam”
Written by: Jay Luvaas, Harold W. Nelson and the Army War College
Paperback: 310 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: August 1996
ISBN-10: 0700607846

(i) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 85.
(ii) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 127.
(iii) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pgs. 349–352.
(iv) Battle of South Mountain, at Wikipedia, was used to research this article.
(v) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 198.
(vi) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 194.
(vii) Priest, John M., Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle, published by White Mane Publishing Co., Inc. in 1989, Pg. 160.
(viii) Priest, John M., Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle, published by White Mane Publishing Co., Inc. in 1989, Pg. 162.
(ix) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 266.
(x) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 288.