This Mighty Scourge

Happy 2010!  We have much to look forward to in the coming year.  But let us take a quick look at what happened in 2009.  According to Time magazine, the Top 10 ten news stories of 2009 were:

10. The end of Sri Lanka’s Civil War

9. H1N1 – The Swine Flu

8. Mexico’s Bloody Drug War

7. Pakistan: On the Verge of Breakdown

6. The Death of Michael Jackson

5. Massacre at Fort Hood

4. The Divisive Debate Over Healthcare Reform

3. Iran’s Tumultuous Election and Its Aftermath

2. Afghanistan: Can the U.S. Avoid a Quagmire?

1. America’s Economic Crisis

While most news stories, that would make an annual Top 10 list, are going to involve bloodshed, or death, two of last year’s top stories, at Time magazine, did not: “The Divisive Debate Over Healthcare Reform” and “America’s Economic Crisis.”  Obviously these stories will continue to make news headlines over the coming year.

After reading Time Magazine’s Top 10 list of news stories for 2009, I decided to assemble my own list.  The Top 10 most popular articles on This Mighty Scourge for 2009.  While totally unscientific, it certainly points out which articles my readers liked the most.  As I have done in previous lists, I have left out the articles on the Wilderness Wal-Mart, and other “calls to action,” as they always tend to enjoy a huge spike with little follow-up readership after a couple of days.  My top 10 list for 2009 are articles that have enjoyed consistent readership over long periods during the year.  If you haven’t read all of these articles, they are each hyperlinked so you can do so today.

2009 Top 10 List of Articles on This Mighty Scourge

10. Interview with James A. Hessler, author of “Sickles at Gettysburg” (Click HERE to Read)

9. The Battle of the Crater (Click HERE to Read)

8. Interview with Sally Jenkins & John Stauffer co-authors of “The State of Jones.” (Click HERE to Read) This article has been quite controversial and has been picked up by many news outlets due to the ongoing bickering between Stauffer & Jenkins and Vikki Bynum.

7. Gettysburg National Military Park – A Study in Contrasts (Click HERE to Read)

6. Interview with J. David Petruzzi, author of “The Complete Gettysburg Guide” (Click HERE to Read)

5. Antietam – One Bloody Day in September 1862 (Click HERE to Read)

4. Andersonville Prison – A Photo Essay and History (Click HERE to Read)

3. The Fighting 69^th New York Infantry and the Irish Brigade (Click HERE to Read)

2. Interview with Earl J. Hess, author of “In the Trenches at Petersburg” (Click HERE to Read)

1. Interview with Jim Lighthizer, President of the Civil War Preservation Trust (Click HERE to Read)

It should be noted that a few articles had very impressive finishes, reaching the top 10 list over the past couple of weeks.  Obviously articles that were published earlier in the year, had more time to gain readership.  For those of you interested in the articles that round out the top 20, on This Mighty Scourge, continue reading.  It’s interesting to note, that my mid-December article, on the Battle of Fredericksburg, came in at 14.  A very respectable position for only being available for two weeks.

Filling Out the Top 20 at This Mighty Scourge

11. The Battle of Chancellorsville – Joe Hooker’s Legacy (Click HERE to Read)

12. William T. Sherman – US Major General (Click HERE to Read)

13. Second Manassas – Again the Fields Turned Red (Click HERE to Read)

14. Battle of Fredericksburg – Ambrose Burnside’s First Foray (Click HERE to Read)

15. Robert E. Lee, General – CSA (Click HERE to Read)

16. Battle of the Wilderness – Grant Takes it to Lee (Click HERE to Read)

17. Robert E. Lee Surrenders the Army of Northern Virginia (Click HERE to Read)

18. Wilson’s Creek – the Civil War Breaks Out in the West (Click HERE to Read)

19. Interview with Scott L. Mingus, Sr. – Author of “Flames Beyond Gettysburg” (Click HERE to Read)

20. Albert Sidney Johnston – CSA General (Click HERE to Read)

Thank you for making 2009 a successful year at This Mighty Scourge!

Mike Noirot

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147 years ago this week, US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s Army of the Potomac fought Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in one of the most bloody, one sided engagements, of the entire American Civil War.  This was Burnside’s first major engagement as commander of Abraham Lincoln’s largest army.  It would also be his last full scale battle.  To say that Burnside was a reluctant commander is an understatement.  When Lincoln decided to relieve US Major General George B. McClellan from command, after failing to arrest Lee’s retreat into Virginia, after the Battle of Antietam, he had few choices.  It came down to Burnside or US Major General Joe Hooker – a behind the scenes schemer of the first order.  Burnside would have turned down the command if Lincoln’s second choice had been anyone other than Hooker.  The following short narrative is the story of Burnside’s first foray in command of the Army of the Potomac.  I wrote this a couple of years ago, for my other website, Battlefield Portraits and it is reprinted here in its entirety.

Battle of Fredericksburg

Location: Fredericksburg, VA
Dates: February 11-15, 1862
Union Commander:  Ambrose Burnside, Major General
Confederate Commander:  Robert E. Lee, General

Battle Summary:
In late September, 1862, the Union’s Army of the Potomac, commanded by US Major General George B. McClellan, expelled Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia from Sharpsburg, Maryland.  On September 17 these armies engaged in what would become the bloodiest single day in United States history -a battle that would be named after a lazy creek that runs through Sharpsburg – Antietam. While the battle was essentially a draw, it was greeted in the north as a resounding victory, prompting Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

Lincoln’s excitement turned to despair, however, as he tried to nudge McClellan into the offensive, while Lee’s army was most vulnerable to attack.  Finally, in late October, 1862, McClellan put his army in motion, entering into Virginia, skirting the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains.  Unfortunately, he moved very sluggishly.  Lincoln, in an effort to speed McClellan, wired his commander that his army was closer to Richmond than Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  At the same time, Lincoln made private vow to remove “Little Mac” if he let Lee’s army get between him and Richmond.  On November 7, Lincoln had had enough.  He sent US Brigadier General C.P. Buckingham to McClellan’s headquarters, at Rectortown, with orders to remove McClellan.  The same orders placed US Major General Ambrose Burnside in command of the Union’s Army of the Potomac.

Ambrose Burnside, was a reluctant commander.  Friends with McClellan, he preferred to have a supporting role in the east, rather than overall command.  Fearing the commanding role would devolve, upon his nemesis, Joe Hooker, Burnside accepted the new position.  Burnside would be the third commander of the Army of the Potomac, and was an 1847 graduate of West Point.

Burnside wasted little time.  By November 15, he had his army in motion.  His plan was to flank Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, crossing the Rappahannock River above, and below, Fredericksburg.  By choosing Fredericksburg as his point to launch into the Rebel army, he would only have to cross the Rappahannock River.  If he were to take the more direct route, he would have two formidable rivers to cross – the Rappahannock and the Rapidan.  A quick movement would assure surprise and would catch the Army of Northern Virginia in a vulnerable position - as it was falling back to protect Richmond.

Burnside also changed the organizational structure of his army.  While retaining the overall Corps structure, he organized his Corps into three grand divisions.  The Right Grand Division, commanded by US Major General Edwin Sumner, would include the II Corps, commanded by Major General Darius Couch, and the IX Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Orlando Willcox.  The Center Grand Division, commanded by US Major General Joseph Hooker, would include the III Corps, commanded by Brigadier General George Stoneman, and the V Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Daniel Butterfield.  The Left Grand Division, commanded by US Major General William Franklin, would include the I Corps, commanded by Major General John Reynolds, and the VI Corps, commanded by Major General William F. “Baldy” Smith.

By November 17, the flanking move seemed to be working.  Sumner’s Grand Division had arrived on the east bank of the Rappahannock and were at Stafford Heights, immediately opposite Fredericksburg.  The rest of Burnside’s army arrived shortly afterwards.  Unfortunately, a mix up at the war department slowed the arrival of the pontoon bridging equipment necessary to ford the Rappahannock.  Burnside would wait a week for his pontoons to arrive.  It was at this same time that Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was also arriving at Fredericksburg.  This effectively made Burnside’s plan, for an unopposed crossing of the river, impossible.

The mighty Army of Northern Virginia was clearly arrayed behind Fredericksburg.  Facing Burnside was the powerful 1st Corps of CSA Lieutenant General James Longstreet.  His Corps was occupying the high ground, beyond Fredericksburg, known as Marye’s Heights.  Fearing a feint at Fredericksburg, and a general movement downstream, Lee had positioned much of his 2d Corps, commanded by CSA Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, 20 miles downstream.  Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was close to 80,000 troops strong, facing a very impressive Union army of over 110,000 troops.

During the overnight hours of December 11, Burnside deployed his engineers to build pontoon bridges at three crossings: the Upper, Middle and Lower.  Work went smoothly until the first rays of sun started to burn through the fog.  Once the engineers were visible, they became easy targets for the single brigade assigned to guard against such a crossing.  CSA Brigadier General William Barksdale’s Brigade, comprised of soldiers from Florida, and Mississippi, was posted in the lower downtown area.

After Barksdale’s Brigade started its deadly shooting, Burnside determined to use his heavy artillery, posted at Stafford Heights, to force them out of town.  For over an hour, the big Union guns fired into the town of Fredericksburg.  All told, over 7,000 shells were fired, by 150 heavy guns, into the town of Fredericksburg.  Unfortunately, Barksdale’s Brigade was unharmed by the massive bombardment.  When the engineers went back to work, they were picked off easily by the Rebel infantry.  Finally, it was decided that Federal infantry would use the pontoons as boats, to storm the opposite bank.  The small “shock” force quickly dislodged Barksdale’s Brigade, pushing them through the streets of Fredericksburg in some of the only urban street fighting during the Civil War.  Burnside’s engineers quickly finished the pontoon bridges, allowing Federal infantry to occupy Fredericksburg on the evening of December 11.

In the meantime, Lee, recognizing that there would not be a crossing further downstream, recalled Jackson’s 2d Corps, assigning them to an area due south of Longstreet.  This line, stretching south of Fredericksburg, was naturally strong as Jackson’s troops could dig into the hillside of a long bluff, Prospect Hill, under the cover of trees.  Jackson was confident that his position would be very strong.

On December 12 the majority of the Army of the Potomac crossed into Fredericksburg.  Unfortunately, the abandoned town was too much for the men with looting, vandalism and drinking commonplace throughout the streets, parlors and homes of Fredericksburg.  After the main battle, when questioned about how he would handle the Union debauchery, Stonewall Jackson said, “Kill them, sir, kill every man!”

On the unusually warm, and foggy morning, of Saturday, December 13, US Major General William Franklin’s Left Grand Division was tasked with assaulting the heights, south of town, held by Jackson’s 2d Corps.  Due to rather ambiguous language in Burnside’s orders, Franklin was given discretion on how he would feed his grand division into battle.  With close to 60,000 soldiers at his disposal, he determined to send in only one division, commanded by US Major General George G. Meade.  Later in the battle he would receive support from two other divisions, commanded by brigadier generals Abner Doubleday, and John Gibbon.  Moving into position, to attack Jackson’s line, Meade’s division was enfiladed by one battery of Rebel cannon, commanded by CSA Major John Pelham.  The fire from the guns was very accurate, and destructive.  Gibbon would dispatch one brigade, of Wisconsin and Indiana troops, to silence Pelham’s Horse Artillery.  These troops, the only all Western brigade in the Army of the Potomac, had earned the well deserved moniker, “Iron Brigade,” during their action at the Battle of South Mountain.

After dislodging Pelham’s artillery, Meade sent his troops against Jackson’s entrenched infantry and artillery.  The area they struck was a sliver of woods that crossed the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad tracks.  While they had heavy casualties in crossing the open ground, to these woods, they did enjoy a breakthrough near the tracks.  In this area the Confederates would forever lose the services of CSA Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg.  He would be mortally wounded during Meade’s breakthrough.  Jackson immediately funneled new troops into the area of Meade’s breakthrough, and having very little support, Meade was forced to pull back beyond the tracks, and the Richmond Stage Road.

The second phase – and the better known phase of the Battle of Fredericksburg – against Longstreet’s 1st Corps started when Burnside observed Meade’s repulse.  Originally designed to start when Franklin’s Left Grand Division had started to roll up Lee’s right flank, Sumner’s Right Grand Division was to assault Longstreet’s Corps, approximately 1/2 mile beyond Fredericksburg, on Marye’s Heights.  Wave, after wave, of Union soldiers marched through Fredericksburg, across the open fields, the Canal Ditch and up the hill, only to be annihilated before they reached the stone wall, beyond which was a sunken road.  Here CSA Brigadier General Thomas R.R. Cobb’s Georgia brigade poured out a withering fire.  While Cobb would be mortally wounded by an artillery shell, his brigade would mow down successive waves of divisions and brigades.  Even the vaunted Irish Brigade would be chewed up trying to reach the Sunken Road.

By sunset, the fighting had sputtered to an end.  The weather, however, changed for the worst.  Soldiers who had thrown aside their jackets, and blankets, in the balmy weather of December 13, were greeted with sub-freezing temperatures overnight.  The area between Marye’s Heights, and Fredericksburg, became a “no man’s land,” where the slightest movement by a Federal soldier would illicit a shot from the Confederates.  Besides dying from their injuries, Union soldiers also froze to death where they had fallen.  On December 14, CSA Sergeant Richard R. Kirkland, of the 2d South Carolina Infantry regiment, asked CSA Brigadier General Joseph Kershaw if he could aid the wounded Federal soldiers begging for water.  At first Kershaw declined Kirkland’s request, but later would allow him to move into the “no man’s land.”  However, he refused his request to carry a white flag, which would have protected him.  Nineteen year old Kirkland gathered as many canteens as he could, filling them with water, and stepped out over the wall.  Sporadic musketry failed to hit him and when the Federal soldiers understood his humanitarian intentions they, along with many Confederate soldiers, cheered him.  He walked among the wounded soldiers giving them water and helping those he could.  After his canteens were emptied, he returned back to his post and his duties as an infantryman.  Known as the “Angel of Marye’s Heights,” Kirkland would continue to fight with the 2d South Carolina until he was killed charging Snodgrass Hill, during the Battle of Chickamauga.

During the Battle of Fredericksburg, Robert E. Lee was quoted, “It is well that war is so terrible – lest we should grow too fond of it.”  How right he was.

While Burnside was determined to make additional attacks against Marye’s Heights, even stating he would lead them himself, he would decide to heed his lieutenants’ advice against doing so.  While the two armies held their positions through the day of December 15, Burnside would retreat across the Rappahannock River during the early morning hours of December 16.  Thus ended the horrific battle of Fredericksburg, an unequaled rout of the Army of the Potomac that ultimately provided no benefit to the Union arms.

Campaign: Fredericksburg

Outcome: Confederate victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 115,000
Confederate: 78,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 12,600 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 5,300 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
The butcher’s bill for Fredericksburg was very high.  The north was appalled at the waste of life that ultimately provided no advantage to the Union war effort.  On January 20, in an effort to resuscitate his career, Burnside tried one more flanking movement, this time against Lee’s left flank.  What would become known as the “Mud March” would further demoralize his army, and lead quickly to another change in commanders for the Army of the Potomac.  Both armies would remain in their relative positions for the remainder of the winter, before they would meet again, just a few miles west, at a sleepy crossroads called Chancellorsville. 

While Abraham Lincoln was not willing to lose the services of Burnside, he was compelled to remove him from the Eastern Theater.  Burnside, along with his IX Corps, would be transferred to the Department of the Ohio, which Burnside would command through 1863.  In early 1864 he would return to the Army of the Potomac, where he would continue to command the IX Corps through the Overland Campaign.  In front of Petersburg, in July 1864, Burnside would approve the explosion of the Crater on July 30.  Proving a debacle, US Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant would relieve him of command on August 14, 1864.  He would not command another field army during the Civil War.  On April 15, the day Lincoln would fall to an assassin’s bullet, Burnside officially resigned his army commission.  After the Civil War, Burnside would take executive positions with several railroads.  He would be elected to three one year terms as Governor of Rhode Island.  From 1871–1872 he would be the commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the Republic.  Burnside would serve as the first president of the National Rifle Association when it was formed in 1871.  His service to his country was still not concluded.  In 1874 Rhode Island would elect him U.S. Senator.  He would be re-elected in 1870 and would serve until his death on September 13, 1881.  He is buried in Swan Point Cemetery, in Providence, Rhode Island.

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I have just finished reading Joan Waugh’s new book on Ulysses S. Grant, “U.S. Grant: American Hero, American Myth.”  Released earlier this month, by The University Press of North Carolina, it has been a very interesting read.  A full review is forthcoming, but many quotes struck me as I was reading the book.  While an avid reader of Grant’s life, and having read his Personal Memoirs, more than once, I have found much new material in Waugh’s book.  The following quote is one I really enjoyed, and will put in proper context.

“When I look for brave, noble characters in the war, men whom death has surrounded with romance, I see them in characters like (James B.) McPherson, and not alone in Southern armies……While I would do nothing to revive unhappy memories in the South, I do not like to see our soldiers apologize for the war.”(i)

Written late in Grant’s life, this quote was directed not just to the northern public, but to the entire United States citizenry.  By the 1880’s Federal soldiers, of the recent war, were caught in a whirlpool of Southern sympathy – sympathy that was tied to the “Lost Cause.”  Grant categorically denied the “Lost Cause” tenet that both sides were fighting for equally just causes.  Robert E. Lee’s reputation, by this time, was rocketing heavenward, while the reputation of Grant, the “butcher” general, was languishing.  Worse, in Grant’s mind, was that the brave Northern soldiers were becoming apologists for the Civil War.  Grant believed that the Southern soldiers were very brave, but fought for a terrible cause.  He believed that history would provide relief for the Northern armies and felt terrible that so many of the brave Yankee soldiers were apologizing to their Southern counterparts for their part in the recent war.

(i) Waugh, Joan, U.S. Grant: American Hero, American Myth, published by The University Press of North Carolina in 2009, Pg. 191.

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The Maryland Campaign has always been one of my favorite campaigns  in the eastern theater.  CSA General Robert E. Lee’s first incursion on northern soil was designed to take advantage of the momentum the Army of Northern Virginia experienced after defeating US Major General John Pope’s Army of Virginia at Second Manassas.  Lee believing the northern armies were badly demoralized, disorganized and suffering from a broken command structure felt confident of his success.  Additionally Lee, and the Confederate government, believed that a decisive victory on northern soil would impact the fall elections, giving the Peace Democrats more control in the Federal legislature and foreign recognition from France and England.  With the hope of adding new recruits to his battered army, he anticipated adding many loyal Marylanders to his army.  Crossing the Potomac River, in early September, he would remove the combatants from Northern Virginia bringing some relief to the citizens of Virginia and allowing him to feed his army from the fields of Maryland.

John David Hoptak, a National Park Service Ranger at Antietam, brings his terrific knowledge of the Maryland Campaign to his new book, “Our Boys Did Nobly: Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, Soldiers at the Battles of South Mountain and Antietam.”  Hoptak provides a wonderful narrative of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam – many details which I have never read before.  While not a complete narrative of these battles, “Our Boys Did Nobly,” provides many new details from these battles that were gathered during years of research.  Much of the new information is primary source material, from the soldiers, that  has previously been untapped.  Hoptak’s book focuses on the soldiers from Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania who fought in the 48th Pennsylvania, 96th Pennsylvania and two companies of the 50th Pennsylvania Infantry.  By the fall of 1862 most of the soldiers in these regiments had seen active service in the Carolinas and Virginia.  The young men came from farms, coal mines, dry goods stores and colleges.  They would fight bravely and many would pay the ultimate sacrifice, for their beloved Country, at Fox’s Gap, Crampton’s Gap and the fields along Antietam Creek.  The 48th and 50th Pennsylvania would be assigned to US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps and would fight at Fox’s Gap and in Burnside’s attack on the Southern sector of Antietam.  Many of the young men would not muster out until the end of the Civil War, participating the the final Grand Review in May 1865.  The 96th Pennsylvania would fight in US Major General William Franklin’s VI Corps and were severely punished at Crampton’s Gap.  They would muster out of service during US Major General Philip Sheridan’s 1864 Shenandoah Campaign.

For those of you, like me, that have an unquenchable thirst for the Maryland Campaign, this book will be a fascinating page turner, from an expert on Lee’s first invasion of the North.  For novice Civil War enthusiasts, the book is written in such a way that is easy to follow, and understand.  Written in terrific prose, the book is both fun to read and very detailed.  The epilogue provides Hoptak’s report card on the commanding generals and details of McClellan’s missed opportunities.  I would definitely recommend that you purchase this book as it will make an excellent addition to your Civil War library.

I recently had the opportunity to speak with John, who being from Schuylkill County, is very passionate about the soldiers from his home.  Hoptak provides insights into his research, stories of the soldiers during the Maryland Campaign and his assessment of the overall campaign.  As with all of my interviews, I’ve separated it into multiple parts so you can easily listen to them, at your leisure, and come back to the next part when you are ready.

About “Our Boys Did Nobly”
Author: John David Hoptak
Paperback: 358 pages
Distributed by: Ten Roads Publishing, LLC
ISBN-10: 0557088968

John David Hoptak Interview – 10 Parts
Total Time: 54 minutes, 53 seconds

Part 1 

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Time: 4:44
Contents: Welcome and introductions | About John Hoptak | Becoming a Park Ranger at Antietam | Background on “Our Boys Did Nobly” | Distribution by Ten Roads Publishing

Part 2 

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Time: 5:05
Contents: George B. McClellan – delusional while at Antietam? | The changing view of McClellan over 14 decades

Part 3 

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Time: 5:22
Contents: The men of Schuylkill County at South Mountain | Redemption of Colonel Henry Cake

Part 4 

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Time: 5:17
Contents: The 96th loses Captain Lewis Martin and Lt. John Doherty and eight color bearers at Crampton’s Gap | Severe losses of the 96th at Crampton’s Gap | The 48th and 50th Pennsylvania at Fox’s Gap | The loss of US Major General Jesse Reno

Part 5 

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Time: 6:45
Contents: The maturation of the boys from Schuylkill County | South Mountain a tactical Union victory? | Researching “Our Boys Did Nobly” | New primary source material

Part 6  

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Time: 6:59
Contents: The 48th Pennsylvania’s surprise after crossing Burnside Bridge | Ambrose Burnside at Antietam

Part 7 

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Time: 6:29
Contents: Diversion or assault for the IX Corps | Tactical issues involving the IX Corps’ approach to Burnside Bridge | Bravery of the Schuylkill County boys

Part 8 

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Time: 5:52
Contents: The last charge at Antietam | The forgotten sector of Antietam Battlefield | Robert E. Lee: To fight or not to fight?

Part 9 

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Time: 6:05
Contents: Army of Northern Virginia faced destruction at Antietam | George B. McClellan’s lost opportunities

Part 10 

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Time: 2:15
Contents: Future plans and what’s in the works | Wrap up and closing

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For the past week, I have been reading a very interesting new book on the history of the 121st New York Infantry.  By Salvatore G. Cilella, Jr., “Upton’s Regulars: The 121st New York Infantry in the Civil War,” details the history of this famous regiment, commanded by young Emory Upton.  While reading about the 121st at Rappahannock Station, and the following Mine Run Campaign, I came upon a quote that as first struck me as humorous, but then caused me to realize the horrors of war on civilians.

After three freezing cold days, opposite Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, at Mine Run, commanding general of the Union Army of the Potomac, Major General George Meade decided to call the attack off.  For the men in US Major Andrew Mather’s 121st NYV Infantry (Colonel Upton was commanding their brigade at this time), which was posted in the first attacking line, it felt like the reprieve of a death sentence.  John Hartwell, from Company C, aptly described the relief he felt after Meade called off the attack, writing his wife he stated, “(Meade would have been without an army and she)…would have been without a husband.”(i)

Now, getting to the quote that caused me to chuckle, followed by no little guilt when taking the civilian plight into consideration, I must provide some additional detail.  After pulling back from their Mine Run line, the 121st regimental surgeon, Dr. Daniel Holt commandeered a secesh house, and its out-buildings, for a field hospital.  The home’s owner, a tanner by trade, vacated his home, leaving his daughters behind.  The daughters, were described as, “Fair specimens of Southern Chivalry – snuff dipping, dilapidated, lantern jawed bipeds of neuter gender.”(ii)  When these young ladies were told that the army had taken their home, they promptly expressed the hope that it would burn down, “with every damned Yankee in it!”  Dr. Daniel Bland, a staff surgeon, assured them it would burn down, but with no Yankees in it.  Several hours later, after they were done using the house, it and the out-buildings were put to the torch.

While the quote describing the young southern ladies may be humorous, when put in context of what happened to their home, it demonstrates how deeply the Civil War affected the lives of civilians.  As a student and amateur scholar of the Civil War, sometimes I find myself enamored with the fighting, often forgetting how terrible the fratricidal war was for the civilians that were randomly caught in its action.  Sometimes I need to reflect on a very popular quote from US Major General William Tecumseh Sherman, “War is hell,” and remember that it was not glamorous, chivalrous or anything close to romantic.

(i) Cilella, Salvatore G., Jr., Upton’s Regulars: The 121^st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 248.
(ii) Cilella, Salvatore G., Jr., Upton’s Regulars: The 121^st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 248.

After CSA General Robert E. Lee pushed US Major General George B. McClellan from the peninsula, at the conclusion of the Seven Days, he pushed quickly after US Major General John Pope’s Army of Virginia.  The two adversaries would clash at Second Manassas from August 28–30, 1862.  While Pope had a numerical advantage for much of the battle, he failed to take advantage of it.  With the arrival of CSA Major General James Longstreet’s Right Wing, on the afternoon of August 29, Lee was able to completely defeat Pope, pushing him back towards the Washington City defenses.

After resting and resupplying his Army of Northern Virginia, Robert E. Lee set his sights north of the Potomac.  Northern Virginia had been ravaged by the Civil War for over a year.  The citizens of the commonwealth had been punished by the marauding armies – with their crops, livestock and other foodstuffs having been depleted.  Lee’s army, while achieving its goal of pushing McClellan from the Richmond area, and defeating Pope, had suffered significant casualties during three hard campaigns.  Lee believed there was widespread Confederate sympathies in Maryland, a slave state.  By invading Maryland Lee could find ample food for his army and recruit new soldiers for his army.  Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, believed a victory in Maryland would provide the impetus for England and France to recognize his fledgling country.  A victory would also hurt Lincoln’s Republican party during the midterm elections making it difficult for them to pursue the war against the South.  With the approval of the civilian government, Lee crossed the Potomac River, entering Maryland, on September 3.

The Armies Gather

Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia would cross the Potomac River using White’s Ford and Cheek’s Ford, after pushing through Dranesville and Leesburg, Virginia.  Pushing north to Frederick, Maryland Lee quickly learned that Confederate sympathies were not what he expected.  Writing Jefferson Davis on September 7, Lee stated, “I do not anticipate any general rising of the people in our behalf.”  While there were some kind acts, such as civilians giving the shoe less Confederate soldiers their shoes, or a drink of water, Lieutenant William Johnson summed it up well, “We were not received with cheers or songs or other evidences of approbation, but instead they looked at us in self-evident pity.”(i)

On September 9, Lee issued Special Orders No. 191, which detailed the operational plans for the upcoming campaign.  CSA Brigadier General John Walker’s two brigade division would turn around and counter march to Harper’s Ferry, while CSA Major General Lafayette McLaws would push through South Mountain with two divisions and take position on Maryland Heights.  Meanwhile, CSA Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s 2d Corps would approach Harper’s Ferry from the west, after the three divisions crossed the Potomac River into the Shenandoah Valley.  This three pronged attack would trap the Federal garrison without an escape route.  The rest of Lee’s army would leave Frederick, cross South Mountain and maintain a position at either Boonsboro or Hagerstown, Maryland.

George B. McClellan, now commanding an expanded army of over 100,000 soldiers, took the field on September 5 with approximately 75,000 men.  Using three roads to move his large army, he was able to move more efficiently.  Portions of the army pushed along the north bank of the Potomac River, through Poolesville, others pushed through Rockville and Gaithersburg, while the remainder pushed further north through Brookeville and New Market.  The destination was Frederick County, Maryland.  McClellan’s Army of the Potomac stretched from Frederick on the north, through Buckeystown, to Licksville on the south.  In the environs of Frederick were US Major General Joseph Hooker’s I Corps, US Major General Edwin Sumner’s II Corps, US Major General Joseph Mansfield’s XII Corps, US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps (under the command of Jesse Reno) and a division of US Major General Fitz John Porter’s V Corps commanded by US Brigadier General George Sykes.  Further south, at Buckeystown was US Major General William Franklin’s VI Corps.  Holding the Federal left flank was a division of the IV Corps commanded by US Major General Darius Couch.(ii)

On September 13, a copy of General Lee’s Special Orders 191 was found wrapped around three cigars along a fence row near Frederick (today this spot is marked across from the Monocacy National Battlefield’s Visitor’s Center on Urbana Road).  According to an examination by Stephen W. Sears, in his book “Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam,” the “Lost Orders” were found by Corporal Barton Mitchell of Company F 27th Indiana Infantry.  They would be sent by US Brigadier General Alpheus Williams through the XII Corps headquarters to McClellan, who received them by 12:00 p.m.  The copy was destined for CSA Major General Daniel Harvey (D.H.) Hill commanding a division in Jackson’s 2d Corps.  Hill claims to have never received the order and there was never any written evidence that he, or his adjutant, Major J.W. Ratchford, ever signed for the order.  Regardless of whether Hill received Special Orders 191 or not, the controversy still swirls today.  With the intelligence the “Lost Orders” gave McClellan - that Lee’s army was scattered from Harper’s Ferry to Boonsboro and possibly as far away as Hagerstown - McClellan had an opportunity to attack the Army of Northern Virginia and defeat it piecemeal before they could consolidate their commands.  Unfortunately, McClellan acting in his usual deliberate fashion did not put his army in motion for a full eighteen hours – truly missing an opportunity to completely defeat Lee.  So, in this author’s opinion, the real controversy is not whether Hill received the orders, but why McClellan waited so long to take advantage of the intelligence they offered.  For a detailed analysis of the controversy of the “Lost Orders” see Appendix I in Sears’ book.(iii)

On September 14, McClellan finally put his Army of the Potomac in motion.  Marching west on the National Road to Fox’s and Turner’s gaps were Hooker’s I Corps and Reno’s IX Corps.  Further south, Franklin’s VI Corps pushed west towards Crampton’s Gap.  In what would be called the Battle of South Mountain, they would be opposed by three divisions of Longstreet’s 1st Corps (McLaws, Hood and D.R. Jones), and Hill’s Division of Jackson’s 2d Corps.  The fighting would be in very close quarters, as the gaps were narrow, and would end with a Confederate withdrawal leaving the Federal forces in command of all three passes.  The battle would be costly, with the Federals suffering 2,300 casualties and the Confederates suffering nearly 2,700.(iv)

Robert E. Lee would move to consolidate his forces on the west side of Antietam Creek, around the village of Sharpsburg, Maryland.  Having captured Harper’s Ferry, Jackson would reunite with the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia by September 15.  Lee would create a fairly defensible position at Antietam.  His biggest weakness being that he was backed up against the Potomac River with one ford to cross his army if he needed to retreat. 

On September 15, McClellan would push after Lee, arriving on the east bank of Antietam creek.  He would have his entire army in place on September 16.  If he had attacked immediately, he would have had a numerically superior force.  Unfortunately, McClellan would continue to operate very deliberately. 

McClellan could easily see the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia from his headquarters at the Pry house.  Having lost the advantage of attacking Robert E. Lee’s army while it was separated, he would be forced to attack Lee where he was.  His plan was to attack Lee’s left flank with two corps (I and XII), rolling it up and allowing him to trap Lee against the Potomac River.  He would demonstrate against Lee’s right flank, at the lower bridge, with Burnside’s IX Corps, to keep him from reinforcing his other flank.  Additionally he would hold Franklin’s VI Corps in reserve, utilizing it where necessary.  In preparation for his attack, McClellan had ordered Hooker’s I Corps to cross Antietam Creek, utilizing the upper bridge, late on September 16, probing the Confederate defenses.  The stage was set for the bloodiest single day of fighting in American history. 

The Battle Opens – 5:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. – September 17

Hooker’s I Corps pushed down the Hagerstown Pike early on September 17.  Crossing through the North Woods they would enter a field of brown corn, ready for harvest.  US Brigadier General Abner Doubleday’s division was on the right flank, US Brigadier General James Rickett’s Division was on the left flank and US Brigadier General George Meade’s Division was behind them.  As the made their way through the Corn Field, the waiting Confederates could see them coming – their muskets glistening above the corn in the early morning light.  Facing them were CSA Brigadier General John Jones’ division from Jackson’s 2d Corps and CSA Brigadier General John Bell Hood’s division from Longstreet’s 1st Corps.  As the Federals exited the Corn Field they were met with a terrific blast of musketry from the two Confederate divisions.  The battle would rage back-and-forth for close to three hours with control of the Corn Field changing hands several times.  McClellan would order Mansfield’s XII Corps to support Hooker with the corps pushing through the East Woods towards the fighting in the Corn Field.  They would engage Hood’s Texans as they approached the southeast corner of the Corn Field.  During this action Mansfield would be killed and command of the XII Corps would pass to the senior brigadier, Alpheus Williams.  US Major Rufus Dawes, of the 6th Wisconsin, would pick up their regimental colors after four color bearers had fallen, urging his men forward.  The 6th Wisconsin was part of US Brigadier General John Gibbon’s Iron Brigade and was in the thick of the fighting at the Corn Field.  Dawes described the action that morning, “When I took that color in my hand, I gave up all hope of life.  It did not occur to me as possible that I could carry that flag into the deadly storm and live.  I felt all that burning throng of thoughts and emotions that always comes with the presence of Death.”(v)

The Corn Field was strewn with the dead and wounded.  Each side fought to control the small parcel of ground.  The corn would be mowed down from artillery and musketry fire.  While none of the Federal divisions gained much ground, Gibbon’s Iron Brigade would have some success on the far right flank.  Pushing south astride the Hagerstown Pike, they would enter the West Woods where they would encounter Jackson’s troops.  Pushing them aside the Iron Brigade would continue to push towards the Dunker Church.  With two Confederate brigades, commanded by CSA Brigadier General William E. Starke, arriving to reinforce Jackson’s 2d Corps, the Iron Brigade received a fierce volley from over 1,100 men.  While Gibbon’s soldiers were halted, they returned such a withering fire that Starke was killed and his brigade was forced to retreat.  A Confederate war correspondent, Felix de Fontaine would write about this action, “The fire now became fearful and incessant, (it) merged into a tumultuous chorus that made the earth tremble.  The discharge of musketry sounded upon the ear like the rolling of a thousand distant drums…”(vi)  Gibbon’s brigade was again pushing towards the Dunker Church, tearing a wide gap in Jackson’s reeling lines.

With continuing pressure from Hood’s Division, the battle for the West Woods and Corn Field continued to sway back-and-forth.  By 10:00 a.m., with US Brigadier George S. Greene’s XII Corps’ division arriving, between the Corn Field and the West Woods, the Federals were able to gain a solid footing near the West Woods.  In the melee of fighting, Hooker would be shot through the foot and command of the I Corps would be passed to the senior division commander, Brigadier General James Ricketts.  This would end the morning phase of fighting in the Corn Field and the West Woods.  While stalled, the Federal offensive had gained ground and placed Jackson’s 2d Corps in a tenuous situation.  The gains came at an extremely high price for the opposing forces.  Total casualties in this sector approached 13,000 men.

For a map of the late morning fight for the West Woods and Corn Field click HERE.

Battle for the Sunken Road – 10:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. – September 17

George B. McClellan recognized the dangerous nature of the battle waging near the Corn Field.  He was able to clearly see the battle from his headquarters at the Pry house on the east bank of Antietam Creek.  Having already committed the I Corps and XII Corps to the battle, he ordered US Major General Edwin V. Sumner’s II Corps into the fray at 7:30 a.m.  Riding with US Major General John Sedgwick’s division he pushed towards the action near the West Woods.  Sedgwick would be injured in the fighting there and ultimately the division would be pulled back by Sumner.  Inexplicably, his other division detailed to the attack, commanded by US Brigadier General William French, would lose contact with Sedgwick’s division and veer towards the southeast.  Sumner’s last remaining division, commanded by US Major General Israel Richardson, was to follow the first two divisions, providing support where necessary.  Following closely behind French, Richardson’s division would also veer away from the fighting raging near the Dunker Church.

French’s division quickly ran into enemy skirmishers from D.H. Hill’s division.  Hungry for a fight, the ever aggressive French pushed after the skirmishers pushing them back to their lines.  Hill’s 2,500 man division was posted on a slight rise just past a road that was sunken from years of wagon traffic.  Their position, while below the rise of ground the Federals would have to cross to reach them, was defensible.  Dressing their lines, French’s division, followed by Richardson’s division on the left, left the sheltered confines near the Roulette Farm.  Marching across a field, they would quickly begin climbing a rise.  As they approached the crest of the rise, they became silhouetted for Hill’s Rebels at the Sunken Road, below them.  Unleashing a withering volley into the Federals, CSA Brigadier General Robert Rodes Brigade slowed French’s Union soldiers.  On the left side of the Federal line, Richardson’s division, being led by US Brigadier General Thomas F. Meagher’s famed Irish Brigade, reached the crest and were also slowed by a musketry volley from CSA Brigadier General George B. Anderson’s North Carolina Brigade.  As the Federal troops pushed down the hill, towards the Sunken Road, additional Confederate reinforcements arrived to stabilize D.H. Hill’s line.  CSA Major General Richard Anderson’s 1st Corps division arrived from the direction of the Piper farm and provided relief for Hill’s battered division which had begun to pull back.  Under intense fire from the reinforced Rebel line, Richardson ordered Meagher’s Irish Brigade forward.  Armed with smoothbore muskets, Meagher’s Fenians unleashed a terrible blast from the crest of the hill.  Encouraging his brigade forward, Meaher yelled to his men, “Boys!  Raise the colors and follow me!”(vii)  With a yell the Irishmen poured down the hill and into the Sunken Lane.  The fighting was often hand-to-hand and the Irish Brigade would eventually have to pull back for additional ammunition.  Richardson’s last brigade would arrive as the Irish Brigade was pulling back.  Commanded by US Brigadier General John Caldwell, they provided the necessary reinforcements for the Federal line to not just hold, but defeat the Rebels in near the roadbed.  Approaching from the left side of the Federal line, Caldwell’s men were able to position themselves to enfilade the entire length of the Confederate line, making the Sunken Road untenable for the Rebels.  They would be forced to pull back to the Piper Farm around 12:30 p.m.  CSA Captain John Gorman of Company B 2d North Carolina described the fighting, “(the) lead was flying thick (making it) too hot (for reinforcements to come up).”(viii)

As the smoke cleared from the air along the Sunken Road, it became clear that the cost in life was terrible.  Besides nearly 5,600 combined casualties, each side would lose experienced commanders while fighting for the Bloody Lane.  Federal Division commander General Israel Richardson would be mortally wounded – the second Federal general officer that would die from his wounds at Antietam.  On the Confederate side, things were worse.  Major General Richard Anderson was wounded, Brigadier General George B. Anderson would be killed and his senior regimental commander, Colonel C.C. Tew, would be instantly killed moments after taking over brigade command.  Brigadier General Ambrose R. Wright would be seriously wounded and a rising star in the Army of Northern Virginia, Colonel John B. Gordon, would be seriously wounded.  As on the Federal right, the Union forces were able to move forward and capture ground held by the Confederates.  Robert E. Lee’s position was tenuous at best.  He was significantly outnumbered and his left and center were under brutal attack.  If matters were not bad enough for Lee, his right flank was beginning to be attacked at the lower bridge.  The entire outcome of the Battle of Antietam would be determined by the results of the fighting on his right.

Burnside’s Attack on the Confederate Left – 10:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. – September 17

McClellan’s battle orders for Burnside called for his IX Corps to divert attention from the fighting on the right flank (the Corn Field fight) to keep Lee from sending reinforcements from this sector to Jackson’s 2d Corps.  However, Burnside was told to wait for orders before he attacked.  These orders did not arrive until 10:00 a.m. – four full hours after the Hooker launched his attack.  By this time Lee had already pulled a significant amount of troops from his right flank to support Jackson.  With nearly 13,000 men, Burnside held a significant numerical superiority to the Confederates on the opposite bank of Antietam Creek.  By this time only two Georgia regiments held the opposite bank – the 20th and 2d infantry regiments.  Unfortunately, these regiments held a commanding position 100 feet above Antietam Creek.  This position allowed them to pour a deadly fire into Burnside’s troops as the moved towards the south bridge along Rorhbach Bridge Road.  The Federal troops would be under Confederate artillery and musket fire for several 100 feet along the road, and then have to cross the 125 foot bridge – all the while under heavy fire.

US Brigadier General George Crook’s brigade, from the Kanawha Division, was ordered to cross the bridge first, followed by two divisions commanded by US brigadier generals Samuel Sturgis and Orlando Willcox.  Burnside’s last division, commanded by Brigadier General Isaac Rodman were ordered to cross the Antietam at Snavely’s Ford, approximately two miles further downstream.

Crook had his brigade in motion shortly after McClellan’s orders arrived at 10:00 a.m.  He sent skirmishers from the 11th Connecticut to seize the bridge.  Within about 15 minutes time they would be roughly treated and forced back, suffering 139 casualties.  Unfortunately, Crook’s primary assault never materialized as he had led his men to a position nearly a 1/4 mile upstream.  By 11:30 a.m., with Rodman’s division attempting to cross at Snavely’s Ford, Burnside would send US Brigadier General James Nagle’s brigade forward to take the bridge.  These soldiers would also be turned away by the Confederate fire from the far bank.  At 12:30 p.m., under increasing pressure from McClellan to take the bridge, Burnside sent Sturgis’ other brigade, commanded by US Brigadier General Edward Ferrero to take the bridge.  These men, motivated by a promise of whiskey, quickly established a hold on the east bank of the creek and began shelling the Georgians with double canister.  CSA Brigadier General Robert Toombs, in overall command of the Georgians, knew his situation was bad.  He was running low on ammunition and at 12:30 p.m. had received word that Rodman’s Federal division had crossed Snavely’s Ford.  CSA Colonel Henry Benning described the situation, “The combined fire of infantry and artillery was terrific.”(ix)  With little ammunition left, and an entire Federal division on their flank, they were forced to withdraw.  The Federals cheered when they saw the Georgians retreat.

With the bridge open, and no Rebels in their front, Burnside now had another problem to contend with.  While his soldiers were bottle necked trying to cross the bridge, it became known that staff officers had not brought adequate ammunition forward.  This would cause another two hour delay as Burnside waited to get ammunition – and men – across the narrow bridge.  It was approximately 2:00 p.m.  Meanwhile, Lee could spare no men to shore up his crumbling right flank.  Burnside’s ammunition shortage could not have come at a better time.  At 2:30 p.m., A.P. Hill had reached Lee and advised him that his 3,000 man division would be on the field in the next hour.  Lee ordered Hill to place them on his right flank.  Burnside, planning for an attack west towards Sharpsburg, was unaware that Lee was being reinforced.  At 3:00 p.m., leaving Sturgis’ division to guard the bridge, Burnside pushed west with close to 8,000 troops and 22 heavy guns.  With only D.R. Jones small division separating Burnside from flanking the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, the situation was bleak.  Additionally Rodman’s division was pushing towards Jones’ flank from the south.  The residents of Sharpsburg were panic stricken.  Burnside’s troops had pushed the Confederate flank back to within a couple hundred yards of town.

Things changed rapidly.  At 3:30 p.m., A.P. Hill arrived with his light division.  Having marched at the double quick for 17 miles, they were worn out.  However, they became energized when they heard the sound of battle.  Separating his command in two columns, he would detach two brigades to protect his flank.  The remaining 2,000 soldiers marched quickly to the right of Jones’ shattered division.  Burnside was unprepared for the vigorous assault by A.P. Hill’s Division.  Some of the heaviest fighting would occur in John Otto’s corn field where CSA Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg’s South Carolinians attacked the 16th Connecticut of Rodman’s division.  These young men had barely been in the Federal service three weeks and were immediately routed, leaving 185 casualties on the field.  Lieutenant B.G. Blakeslee of the 16th described the initial contact with Gregg’s Brigade, “(the order to move on had just been given) when a terrible volley was fired into us from behind a stone wall about five rods in front of us….In a moment we were riddled with shot.”  Blakeslee added, “Orders were given which were not understood.  Neither the line-officers nor the men had any knowledge of regimental movements.”(x)  While the 16th Connecticut was receiving its baptism of fire, the 4th Rhode Island came up on their right.  They were confused as many of the Confederates were wearing Federal uniforms captured at Harper’s Ferry.  They quickly broke and ran leaving only the 8th Connecticut in Otto’s field.  They also were quickly driven from the field and towards Antietam Creek.  Other than one last counterattack by the Kanawha division, which was unsuccessful, the fighting was over.

For my photo essay on the Battle of Antietam click HERE.

Battle Summary

Campaign: Maryland

Outcome: U.S. Victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 75,000
Confederate: 38,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 12,410 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 10,300 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
While the battle was a technical “draw,” the North considered it a victory since the Army of the Potomac held the field, after Lee retreated.  After having written the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln held it, waiting for a victory on the battlefield.  Using Antietam as the victory, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862.  This proclamation is widely considered to have changed the North’s war goals of reunification of the Union, to a battle to eradicate slavery in the United States.  The South’s goals to receive European recognition, and fresh recruits, was never realized.  US Major General George McClellan, a model of deliberate action, did not pursue Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia quickly enough for Lincoln and was removed from command on November 7, 1862.

Recommended reading on the Maryland Campaign
 
Details about “The Landscape Turn Red: The Battle of Antietam”
Written by: Stephen W. Sears
Paperback: 464 pages
Publisher: Mariner Books
Date of First Edition: June 3o, 2003
ISBN-10: 0618344195

Details about “Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle”
Written by: John M. Priest
Paperback: 424 pages
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date of First Edition: January 20, 1994
ISBN-10: 0195084667

Details about: “Guide to the Battle of Antietam”
Written by: Jay Luvaas, Harold W. Nelson and the Army War College
Paperback: 310 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: August 1996
ISBN-10: 0700607846

(i) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 85.
(ii) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 127.
(iii) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pgs. 349–352.
(iv) Battle of South Mountain, at Wikipedia, was used to research this article.
(v) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 198.
(vi) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 194.
(vii) Priest, John M., Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle, published by White Mane Publishing Co., Inc. in 1989, Pg. 160.
(viii) Priest, John M., Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle, published by White Mane Publishing Co., Inc. in 1989, Pg. 162.
(ix) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 266.
(x) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 288.

James Barton Wiley was born in Ohio between 1836 and 1838.  By 1850 he was living with his parents, Jacob and Mary Wiley, in Noble, Ohio.  He was the oldest of seven siblings.  He was the only son of Jacob and Mary.  He would marry Catherine Coffee on February 2, 1854 in Noble County, Indiana.  Together they would have three children: Mary Jane (1856), John M. (1859) and William S. (1862).  Wiley would often go by his middle name on official records, including his marriage certificate and the 1860 Federal Census record which listed the Wiley residence in Baker, Indiana.(i)

With the outbreak of hostilities, Wiley would enlist as a private in Company H, 59th New York Infantry.  His date of enlistment was September 20, 1861 at Bellville, Ohio.  In speaking with a couple of his ancestors, this author has been unable to determine why he would enlist in a New York regiment when he lived in Indiana and entered the service in Ohio.  The only logical conclusion is that Ohio had filled her volunteer requirements and the state had not authorized the formation of additional regiments by his enlistment date.

The 59th New York was officially mustered into Federal service in November 1861 and would leave New York City on November 23.  Proceeding to Washington City they would serve in US Brigadier General James Wadsworth’s command, defending Washington, through May 1862.  In July 1862 the 59th New York would join the Army of the Potomac and be assigned to the Third Brigade (Brigadier General Napoleon J.T. Dana), Second Division (US Major General John Sedgwick) of US Major General Edwin Sumner’s II Corps.  Commanding the 59th New York was Colonel William L. Tidball.  Leaving Washington City, they would join their new command at Harrison’s Landing on the James River Peninsula.  By this time The Seven Days was over and the Army of the Potomac, commanded by US Major General George B. McClellan was preparing to leave Harrison’s Landing to return to Alexandria, Virginia.  Private James Wiley would see no action while at Harrison’s Landing.(ii)

By August 28, 1862, the II Corps was located at Fairfax Court House, Virginia, and would be involved in covering US Major General John Pope’s retreating Army of Virginia from their rout at Second Manassas.  After the defeat of Pope’s army, CSA General Robert E. Lee determined to invade the North in an effort to recruit troops and provide relief for wary Virginians who had suffered through nearly all of the fighting in the Eastern Theater.  Pushing into Maryland during the first days of September, Lee would begin an effort to recruit Marylanders who were loyal to the Confederacy – an effort that turned out to be in vain.

Meanwhile, in Washington City, McClellan began to organize the remnants of Pope’s Army of Virginia using some of them to fill the ranks of his Army of the Potomac.  A master of organization, McClellan quickly had his army back in shape.  With intelligence mounting, that Lee had pushed into Maryland, McClellan quickly began planning his movements.  On September 6, the Army of the Potomac left Washington, in several columns, to find Lee’s army.  The first action of the Maryland Campaign would occur at South Mountain on September 14, when US Major General Joseph Hooker’s I Corps would engage portions of CSA Major Generals James Longstreet and Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s army wings.  The fighting at South Mountain would take place at Fox’s Gap, Crampton’s Gap and Turner’s Gap and would be intense.  Hooker was severely pressed while trying to push through the gaps.  The II Corps, including the 59th New York, would be sent to reinforce Hooker, but would arrive to find the I Corps alone at South Mountain – Lee having pulled his forces back.

On September 16, Sumner’s II Corps would be on the east side of Antietam Creek, facing the majority of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia (CSA Major General A.P. Hill’s Light Division was at Harpers Ferry) deployed around Sharpsburg, Maryland – just west of Antietam Creek.  On the morning of September 17, Hooker’s I Corps, having crossed Antietam Creek north of the Confederates, pushed south towards the left flank of Lee’s forces.  Pushing through the “Corn Field” they would be heavily engaged against Jackson’s Left Army Wing.  With the fighting going back-and-forth, across the Corn Field, the I Corps would suffer terrible casualties.  At 7:20 a.m., McClellan would order the II Corps to reinforce Hooker’s I Corps, and US Major General Joseph Mansfield’s XII Corps which had become engaged east of the Corn Field, near the North Woods.  The plan was for Sumner’s II Corps to push towards the Dunker Church, slamming into the left of Jackson’s Confederate lines.  Two of the II Corps divisions were to attack in force.  Unfortunately, US Major General William H. French’s division would veer to the left instead of staying on Sedgwick’s Second Division’s left flank.  This would leave the Second Division, including Wiley’s 59th New York, unsupported as they pushed through the Corn Field towards the West Woods.  Crossing the Hagerstown Pike, the general order was to keep the Dunker Church on their left, and rear.  Pushing straight forward, the three brigades of Sedgwick’s division would not find the enemy in their front, but with their left flank refused and facing north into Sedgwick’s left flank.  Confusion reigned throughout Sedgwick’s division and it became especially pronounced within Dana’s brigade.  His troops, including Wiley’s 59th New York, were receiving heavy enemy fire from a direction they did not expect – their left - enfilading their lines.  Additionally, the division was receiving heavy artillery fire from CSA Major General J.E.B. Stuart’s horse artillery located on a rocky rise to their right.(iii)  Sumner, maintaining his composure, rode up and down his lines, encouraging his soldiers to remain steady.  One of Dana’s soldiers wrote home describing Sumner’s actions, “We were completely flanked on the left and in two minutes more could have been prisoners of war if Gen Sumner himself had not rode in through a terrific fire of the enemy and brought us off……My men fell around me like dead flies on a frosty morning.”(iv)  The 59th New York’s baptism of fire was harsh.  The regiment did not handle themselves well.  With the field shrouded by smoke, they fired unknowingly into the backs of the 15th Massachusetts Infantry.  Not hearing the Massachusetts men yelling at them to cease firing, they would continue to fire into them until Sumner rode up and “cussed them out.”  Sedgwick’s division was able to retreat across the Hagerstown Pike and reform.  The fighting at Antietam would move south to the Bloody Lane, where the II Corps divisions of French and US Major General Israel Richardson would continue the fight.  The fighting on the Federal right would diminish as the action at the Bloody Lane intensified.  US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps would attack on the far left, after which the Battle of Antietam sputtered to a close.  Sergeant James Wiley, along with the 59th New York, had experienced their first major fighting, on a grand scale, at Antietam.

Wiley would continue to serve with the 59th New York through upcoming battles at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville – each being terrible Federal defeats.  Once again, after the Battle of Chancellorsville, Robert E. Lee decided to invade the North.  From July 1–3, 1863, the Army of the Potomac, commanded then by US Major General George Gordon Meade, would battle Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in the small southern Pennsylvania town of Gettysburg.  US Major General Winfield S. Hancock now commanded the II Corps.  The Second Division was now commanded by US Brigadier General John Gibbon with the Third Brigade being commanded by Colonel Norman J. Hall.  The 59th New York was in Hall’s brigade and was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Max Thoman.  Brigadier General John Caldwell’s First Division would see action on the second day of Gettysburg, the other two divisions would not be involved.  On the third day of battle, the II Corps other divisions, commanded by US Brigadier General Alexander Hays, and Gibbon, would see significant action during CSA Major General George E. Pickett’s famous charge.  Positioned along Cemetery Ridge, Hays division held the II Corps right flank while Gibbon’s division held the left.  Gibbon received some support from US Colonel Edmund Dana’s I Corps’ brigade.  Pickett’s combined command, which included his 1st Corps Division and CSA Brigadier General J. Johnston Pettigrew’s Division and portions of CSA Major General Richard H. Anderson’s Division, both of the 3d Corps, totaled approximately 12,500 soldiers.  After CSA Colonel E. Porter Alexander’s 1st Corps artillery bombarded the Federal lines for over an hour, Pickett’s troops dressed ranks along Seminary Ridge and pushed towards Hancock’s II Corps.  It was approximately 3:00 p.m.  Crossing the fields between Seminary Ridge and Cemetery Ridge, the Confederates would start to receive artillery shelling.  Crossing a fence along the Emmittsburg Road, they pushed towards the Federal line, its soldiers well protected behind a stone wall.  As they closed to within small arms range, they received a terrible storm of lead as the Federal infantry opened on them.  The Confederate charge would be repulsed, with only a handful of regiments breaking through the II Corps’ line.  The 59th New York would receive a direct assault from the 48th Georgia Infantry regiment.(v)  During the hard fighting here, some of which was hand-to-hand, Wiley would capture the Georgia regiment’s battle flag.  He would receive the Medal of Honor for his actions at Gettysburg, on December 1, 1864.  His citation reads, “Capture of flag of a Georgia regiment.”

Meade’s Army of the Potomac would repulse Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg, ending the bloodiest battle on American soil.  Lee would retreat back into Virginia, with Meade’s army slowly pursuing them, essentially “nipping at their heels.”

Wiley, and the 59th New York Infantry, would continue to serve their country.  They would be engaged in all the remaining battles in the eastern theater including Mine Run, the Overland Campaign, Petersburg Campaign and Appomattox Court House.  On June 22, 1864, during the fighting at Jerusalem Plank Road, 1st Sergeant James Wiley would be captured.  He would be sent south to the Confederate Prison at Camp Sumter – better known as Andersonville.  He would suffer, with his fellow prisoners, from malnutrition, poor drinking water and exposure to the elements.  On February 7, 1865, Wiley would die from dysentery – most likely never knowing he had been awarded the Medal of Honor for gallantry at Gettysburg.  James Barton Wiley is a true American HERO.

(i) James Barton Wiley, at Ancestery.com was used to research this article.
(ii) The Civil War Soldiers and Sailors System was used to research this article.
(iii) Walker, Francis A., History of the Second Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac, Second Edition, published by Charles Scribner’s Sons in 1891, Pgs. 100–107.
(iv) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pgs. 227–228.
(v) Hess, Earl J., Pickett’s Charge: The Last Attack at Gettysburg, published by the University of North Carolina Press in 2001, Pg. 91.

Today marks the 147th anniversary of the start of the Battle of Second Manassas.  For three days in August 1862, death revisited the fields north of Manassas Junction, Virginia.  Barely a year after US Brigadier General Irvin McDowell was turned away, by CSA Brigadier General P.G.T. Beauregard, at the First Battle of Manassas, an even deadlier affair would be fought on the same rolling hills.

This time the Federal troops were commanded by US Major General John Pope.  Designated the Army of Virginia, they were opposed by CSA General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  Pope, strong willed and bombastic, was reeling from his bloody repulse at the Battle of Cedar Mountain on August 9, 1862.  With his army widely scattered, he was searching for CSA Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s Left Wing.  According to intelligence Pope received, Jackson was bivouacked at Centreville, Virginia – approximately five miles east of the plains of the First Manassas Battlefield.  Late in the afternoon, on August 28, portions of US Major General Irvin McDowell’s III Corps were attacked as the pushed east on the Warrenton Turnpike, near Groveton, Virginia.  Still west of the Manassas battlefield, US Brigadier General John Gibbon’s brigade was surprised by the volley of artillery slamming into their left flank – from the north.  Believing the fire was coming from Confederate horse artillery, Gibbon deployed his brigade and advanced north towards Brawner’s Farm, unaware that he was opposed by an entire division of Jackson’s detachment.  The fighting quickly escalated with Gibbon being reinforced by US Brigadier General Abner Doubleday’s brigade.  The Battle of Brawner’s Farm was extremely brutal, with some of the most desperate fighting of the war occurring while the Federal army was spread out and very vulnerable.  Brawner’s Farm, while considered a separate battle, was the prelude to one of the largest battles of the Civil War – Second Manassas.

Get comfortable, and relax.  Take a journey with me to August 1862, to the fields north of Manassas Junction where one of the bloodiest battles of the American Civil War took place.  The following essay comes from my other website, BattlefieldPortraits.com.  Enjoy.

Battle of Second Manassas
(also known as 2nd Bull Run)

Location: Manassas, VA
Dates: August 28 – 30, 1862
Union Commander:  John Pope, Major General
Confederate Commander:  Robert E. Lee, General

Battle Summary:
Robert E. Lee had accomplished the unimaginable.  He had pushed US Major General George B. McClellan’s massive Army of the Potomac, from the “Gates of Richmond.”  After CSA General Joseph Johnston was wounded, at the battle of Seven Pines, Robert Lee would take over command of the Army of Northern Virginia.  During the Seven Days battles, Lee would hammer McClellan’s larger army until it was pushed to Harrison’s Landing, on the James River.

In the west, after earning a victory at Island #10, US Major General John Pope would be brought east, by Abraham Lincoln.  Creating the Army of Virginia, Lincoln determined to pressure Robert E. Lee, from northern Virginia.  Lee would detach his 2d Corps, commanded by CSA Major General Thomas Jackson, to keep Pope from reinforcing McClellan.  This would culminate in the Battle of Cedar Mountain, where US Major General Nathanial Bank’s detachment, from the Army of Virginia, would be badly trounced by Jackson.

Pope would consolidate his army, north of the Rappahannock River, and await Jackson’s next move.  In the meantime, with George McClellan’s Army of the Potomac retreating from the peninsula, Robert E. Lee quickly moved to consolidate his army, and deal with John Pope.

For several days, in late August, after the consolidation of the Army of Northern Virginia, John Pope did not know where Lee’s army was.  Still camped near Culpeper, Virginia, Pope would learn quickly about the speed Thomas Jackson’s “foot cavalry.”  Having “forced marched” his 2d Corps northwest, through Thoroughfare Gap, Jackson attacked Pope’s supply line, at Bristoe Station.  Pope would not learn of this until a train, destined for Bristoe Station, would rapidly return to Pope describing the terrible destruction of his supply line.

This news broke John Pope’s lethargy.  He quickly put his Army of Virginia into motion, in an effort to defeat Jackson’s lone 2d Corps.  Using separate roads, Pope’s army quickly pushed north.  US Major General Franz Sigel’s I Corps, and Irvin McDowell’s III Corps, represented the left army wing.  Nathanial Bank’s II Corps would push north on the army’s right flank.  Additionally, US Major Generals Joseph Hooker and Jesse Reno’s divisions, from the Army of the Potomac, would be in the army’s right wing.

As McDowell’s III Corps pushed north, US Brigadier General James Ricketts would detach his division, from McDowell, and push west.  Ricketts’ concern with protecting the Army of Virginia’s left flank, would culminate in a short, but brutal battle, at Thoroughfare Gap, against CS Major General James Longstreet’s 1st Corps division, commanded by CS Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox.  Facing the entire 1st Corps, of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, Ricketts’ division did not stand a chance.  Once he was pushed aside, Robert E. Lee could consolidate his army to fight Pope.  Speed was essential as Lee recognized that Pope could defeat his two wings piecemeal.

Certain that he would find Jackson at Centreville, Virginia, John Pope pushed his army towards the familiar fields near the Bull Run Creek.  Late on August 28, approaching from the west along the Warrenton Turnpike, Irvin McDowell’s III Corps would find Thomas Jackson’s 2d Corps.  Marching east were US Brigadier General John Reynolds’ division of Pennsylvanians, followed by US Brigadier General Rufus King’s division.  Just west of the old battlefield, near Pageland Avenue, Union troops spotted what appeared to be Confederate cavalry, north of the turnpike, scouting their movements.  Soon thereafter, the Rebels disappeared and King’s division started to receive cannon fire from the same ridge.  The battle of Second Manassas had opened.  In what would later been known as the Battle of Brawner’s Farm, US Brigadier Generals John Gibbon, and Abner Doubleday, would engage the entire right flank of Jackson’s 2nd Corps.  These Federal brigades would hold Jackson to a draw, during a battle that would last long past sunset.  Gibbon’s all western brigade, then called the “Black Hat Brigade” (they wore black hats similar to the regular army) would start earning the reputation that would lead to their designation - after the battle of South Mountain – the Iron Brigade.  Absent from the field near Brawner’s Farm was division commander Rufus King, who suffered a seizure, corps commander, Irvin McDowell and army commander, John Pope.  Gibbon, and Doubleday, would fight this battle without any senior command structure.  The Confederacy would temporarily suffer a significant loss when CS Major General Richard Ewell would sustain an injury to his leg, that would require amputation.

When notified of the evening’s fighting, Pope and McDowell were sure that King’s division had fought a detachment of cavalry - and perhaps a small amount of infantry.  They were positive that Jackson’s Corps was in Centreville.  Overnight they would bivouac east of Sudley Road, near the Stone House, and move on Jackson the next day.  What they did not know was that Jackson’s entire Corps was hidden in an abandoned railroad cut, just west of their position.  From there, Jackson would fight much of Sigel’s I Corps, on August 29.  In what would be piecemeal attacks, Sigel would engage Jackson.  After the battle, Jackson would be criticized for not launching a larger attack against Sigel – perhaps collapsing Pope’s right flank, and quickly destroying his scattered Army of Virginia.  The day’s fighting would end with the two armies in essentially the same position as they started in – with the exception that Robert E. Lee had arrived with the rest of his army.  James Longstreet’s 1st Corps was positioned north to south along Chinn Ridge, south of the Warrenton Turnpike.  Late in the afternoon, CSA Brigadier General John Bell Hood would attack John Reynolds’ division, along Chinn Ridge.  Pope was still not convinced that he faced the entire Army of Northern Virginia – he would find out otherwise, the next day.

On August 30, John Pope would send a large force, nearly 10,000 men, against what he now believed was just Jackson’s 2d Corps.  Attacking north of the Warrenton Turnpike, against the railroad cut, Pope would experience some success.  Robert E. Lee, seeing his opportunity to crush John Pope, wheeled James Longstreet’s 1st Corps on its left flank, and like a giant scissors slammed into John Pope’s left flank – a direction Pope was warned to expect attack - but refused to believe a threat existed.  Pope’s entire army, including US Major General Fitz John Porter’s recently arrived V Corps, from the Army of the Potomac, were sent reeling.  The unexpected attack would rout Pope’s Army of Virginia, resulting in another retreat back to Washington DC along the Warrenton Turnpike – the same route that Irvin McDowell’s army took when defeated at First Manassas.

Additional Resources:

Mike’s Photographic Essay on Second Manassas
Second Manassas Battlefield Maps from the Civil War Preservation Trust

Campaign: Second Manassas

Outcome: Confederate Victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 63,000
Confederate: 55,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 13,826 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 8,353 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
With John Pope’s retreat back to Washington City, the Army of Virginia was badly dispirited and disorganized.  This army would be combined with the Army of the Potomac.  Lincoln, once again, would turn to George McClellan to straighten out the army tasked with protecting the nation’s capitol.

Robert E. Lee, in an effort to recruit new troops and move the fighting out of Virginia, would invade Maryland.  McClellan would chase Lee, fighting him at South Mountain on September 14.  On September 17, the two huge armies would again clash, this time near Sharpsburg, Maryland along Antietam Creek.  The fighting at Antietam would be brutal, providing the country its single bloodiest day of battle – a record that still survives today.  Lee would barely escape Antietam.  His primary goal of recruiting soldiers was a failure.  While modern historians consider the Battle of Antietam a draw, Lincoln used the quasi-victory as an occasion to issue his Emancipation Proclamation, altering the war’s objective from reunion of the states to reunion with slavery abolished.

On July 24, 1864, commanding general, Ulysses S. Grant approved US Major General George Gordon Meade’s request to detonate a mine under the Confederate lines at Petersburg.  In his order, Grant stated, “If this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at that point in the enemy’s line we expect to penetrate.  All officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy’s present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through.”(i) 

Centered near Pegram’s Salient (also called Elliott’s Salient for the infantry brigade commanded by Stephen Elliott), the tunnels, and galleries took several weeks to build.  The 48th Pennsylvania was tasked with building the tunnels, adding supports and placing the galleries in the correct places.  Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants, many of the men of the 48th Pennsylvania were miners by trade.  With the mine excavations completed on July 27, Grant ordered the mine to be detonated at 3:30 A.M., on July 30.  Packed with 8,000 pounds of black powder, evenly placed in separate magazines in the galleries, they were connected with wooden troughs half filled with powder.  Common blasting fuses were used to light the explosives, and ran 98 feet to a wall, constructed of logs and sandbags.  This wall was designed to keep the powerful explosion centered under the Rebel line.(ii)

On July 30, Pleasants lit the fuse at 3:15 A.M., after which he walked calmly out of the shaft.  The mine did not explode at 3:30 A.M.  Deciding to give it one hour to detonate, Pleasants asked for volunteers when the mine had not exploded by 4:15 A.M.  Sergeant Henry Reese, and Lieutenant Jacob Douty, both of the 48th Pennsylvania, volunteered to enter the shaft.  Entering the shaft, they found that all three fuses had been extinguished at a splice.  The fuse was repaired, and the men quickly exited the shaft.(iii)

The mine exploded at 4:44 A.M., with devastating results.  US Captain Thomas W. Clark, describing the blast stated, “There flashed out a lily-shaped fountain of dark red and yellow fire, with brown streaks in it.”(iv)  The explosion was strong enough to lift many of the prone Federal soldiers off their bellies in front of the Federal lines.  It created a “crater” in the earth, 30 feet deep, 50 feet wide and 125 feet long that would be described as resembling “a long Irish potato.”(v)  It is estimated that between 275–300 Confederate soldiers were instantly killed in the blast – or buried alive while they slept.

Tasked with leading the infantry charge against Pegram’s Salient was US Brigadier General James H. Ledlie.  Commanding a division in US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps, Ledlie had a less than stellar reputation – having been found drunk during the action at the North Anna River.  Burnside had originally planned on using US Brigadier General Edward Ferrero’s Fourth Division, consisting of United States Colored Troops (USCT), for the attack, but was overruled by Meade.  Burnside’s reasoning was that Ferrero’s division was better rested than his other veteran divisions.  Meade was concerned with how the “green” USCT troops would react under severe pressure on such an important operation.  Grant sustained Meade and the matter was put to rest.(vi)

After an opening salvo of artillery fire, from US Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt’s batteries, Ledlie ordered his troops forward – approximately ten minutes after the blast. His division quickly pushed towards the crater.  Two brigades, commanded by colonels William F. Bartlett and Elisha G. Marshall, streamed into the crater.  Ledlie, not possessing the best communication skills, did not issue clear orders for his brigade commanders resulting in the brigades entering the crater and not pushing to the ultimate target - the high ground beyond the Confederate lines.  Confusion reigned within the crater as the soldiers had no way of scaling the wall on the Confederate side.  Following Ledlie’s brigade were portions of US Brigadier General Robert B. Potter’s Second Division.  These troops, aligned on the right of Ledlie’s division, pushed to the Rebel lines north of the crater.  Due to the confusion of battle, some of US Colonel Simon Griffin’s Second Brigade veered left into the crater – creating additional mayhem.  Following Ledlie and Potter’s division was a portion of US Brigadier General Orlando Willcox’s Third Division.  Forming a second line of battle, Willcox’s first brigade, commanded by US Colonel John Hartranft, entered the crater, further compacting the mass of men, while the remainder of the division pushed to the south of the crater.

Opposing the Federal troops were Confederate troops under the command of CSA Brigadier General Stephen Elliott.  Consisting of men from South Carolina, Elliott’s Brigade included the 17th, 18th, 22d, 23d and the 26th South Carolina infantry regiments.  South of the crater was CSA Colonel J.T. Goode’s brigade of veteran Virginians.  Elliott’s Brigade would receive the thrust of Potter’s Federal division, while Goode’s Brigade would defend against Willcox’s division.  While portions of Elliott’s brigade streamed to the rear, the 49th North Carolina, of CSA Brigadier General M.W. Ransom’s Brigade pushed to the face of the crater.  They quickly began emptying their muskets into the mass of men stuck in the crater.  The action was vividly described by North Carolina infantryman Thomas R. Rouhac, “Our men aimed steadily and true, and as each rifle became too hot to be used another gun was at work by one who took the place of the first, or supplied him rifles that could be handled.”(vii)

Meade, growing impatient with the stagnated fighting ordered Burnside to, “push your men forward at all hazards (white and black) and don’t lose time in making formations, but rush for the crest.”(viii)  Burnside immediately issued orders to all division commanders to push forward.  Meade, not directly witnessing the action in the crater, would become incensed when he learned of the confusion in the crater.  He further ordered Burnside to use troops from the V and XVIII Corps, as necessary. 

On the Confederate side, much of Elliott’s Brigade had scattered in the confusion of the blast, with the remaining troops all that separated Burnside from successfully penetrating the line.  These South Carolinians fought bravely holding back a much larger force.  Elliott, after ordering a charge around 6:00 A.M., was shot as soon as he stepped out of the trench.  Command of the brigade passed to CSA Colonel Fitz W. McMaster, of the 17th South Carolina, who placed the brigade in position north, and south, of the crater.  McMaster’s efforts were greatly augmented by artillery which poured a deadly fire into the crater, and its approaches.

About this time, CSA General Robert E. Lee learned of the action at Pegram’s Salient.  He immediately dispatched his staffer, Colonel Charles Venable, to CSA Brigadier General William Mahone, ordering two of his brigades to support Elliott and Goode.  Federal signal officers quickly noticed this movement and alerted Meade, who believed he might have an opportunity west of the Jerusalem Plank Road.  Ordering US Major General Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps to determine the feasibility of an attack south of Burnside, they quickly determined that it would be impractical.  Burnside was on his own and Mahone’s brigades now made their presence known at the crater.

Communication on the Federal front was terrible.  Meade felt that Burnside was deliberately keeping him uninformed, while Ledlie provided Burnside no communication.  When he sent his division forward, Ledlie quietly retired to a bombproof behind the lines.  Complaining of malarial symptoms, the surgeon of the 27th Michigan provided Ledlie with rum.  When he received orders from a Burnside staffer to send his division to the ridge behind Pegram’s Salient, Ledlie directed the staffer to spread word to his division.(ix)  Ledlie would later be cashiered for being intoxicated during the battle.

By 9:00 A.M. the Federals held roughly 300 yards of the Confederate trenches.  With all of his troops now in the fray, Ferrero’s Fourth Division, composed of the USCT’s troops, were leading the push towards the ridge, and the Jerusalem Plank Road.  With the tangled mass of men in the crater, only the 30th and 43d USCT regiments managed to break through.  Colonel Delavan Bates, of the 30th USCT, urged his men forward, “Remember Fort Pillow!”(x)  Bates, shot in the face, would survive his wound and be awarded the Medal of Honor on June 22, 1891.

Facing Ferrero’s USCT troops were Mahone’s two brigades which he took personal command of.  Leading his old brigade, commanded by Brigadier General David Weisiger, he would send them to support Elliott’s 200 soldiers north of the crater.  Much hand-to-hand combat took place between Weisiger’s Virginians and the US Colored Troops.  After about twenty minutes the Federal troops had been cleared from the captured trenches.  Meanwhile, south of the crater, Hartranft ordered his men back to a portion of Pegram’s Salient that was still intact.  With the arrival of Mahone many of the Federal troops in the crater retreated in disorder for the Union lines.  However, approximate 600 men remained in the crater, many of them black troops.  They would claw their way to the top of the precipice and would either be shot, or clubbed, inevitably rolling back down the face into the soldiers under them.  The men writhing in the bottom of the crater were mercilessly picked off by Mahone’s Confederates, with little means of defending themselves.

By this time, at Federal headquarters, both Grant and Meade had determined to call off the attack.  Between 9:30 and 10:00 A.M. Burnside received two orders to call off his offensive.  Determined to resurrect his plan, Burnside rode to headquarters to plead his case with Meade.  Meade was unmoved, but allowed Burnside to wait until dark to pull his men back.  Upon returning to his headquarters, at Fourteen Gun Battery, Burnside issued ambiguous orders for retreat, leaving the timing up to his division commanders.  Before these orders reached the field, Mahone issued orders to Hall’s Georgia brigade to attack south of the crater.  This proved a dismal failure as the Georgians, under heavy fire from the crater, pushed towards the left, behind Weisiger’s brigade.  Undeterred, Mahone ordered Sanders’ Brigade to attack south of the crater, at 1:00 PM.  While waiting for the arrival of Sanders, the Federal troops received their orders from Burnside.  Determining that it would be too dangerous to retire during daylight, they stayed in the crater.  Sanders attack started at 1:00 P.M., as planned.  They arrived at the edge of the crater, but advanced no further, for fear of falling into the mass of Federals in the hole.  Resorting to throwing their bayonet tipped muskets into the crater, or throwing dirt clods, they were ineffective.  Finally they pushed into the crater.  They immediately started killing the black soldiers – even after many of them had surrendered.  After about thirty minutes, the crater was completely commanded by Sanders’ brigade.  They captured 500 men and three regimental flags.  The debacle at the crater was finally over.(xi)

All told, the Federals suffered 3,800 casualties at the Battle of the Crater – over 500 were killed.  On the Confederate side, losses were approximately 1,500 of which there were 200 killed in action.  Grant clearly made his opinion known, “The effort was a stupendous failure.  It cost us about 4,000 men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault.”(xii)  For the next eight months, the combatants would continue to attempt to outmaneuver each other in front of Petersburg.  Finally, on April 2, 1865, Grant would break Lee’s lines at Petersburg, ending in the surrender of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865.

Earl J. Hess’ scholarly work on Petersburg, “In the Trenches of Petersburg,” was used to research this article.  This is a wonderful analysis of all the actions at Petersburg, during the ten month offensive.  For more information on this book, please read my review on the book by clicking here.  Included is an in-depth interview with Mr. Hess that is very enlightening.

(i) Grant, Ulysses S., Grant Memoirs and Selected Letters, published by The Library of America 1990, Pg. 611.
(ii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pgs. 84–85.
(iii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 90.
(iv) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 90.
(v) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 91.
(vi) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pgs. 87–88.
(vii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 92.
(viii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 93.
(ix) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 97.
(x) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 98.
(xi) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pgs. 98–103.
(xii) Grant, Ulysses S., Grant Memoirs and Selected Letters, published by The Library of America 1990, Pg. 613.

When I recently read about a new book on US Major General Daniel E. Sickles, that Savas Beatie, LLC. was publishing, my interest immediately sparked.  Like many of my readers, I have read a significant amount about Dan Sickles, but only as it pertained to larger battle narratives.  Searching Amazon.com, for titles on Sickles, there were few to choose from.  While there have been a couple of Sickles biographies over the past couple of decades, they are few, and far between.  Since I hadn’t read any of the other biographies, I contacted Sarah Keeney, at Savas Beatie, to request an advanced copy.  While I have about a dozen books, in my queue, awaiting review, I was anxious to get my copy, and start dissecting it.  Written by James “Jim” A. Hessler, a licensed Gettysburg Battlefield guide, it is his first full length book.  Doing a quick Google search on Mr. Hessler, I found several videos of him at one of my favorite blogs – Gettysburg Daily.  After watching these videos, I quickly understood that Jim has an authoritative knowledge base on Sickles, and the Battle of Gettysburg.  Sarah also stated that Jim would be pleased to let me interview him.

Starting the book, I realized that this was not going to be a “Pro Sickles” biography, but a balanced study of his life.  A life, that had its share of controversies: the murder of Philip Barton Key, back-room maneuvering for promotion in the Army of the Potomac, his abandonment of Little Round Top at Gettysburg , his wounding, his efforts to regain command of the III Corps, and his participation in the hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War – the list goes on, and on.  In the first chapter, I came upon a quote from George Templeton Strong, that I believed set the tone for the entire book, “(Sickles belonged) to the filthy sediment of the [law] profession, and lying somewhere in the lower strata.  Perhaps better to say that he’s one of the bigger bubbles of the scum of the profession, swollen and windy, and puffed with a fetid gas.”(i)  OK, so I was hooked.

For the next several chapters, Hessler reeled me in.  He does not spend a great deal of time detailing his early life but jumps right into Sickles activities recruiting what would be the Excelsior Brigade, in chapter two, “The Making of a First Class Soldier.”  Chapters two, and three, deal with his back-room politicking to obtain a brigadier generalship, which was initially not confirmed by the US Senate, his actions in his first battle at Fair Oaks (Seven Pines), his leapfrog style promotion to division command, dissension in the high command of the Army of the Potomac and his command at the Battle of Chancellorsville – a brave, but less than stellar performance where he claimed CSA General Robert E. Lee was retreating, when in fact CSA Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson was making his legendary flank march which would annihilate US Major General Oliver O. Howard’s right flank – which would lead to US Major General Joe Hooker’s terrible defeat.

Chapters four, through twelve, cover his promotion to command of the III Corps (after only fighting in two battles!), his command decisions at Gettysburg and finally his wounding at the Trostle Farm.  These chapters represent the “meat” of the book – his controversial decision to place his corps nearly a mile in front of the Federal line at Gettysburg, in an effort to protect his flank.  In my interview with Mr. Hessler, he offered his learned opinion that this move may have been attributable to Sickles’ concern that his flank would be rolled up, as Howard’s was at Chancellorsville.  The author provides a great amount of detail, in these chapters, about the tactical placement of troops, troop movements and the actual fighting that took place in areas of the Gettysburg battlefield that will forever be burned into our memory: The Wheatfield, The Peach Orchard and Devil’s Den.  This makes for some exciting reading that draws the reader into Sickles’ reasoning, and state-of-mind.  It is very well bolstered by first hand accounts.  As Hessler quickly pointed out, in our interview, he wanted to “get out of the way,” and let the soldiers tell what happened on that fateful day, in early July 1863.  In much of the narrative of the battle, the author provides differing battlefield accounts, that cannot be reconciled, advising the reader to make their own judgments on what actually took place.  This is especially the case with the wounding of Sickles, and the story that has since be perpetuated by historians of Sickles asking for a cigar, and being readily visible to his soldiers as he is carried to the rear.  Again, Hessler provides several firsthand accounts, that cannot easily be reconciled, allowing the reader to decide what is fact, and what may be fiction.

Chapters thirteen, and fourteen, dive into Sickles maneuvering to regain command of the III Corps, or any other position, “….appropriate to my rank and in a position where I can Communicate easily with influential people who will be in Washington this year…”(ii)  This was part of a letter written to Abraham Lincoln regarding the rumor of an opportunity for him to command the garrison protecting Washington City.  As detailed in these chapters, the command would not materialize and he would be pulled into the hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War.

The remaining four chapters cover Sickles postwar efforts to regain his reputation, his efforts to preserve battlefields – especially Gettysburg, his return to Congress and his twilight years.

“Sickles at Gettysburg” provides a fresh, unbiased evaluation of Major General Daniel E. Sickles.  With much new material, and a fluid prose, Hessler has written the definitive work on this controversial figure in American politics, and military history.  I highly recommend this book to any serious student of the American Civil War.  I am confident that you will enjoy reading it as much as I have.

On the morning of July 3, 2009, I had the pleasure to interview Mr. Hessler.  Unlike my other interviews, which have always been done by phone, this interview was recorded live, at the Trostle Farm, where Sickles had his III Corps headquarters, on July 2.  Originally, one of two sites recommend by Jim, the other being the Peach Orchard – both of which Jim states, “…ARE Sickles to me.”  I am pleased that he chose the Trostle Farm, as this is the site of his wounding.  Plus, it set the mood for a wonderful conversation on Dan Sickles.  Listeners will quickly note that horses can be heard throughout the interview, and at times wind can be heard blowing past my digital recorder.  This does not detract from the quality of the recording, but creates a certain ambiance that can be felt by the listener.  I invite you to take time to listen to all twelve parts of the interview. 

Details about “Sickles at Gettysburg”
Written by: James A. Hessler
Hardcover: 432 pages
Publisher: Savas Beatie, LLC.
Date of First Edition: June 29, 2009
ISBN-10: 1932714642

James A. Hessler Interview – 12 Parts
Total Time: 1 hour, 14 minutes, 12 seconds

Part 1: 

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Time: 7:12
Contents:  Welcome | About Jim Hessler | How Jim became interested in the Civil War | Mentors that influenced Jim’s interest in the Civil War | What styles of Civil War authorship Jim likes | Why write about Daniel E. Sickles?

Part 2: 

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Time: 5:56
Contents:  “Sickles at Gettysburg” – fair and balanced | Recruiting the Excelsior Brigade and the use of “political generals” | Sickles’ troops and their loyalty to him

Part 3: 

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Time: 5:21
Contents:  Sickles’ use of political maneuvering | Sickles’ lack of battlefield experience | Leapfrog promotions for Sickles | Sickles’ ability to navigate around adversity

Part 4: 

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Time: 7:11
Contents:  Animosity in the upper command of the Army of the Potomac | Sickles at Chancellorsville | George Gordon Meade’s promotion to command of the Army of the Potomac | Conflicting orders on the approach to Gettysburg

Part 5: 

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Time: 6:17
Contents: III Corps approach to Gettysburg | Sickles and David Birney at Gettysburg | Political infighting within the Army of the Potomac | Firsthand accounts from the ranks | Researching “Sickles at Gettysburg”

Part 6: 

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Time: 5:58
Contents:  Sickles’ decision making at Gettysburg | Confusion with Meade’s commands on troop placements | Henry Hunt’s impact on the positioning of the III Corps | Hunt’s second analysis of Sickles’ position

Part 7: 

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Time: 5:53
Contents:  Birney’s decision to send troops to Plum Run Valley | Lack of troops to effectively hold the III Corps line | Reinforcements from the II and V Corps | Longstreet’s defective tactical attack | Lack of coordinated command structure throughout Sickles’ lines

Part 8: 

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Time: 6:51
Contents:  The ultimate blame is with Dan Sickles | The buck stops with Meade | Sickles’ confusion with Geary’s divisional placement | The salient at the Peach Orchard – was it the primary cause of the III Corps collapse? | Birney’s division placement causes concern for CSA Major General John Bell Hood

Part 9: 

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Time: 6:57
Contents:  Sickles’ wounding and the truth about the “Cigar” | Modern day accounts of Sickles’ wounding – let the reader decide | Sickles chumming with Abraham Lincoln

Part 10: 

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Time: 5:37
Contents:  Did Meade want to court martial Sickles for his performance at Gettysburg? | The Second Battle of Gettysburg | Cemetery Hill – who chose the line? | “The Circus” - the hearing of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War

Part 11: 

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Time: 5:32
Contents:  Sickles’ efforts to preserve Gettysburg and other battlefields | Gettysburg – Sickles’ legacy? | The long-term legacy of Daniel E. Sickles | Hessler’s hope for his book

Part 12: 

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Time: 5:27
Contents:  Will Sickles’ reputation ever be revived? | Hessler’s future plans | Wrap up and closing

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All these Savas Beatie, LLC. titles can be purchased directly from the publisher, by clicking here. 

(i) Hessler, James A., Sickles at Gettysburg: The Controversial General Who Committed Murder, Abandoned Little Round Top, and Declared Himself the Hero of Gettysburg, published by Savas Beatie, LLC. in 2009, Pg 7.
(ii) Hessler, James A., Sickles at Gettysburg: The Controversial General Who Committed Murder, Abandoned Little Round Top, and Declared Himself the Hero of Gettysburg, published by Savas Beatie, LLC. in 2009, Pg 259.