This Mighty Scourge

July 21, 2009 marks the 148th anniversary of the Battle of First Manassas.  Called Bull Run, in the North, for a creek that meanders through the rolling hills of Fairfax County, Virginia, the Battle of First Manassas ignited the American Civil War.  While there had been other battles (Big Bethel and Falling Waters), Bull Run was the first major coordinated battle of the American Civil War.  After the firing on Fort Sumter, on April 12, 1861, US President Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 state militia troops to quell the insurrection of the southern states.  While eleven states had voted for secession, it was Lincoln’s belief that the union was insoluble – a pact that the seceded states could not break.  In other words, the Confederacy was not a sovereign country.

By early July, both sides were anxious for a battle – a battle they both believed would quickly end the hostilities.  The North believed the South would quickly come back into the union, while the South believed they would quickly be recognized as an independent nation.  Lincoln, having appointed US Brigadier General Irvin McDowell to command the Army of Northeastern Virginia, garrisoned at Washington City, ordered his commander to attack the Confederate forces of CSA Brigadier General P.G.T. Beauregard, camped near Manassas Junction.  Lincoln, frustrated with the inactivity of his armed forces, offered advice to his commander, “You are green, it is true, but they are green also.  You are green alike.”(i)  Foreshadowing the tentative nature of future commanders in the eastern theater, McDowell was very concerned about how his soldiers would react in battle.  Pressured by Lincoln, and growing demands from the northern populace, to attack quickly, McDowell left the environs of Washington City and pushed west, on July 16.  His initial plan was to attack the Confederate forces at Bull Run, in a diversionary move, while his primary objective was to move around Beauregard’s right flank, placing a portion of his army between Beauregard and his supply line, to the south.

Typically war planning is done secretly, behind closed doors.  However, in Washington D.C., in July 1861, there were no secrets.  By Friday, July 19, dignitaries, civilians and the Confederate forces knew a battle was brewing.  On Sunday morning, July 21, after changing his tactical plan, McDowell’s five divisions attacked Beauregard’s Confederate forces.  Believing they would witness a grand spectacle, similar to a carnival, many civilians followed the Federal forces in their buggies, many with their picnic baskets packed.  These unfortunate civilians would witness the largest battle, thus far in the United States, and would become part of the first rout of the Civil War.

The following battle narrative is from my other website, BattlefieldPortraits.com.

Battle of First Manassas
(also known as First Bull Run)

Location: Manassas, VA
Dates: July 21, 1861
Union Commander:  Irvin McDowell, Brigadier General
Confederate Commander:  P.G.T. Beauregard, Brig. General
Joseph Johnston, Brig. General

Battle Summary:
After the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the Commonwealth of Virginia promptly pulled out of the Union, bringing the Confederate territory right to the Potomac River – and Washington D.C.  In order to protect the capitol, US General Winfield Scott put Brigadier General Irvin McDowell in charge of the Washington defenses.  While regiments from the northern states arrived in Washington D.C., Irvin McDowell built extensive defensive lines south of the Potomac - on Confederate soil.  Having taken the heights of Arlington and the city of Alexandria, McDowell went to work training his “green” troops.

Further west, at a rail junction near Manassas, Virginia, CSA Brigadier General Pierre G.T. Beauregard, victor of Fort Sumter, started to bring together seven infantry brigades to defend against what was believed to be an inevitable Federal advance on Manassas.  The remaining Confederate defenders were operating in the Shenandoah Valley, under the command of CSA Brigadier General Joseph E. Johnston.

Watching over these troops, in the Shenandoah Valley, were troops under US Major General Robert Patterson.  Patterson’s small army was instructed to demonstrate against Joseph Johnston’s army to prevent them from reinforcing Beauregard’s troops at Manassas Junction – an assignment he would ultimately fail.

By early July, pressure began mounting for McDowell to put his gargantuan army (the largest army on U.S. soil up to that time) in motion against the Confederates – winning what was assumed to be one massive battle, before moving “On to Richmond.”  McDowell, like George B. McClellan after him, wanted more time to train and drill his troops, but the astute Lincoln reminded him that his troops were no “greener” than the rebels at Manassas Junction.

By mid-July, McDowell had reorganized his army of sixty regiments and batteries, into brigades. These brigades were organized into five divisions, commanded by: Brigadier Generals Daniel Tyler and Theodore Runyon and Colonels David Hunter, Samuel Heitzelman and Dixon Miles.  All of McDowell’s division commanders were older than him.

On the Confederate side, Beauregard had organized his army into seven infantry brigades with artillery attached to each brigade.  His commanding lieutenants were: Brigadier Generals Richard S. Ewell, James Longstreet, David R. Jones, Milledge Bonham and Colonels Nathan “Shank” Evans, Philip St. George Cooke and Jubal Early.  On the whole, the rebel commanders had significantly more experience than the Union commanders.

Leaving the Washington D.C. defenses on July 16, McDowell moved to Fairfax Court House, arriving on July 17.  Brigadier General Tyler was sent on July 18 to seize Centreville and probe beyond, to determine rebel placements and strength.  Tyler ended up running into James Longstreet’s troops at Blackburn Ford, which proved a very unproductive recognizance.  McDowell, undeterred, moved his army into Centreville, where he devised his plan of attack.  It called for a two pronged advance, with one division feinting attack at the Stone Bridge, on Warrenton Turnpike, while two divisions hit the rebel left flank, after crossing Sudley Ford, from the north.

Having arrived from the Shenandoah Valley, troops under Joseph Johnston began to pour into the Manassas area.  As Johnston was the senior commander, it was agreed that Beauregard would command the field forces, with Johnston in overall command of the theater.  The troops arriving at Manassas, with Johnston, were under the command of a little known brigadier general, Thomas J. Jackson.  These troops joined troops already at Manassas under the command of Beauregard.

Early on the morning of July 21, McDowell put his plan into motion.  Troops under Daniel Tyler demonstrated against the rebel commander at the Stone Bridge, Nathan Evans.  Evans recognized the movement as a feint.  Leaving a small covering force at the Stone Bridge, he relocated his troops south of Matthews Hill where he expected the Union attack to begin.  His troops, roughly 900 strong, were attacked by close to 6,000 troops – two Federal divisions.  Being vastly outnumbered, Evans was quickly pushed back to another rise that would become famous – Henry House Hill.  Here Evans, and other troops under Beauregard, including a brigade under CSA Brigadier General Barnard Bee, were joined with a brigade of Valley men under Thomas Jackson, having recently arrived from the Shenandoah Valley.  These men faced an immediate artillery threat from a battery of Federal artillery placed adjacent to the Henry house.  While shells and musketry shrieked into the Confederate line, Bee noticed Jackson on his horse, calmly directing his brigade.  At this point, to rally his troops, he uttered the words that would immortalize Jackson in the south, “There is Jackson standing like a stone wall.  Let us determine to die here, and we will conquer.  Follow me.”  Ironically enough, Brigadier General Barnard Bee was killed there.  This rallied the demoralized rebels.

After a one hour pause in the fighting, while the armies prepared for one final assault, massed Confederate artillery knocked out Federal artillery commanded by Captain James B. Ricketts, who would be shot four times and then captured.  While the Union guns were disabled, a fierce infantry fight took place around them.  During the final infantry push, Beauregard’s troops were joined by troops under Jubal Early, Arnold Elzey and J.E.B. Stuart, tipping the balance in favor of the Confederates.  They pushed the Union troops from the field, past wealthy Washington D.C. citizens and politicians who had come out to see the “show.”  With the roads leading east clogged, the retreat turned ugly with many buggies and wagons overturned as the troops tried to get to the safety of the Washington D.C. defenses.

Additional Resources:

Mike’s Photographic Essay on First Manassas
Mike’s article on Second Manassas

Campaign: First Manassas

Outcome: Confederate Victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 35,000
Confederate: 33,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 2,896 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 1,982 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
While the losses were not large, compared to later battles, citizens of the North and South were ill prepared for the long casualty lists.  The country was baptized in fire and realized this war would not be won in one quick battle.  The north realized that the resolve of the south could overshadow their lack of manufacturing and technology.  The south became bold and believed that their armies could defeat any army thrown at them from the north.  In its aftermath, the loss at Bull Run, and subsequent retreat, made Lincoln’s administration realize that the army, soon to be called the Army of the Potomac, needed a professional commander that could bring organization to the battered soldiers.  Fresh off a win against rebel forces, in what now is West Virginia, against his future nemesis Robert E. Lee, Lincoln tapped the “young Napoleon,” George B. McClellan to lead the reformation of his army.  Writing his wife, shortly after his promotion to command the Army of the Potomac, McClellan stated, “…I seem to have become the power of the land.”  While overly confident in his abilities, McClellan did significantly improve the moral of his troops and they came to love him.  However, he will always be known as having what Lincoln called, “the slows.”

In the south, the Confederacy continued to build its army, soon to be called the Army of Northern Virginia.  Joseph Johnston, would command this army, protecting Richmond, until McClellan would be pushed into action, during the spring of 1862, in what would become the Peninsula campaign.  Johnston would be severely injured in this campaign, at Seven Pines, and Robert E. Lee would push McClellan from the “Gates of Richmond” and the peninsula in the Seven Days battles.  By then, it was known throughout the north, and the south, that the war would rage for years.

(i) Eicher, David J., The Longest Night, published by Simon & Schuster, September 2001, Pg. 79.

On April 6, 1862, the largest battle, to that point, of the Civil War was raged at Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee – the Battle of Shiloh.(i)  Today, the battlefield is one of the most pristine battlefields in North America.  Due to its remote location, it has been spared much of the urban sprawl that many other battlefields have endured.  However, it is still at risk and must be protected from nearby development.  Last year, the Civil War Preservation Trust had a campaign for Shiloh, and Fort Donelson.  I encourage you to support the Civil War Preservation Trust so it can continue to protect our sacred battlefields – battlefields on which our ancestors gave their “last full measure of devotion” to protect the rights of our great country.

I have visited Shiloh several times.  It is my favorite battlefield.  When I walk the fields, and woods, of Shiloh I feel very connected to the soldiers who fought there.  I have been there after the sun has set, and when the sun had not risen enough to burn off the early morning fog.  I have many pictures of this great field of battle, on my web site BattlefieldPortraits.com.  I encourage you to visit my site today, its 147^th anniversary, and view the pictures I have taken.  Hopefully, through my photos, you can feel a closer connection to the great battlefield: Shiloh.  The following text is the battle summary, I wrote for my site.

Summary of the Battle of Shiloh

Location: Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee (Hardin County)

Dates: April 6–7, 1862

Commanders:
Federal:  Ulysses S. Grant, Major General
Confederate:  Albert Sidney Johnston, General

In February, 1862, Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant would start an offensive against the Confederate Army of the Tennessee.  On February 6, utilizing Admiral Foote’s powerful river gun boats, Grant would receive the the surrender of the troops garrisoned at Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River.  Moving across the finger of land, between the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, Grant would receive the capitulation of the army garrisoned at Fort Donelson, on February 16.  On the evening of February 15, Grant received a note from the Confederate commander, Brigadier General Simon B. Buckner, asking for terms of surrender.  Grant wrote Buckner, “No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.  I propose to move immediately upon your works.”  With this quick note, Grant would be launched into celebrity.  The north had been looking for a general who could win, and they found him in Ulysses S. Grant.  Grant was promptly promoted to Major General Volunteers for his win at Fort Donelson.

The victories at Forts Henry and Donelson opened two of the most important waterways, in the south, to Union gun boats – and foot soldiers.  The fall of Fort Henry opened the Tennessee River and Fort Donelson opened the Cumberland River, to Nashville.  Having a line several hundred miles long, to defend, starting at Columbus, Kentucky in the west, going through Bowling Green (Johnston’s headquarters) on to the Cumberland Gap, the fall of these two forts was disastrous for Johnston.  His line was severed and untenable.  Johnston would retreat, with his army, from Bowling Green, to Corinth, MS.  Once there, he would unite with “Bishop” Leonidas Polk’s army, retreating from Columbus, KY and that of Pierre G.T. Beauregard, already in Mississippi.

With the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers opened into the deep south,  U.S. Grant did not sit back on his heels.  He had wired Major General Henry W. Halleck, headquartered in St. Louis, and asked permission to continue on to Nashville, and to send Brigadier General Charles F. Smith to Clarksville.  After not hearing anything from Halleck, Grant put his plans in motion.  Unfortunately for Grant a Confederate sympathizer intercepted his dispatches.  Halleck, continued to send repeated telegraphs to Grant, wanting updates on his troop strengths.  Grant was not there to reply.  After returning to his army, from meeting Major General Don Carlos Buell, at Nashville, Grant found he had been removed from command and placed under the command of Brigadier General C.F. Smith.  He was told to wait at Fort Donelson for further orders.  Grant, at the insistence of Lincoln,  was restored to command on March 13, soon after General Charles Smith was injured while getting on a boat in Savannah, TN.

Grant immediately began transporting his army upstream, to Pittsburg Landing, in preparation for an advance on Sidney Johnston’s Confederate Army at Corinth, MS.  His army consisted of the following divisions: First Division commanded by Major General John McClernand, Second Division commanded by Brigadier General W.H.L. Wallace, Third Division commanded by Major General Lew Wallace, Fourth Division commanded by Brigadier General Stephen Hurlbut, Fifth Division commanded by Brigadier General William T. Sherman and the Sixth Division commanded by Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss.  All of these division, with the exception of Lew Wallace’s Third Division were deployed in the vicinity of Pittsburg Landing.  McClernand’s First Division, Sherman’s Fifth Division and Prentiss’ Sixth Division were placed furthest from Pittsburg Landing, commanding the approaches Johnston’s Confederate Army would use – if they were to attack.  W.H.L. Wallace and Hurlbut’s Divisions were closer to the landing.  Lew Wallace’s Fourth Division was camped at Crumps Landing, down river (north) from Pittsburg Landing, along a line Grant feared may be attacked if Johnston moved on him.

Grant made headquarters down river, at Savannah, TN, about eight river miles from Pittsburg Landing.  He was instructed by Henry Halleck to not bring on a general engagement until Major General Don Carlos Buell’s Army of Ohio had arrived, from Nashville.

While U.S. Grant’s troops were camped at Pittsburg Landing, they drilled and marched.  Many troops were “green” and had not “seen the elephant” – a term that meant they had not been battle hardened by direct action. 

Meanwhile, at Corinth, Albert Sidney Johnston was planning to go on the offensive.  General P.G.T. Beauregard was pushing A.S. Johnston to move on Grant’s forces, before Buell’s Army of the Ohio could combine with Grant.  Confederate scouts had located D.C. Buell’s troops and knew they were on the move.  However, there was some confusion about what his destination was.  A.S. Johnston grappled with whether he should begin his offensive immediately or wait for Earl Van Dorn’s Army of the West to arrive from Arkansas.  In late March he determined to attack on April 3.  His army was organized into four corps under the following commanders: Major General Leonidas “Bishop” Polk: First Army Corps; Major General Braxton Bragg: Second Army Corps; Major General William J. Hardee: Third Army Corps and Brigadier General John C. Breckinridge: Reserve Corps.  His battle plan was to turn U.S. Grant’s left flank, getting between him and the Tennessee River and pushing Grant’s army north, into Owl Creek.  The Confederate attack would be in “stacked” order, with Hardee’s Corps going in first, followed by Bragg and Polk.  If necessary, Breckinridge’s Reserve Corps would go in last.

A.S. Johnston’s Army was to have pushed out of Corinth on Thursday, April 3.  They would march the twenty-two miles on April 3 and be ready to attack Grant’s army on Friday, April 4.  The army would primarily use two roads to reach Pittsburg Landing: Ridge Road and Monterey Road.  The army would stop at Mickey’s farmhouse, which is located about 6 miles from the landing.  Due to a mix up on April 3, Leonidas Polk’s Corps were blocking the other corps’ access to Ridge Road.  It took the better part of the morning for the last of the troops to march from Corinth.  The inexperience of the commanders, in moving their Corps, made a Friday attack on Grant impossible.

The armies were in position late Friday afternoon, April 4, so Johnston set Saturday as the day he would attack.  Overnight, on Friday, heavy rains saturated the area.  The troops pushed from camp early on Saturday, but moving an army in these conditions was slow.  It would be close to noon before any of the rebel troops would reach the staging area for the attack on the Federals.  It would be late in the day, on Saturday, before Sidney Johnston would have all of his troops in the deployment area.  Again, an attack was not possible this day.

On the Union side, troops from W.T. Sherman’s Fifth Division and Benjamin Prentiss’s Sixth Division were hearing noises in the distance.  Soldiers on picket duty for both divisions would claim to hear, and see, Confederate troop movements southwest of their camps.  Sherman would discount these reports, out of hand, as being nothing but rebel skirmishers in the woods.  Even after troops under Colonel Buckland fought with advanced rebel troops, Sherman was unconvinced.  He would tell an Ohio lieutenant, reporting to him on Saturday, “Tell Colonel Appler to take his damned regiment to Ohio.  There is no force of the enemy nearer than Corinth.”  Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss was no less skeptical and later in the day, Grant would wire D.C. Buell that the Confederate Army was still in Corinth.

Missouri Colonel (U.S.) Everett Peabody was not so skeptical.  He believed there was reason to be concerned and had his brigade adjutant order troops to sleep with their rifles and cartridges, at hand.  Peabody detailed companies from the 25th Missouri (Major James Powell) and the 12th Michigan (Colonel Francis Quinn) to early morning patrol.  Just after midnight, scouts from the 25th Missouri while on patrol, identified Confederate troops a couple miles from camp.  Powell returned to report this to Peabody, who decided to send Powell with a large enough detachment to determine the rebel strength, and intentions.  This detachment included four Missouri companies and a small detachment from the 12th Michigan.  They started out at approximately 3:00 AM.  Just as the rays of the sun were coming over the eastern horizon, the advanced troops of Powell ran into a group of Alabama soldiers.  They were advanced cavalry scouts of the Confederate Army.  The Union forces under Powell, hastily organized a line of battle and proceeded to move on the retreating rebel horsemen.  In a short distance they would run into the advancing Confederate line, a battalion of Mississippi infantry.  The Battle of Shiloh had started.  The Confederate army would continue to move forward, for the next couple hours, over-running the 5th and 6th Division camps.

Around 7:15 AM, U.S. Grant was sitting down for breakfast, when he heard the distant rumble of cannon.  He knew the battle had started and dictated a quick message for D.C. Buell to send General William “Bull” Nelson’s division up the east bank of the Tennessee, directly opposite Pittsburg Landing.  There they would meet boats to ferry them across.  Hopping on his river boat, the Tigress, Grant steamed south, stopping at Crump’s Landing where he met Major General Lew Wallace, instructing him to proceed with haste to Pittsburg Landing.  After meeting with Wallace, Grant steamed up river (south) to Pittsburg Landing where he was able to assess the situation.  It was not good.

Hardee’s Corps had attacked Peabody’s 6th Division regiment commanded by Major Powell, pushing it back into the division’s camp.  This had caught the Union army by surprise.  Further west, Hardee’s Corps pushed into Sherman’s 5th Division camps, catching his Corps in the middle of breakfast.  CS Brigadier General Patrick Cleburne, a rising star in the army of the south, would lead many of the mixed rebel troops into the 5th Division’s camps.  US Major General John McClernand would send reinforcements to Sherman, in an effort to contain the punishing rebel assault.  Back along the central portion of the Confederate line, General Prentiss would confront Colonel Peabody, “Colonel Peabody, I will hold you personally responsible for bringing on this engagement.”  Peabody replied that he was responsible for all of his official actions.  Both Peabody, and Major Powell would be killed, early in the action, that Sabbath morning in April 1862.

At this point, confusion ruled on both sides of the battle.  The Union troops had been forced out of their camps during breakfast, many ill prepared for battle.  As the Confederates piled into the Union camps they became disorganized, plundering the tents and eating the still simmering breakfasts.  Slowly, General A.S. Johnston would reorganize his battle lines, with Hardee commanding the left, Polk commanding the center and Bragg’s troops manning the right flank.  General Pierre G.T. Beauregard, second in command to Johnston, pushed the left flank into action, slamming into McClernand and Sherman around 11:00 AM.  For the better part of four hours this western sector of the battlefield would witness some of the most brutal fighting in the Civil War.  U.S. Grant’s shattered right would continue to be pushed by the rebels for the rest of the day.

On the other Confederate flank Johnston ordered CS Brigadier General Jones Withers’ division to move north along the Hamburg Road.  With this action, they pushed US. Colonel David Stuart’s brigade northeast, towards Pittsburg Landing, an area that was supported by Brigadier General Stephen Hurlbut’s Fourth Division. 

Around 10:30 AM Grant pushed W.H.L. Wallace’s Second Division into action.  They had pushed down the Corinth Road to an area just north of the “Crossroads” (junction of the Corinth Road and the Hamburg Purdy Road).

Before noon the Confederates had established a solid line extending from the Crossroads in the west, through a low ridge along the Eastern Corinth Road and into the area held by Prentiss, Hurlbut and W.H.L. Wallace, near the junction of the Hamburg Purdy Road and the Hamburg Road.  The extreme right flank of the Confederate line passed through the Hamburg Road and extended towards the Tennessee River.

Grant had stabilized his lines, with the remnants of Sherman’s Fifth Division holding the right flank, followed by portions of McClernand’s First Division.  Next in line would be W.H.L. Wallace’s Second Division, Prentiss’s battered Sixth Division and Hurlbut’s Fourth Division.  The area held by Wallace and Prentiss would become the scene of some of the most intense fighting at Shiloh.  Directly in front of Wallace, and to the right of Prentiss, was the Duncan field.  Directly north of the field was an old farm road that connected the Corinth Road to the Hamburg Road.  Over many years of use the road had sunken slightly lower than the fields.  This road, like one at Antietam, in the east, would forever be known as the “Sunken Road.”  The area in front of the Sunken Road would be dubbed the “Hornet’s Nest,” by the Confederates.   Wallace had deployed Colonel James Tuttle’s First Brigade and Colonel Thomas Sweeny’s Third Brigade to hold this vital section of the Union line.  Sweeny’s brigade would suffer the highest casualty rate of the entire Union army, at Shiloh.

By 2:00 PM, the Confederate troops commanded by Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles started to cross the Duncan field, only to be pushed back in disarray.  This back and forth action continued for a period of time as Ruggles continued to feed his troops in one brigade at a time.

In an effort to make a coordinated attack on the right side of his lines, Albert Sidney Johnston was working near the front of his lines, near the right flank.  Sitting on his horse, he received a wound to his right leg.  While a staff officer asked him about the wound, Johnston did not fuss about it.  Governor Harris, from Tennessee, was with Sidney Johnston at the time and grabbed him as he reeled in his saddle.  Asking the general if he was wounded, Johnston replied quietly, “Yes, and I fear seriously.”  Leading Johnston’s horse a short distance, into a small ravine, they placed Johnston directly on the ground.  They searched his body and could not find a wound.  He has been hit in a major artery on the back of his right leg.  Johnston had a field tourniquet in his pocket that could have been used to save his life, had treatment been started earlier.  Albert Sidney Johnston would be the highest ranking Confederate officer killed during the war.  Couriers discreetly went to find Beauregard, to let him know he now commanded the entire army.

By 4:00 PM, very deliberate fighting was occurring in at the middle of the field, at the Hornet’s Nest.  Ruggles had positioned eleven field batteries to sweep the entire opposing line before sending his infantry in.  Meanwhile both Union flanks were collapsing, leaving W.H.L. Wallace and Benjamin Prentiss’s divisions exposed to being attacked on both flanks.  Wallace would be hit in the head by a minie ball, and Prentiss would be captured.  Wallace was left on the field for dead, but ended up being found alive, the next day.  He would die several days later, with his wife at his bedside, in Savannah, TN.  Many Federal troops would be captured at the Hornet’s Nest, but many would return to Pittsburg Landing to help protect Grant’s final defensive position, along the Pittsburg Road.

Grant would use his chief engineer, Colonel Joseph Webster to deploy his final defensive line along Pittsburg Road.  Webster would deploy 50 large cannon and 25,000 troops along this ridge.  Troops would include a division of D.C. Buell’s Army of the Ohio, under the command of Brigadier General William “Bull” Nelson.  Grant’s line would extend from Pittsburg Landing to the Hamburg-Savannah Road, the route he expected his Fourth Division, commanded by Major General Lew Wallace, to arrive by.  Lew Wallace had been expected by mid-morning but had taken his division down the wrong road.  Grant’s aides, sent for him, caused him to turn around and return the way he came, and come down the Hamburg-Savannah Road.  This took valuable time and his troops would not arrive until 7:00 PM.  Ironically, if Wallace had continued on the first road, he would have hit the Confederate army in the right flank during the afternoon.  This may very well have changed the outcome of the first day’s fighting.

In the day’s final action 6,000 rebel troops stormed up Dill Branch, attempting to overpower the Union left flank, getting between it and the Tennessee (Johnston’s original battle plan).  These troops ran into the big guns Webster had deployed and Nelson’s division.  They would be pushed back before they reached the northern slope of the Dill Branch.

After dark, the Confederates would pull back to the camps around Shiloh Church.  Grant, meanwhile, would continue to fortify his position and deploy the rest of Buell’s arriving Army of the Ohio.  Sherman, meeting Grant offered, “Well, Grant, we’ve had the devil’s own day, haven’t we?”  Grant, confidently replied, “Yes.  Lick ‘em tomorrow, though.”  This was typical Grant.  He operated best when under pressure.  Throughout the night, Grant had his river flotilla pound the Confederate positions with large river guns.  Most of the rebels slept little, although the big guns did not cause a significant amount of casualties.

By 6:00 AM, on Monday, April 7, Grant started his line in motion.  His troops were arrayed, from right to left: Lew Wallace’s Third Division, Sherman’s Fifth Division, and Hurlbut’s Fourth Division, all of the Army of Tennessee.  Next in line were the following Divisions, all of Buell’s Army of the Ohio: Brigadier General Alexander McD. McCook’s Second Division, Brigadier General Thomas Crittenden’s Fifth Division and Nelson’s Fourth Division.  The rebels were caught totally off guard by the well organized advance of close to 30,000 Union troops.  It took P.G.T. Beauregard until 10:00 AM to have his army fully deployed.  The battle all along the line rocked back and forth.  By 12:00 PM they had been pushed out of the ground they had fought so hard for, the day before.  Beauregard continued to hope that Earl Van Dorn would arrive with the Army of the West, however that was not to be.  By 1:00 PM, the Confederate commander had determined he needed to withdraw his army to Corinth.  During this withdrawal John Breckinridge would be in charge of the rear guard.  The battle of Shiloh was over.

Campaign: Shiloh

Outcome: Union victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 65,000
Confederate: 44,700

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 13,047 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 10,699 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
With the northern populace heady over U.S. Grant’s victories at Forts Henry and Donelson, news from Shiloh brought a feeling of gloom over the country.  More troops had been killed in two days of fighting at Shiloh, than had been killed cumulatively in every battle fought in the U.S., to that date.  While the battle was a Union victory, Grant would be highly criticized by the northern press.  There were rumors that he was once again drinking and that the rebels had caught the Army of the Tennessee unprepared.  Congressional leaders would visit Abraham Lincoln demanding that Grant be removed from command.  Lincoln chose to stand loyally by Grant stating, “I can’t spare this man, he fights.”

While Grant was not cashiered for his performance at Shiloh, he was effectively removed from command.  Shortly after the battle, Major General Henry Halleck would arrive at Shiloh to command the next offensive, on Corinth.  Grant was essentially placed second in command, a commander with no army.

The combined armies of the Ohio, and Tennessee, would slowly push into northern Mississippi, building fortifications, and then moving forward a short distance, where they would construct new fortifications.  This would continue all the way to Corinth, where on May 30, the Union troops would find the works, and the city, abandoned.  Shortly after Corinth, on June 10, Grant would be restored to full command.  Halleck would end up being brought to Washington, D.C., as General-In-Chief of all Union Armies, on July 23.

P.G.T. Beauregard’s Army of the Mississippi would be pushed back, from Corinth, south to Tupelo.  Grant’s army would next concentrate on capturing Vicksburg.  This would open the Mississippi to Union craft and would essentially sever the Confederacy in two.  It would, however, take over a year for this to happen.

(i)  The Battle of Shiloh, at BattlefieldPortraits.com, was used to research this article.