So it was with the 121st New York Infantry.  Salvatore G. Cilella’s recent book, “Upton’s Regulars: The 121st New York Infantry in the Civil War,” is the story of the foot soldiers from that famous New York Volunteer regiment.  Breaking new ground, by not just studying the battle history of the 121st, Cilella’s cutting edge book explores the lives of the soldiers, before, during and after the conflict.  Made famous by their second commander, Colonel Emory Upton, the 121st New York was considered unequaled in the proud VI Corps, Army of the Potomac.  Upton drilled the men and earned their trust, respect and loyalty.  On the parade ground they operated with precision, but on the battlefield they earned their laurels by hard fighting.  During the battle of Salem Church, part of the Chancellorsville Campaign, they would be decimated by an ambush engineered by CSA Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox.  At the battle of Rappahannock Station, they would capture over 1,000 Confederate soldiers by storming their bridgehead.  In May 1864, they would arrive at Spotsylvania Court House with an effective strength of 460 soldiers, of all arms.  After Upton’s gallant charge of the Mule Shoe salient, and the fighting at the “Bloody Angle,” they would be reduced to 94 – with only four field officers left unscathed.  They would continue to cement their reputation during US Major General Phil Sheridan’s 1864 Shenandoah Campaign, with solid battlefield performances at Third Winchester, Fisher’s Hill and Cedar Creek.  During the waning months of the war, they would fight in the trenches in front of Petersburg and perform heroically, while being flanked on two sides, at Hatcher’s Run.  Saving one of their best battlefield exploits for the Battle of Sailor’s Creek, they would capture over 1,000 Confederate soldiers, including CSA Major General George Washington Custis (G.W.C.) Lee – son of Robert E. Lee.  Arriving at Appomattox Station, on April 9, 1865, they were prepared to offer battle again – but were spared by Lee’s surrender to Ulysses S. Grant.  While their regimental battle flag proudly carried the names of the battles they fought in, four members of the regiment would earn the Medal of Honor for individual gallantry: Seymour H. Hall, Warren Dockum, Benjamin Gifford and Harris Hawthorne.  All told, 1,800 soldiers served in the 121st, with nearly 740 becoming battlefield casualties, or dying of disease.

“Upton’s Regulars” is a monumental study of these brave fighting men.  Cilella, no stranger to history, is the president and CEO of the Atlanta History Center.  His biography of the 121st New York will take you on a journey with the soldiers.  Beginning with the recruitment of the regiment and taking you through the publication of its regimental history, in 1921, his fast paced book is hard to put down.  I recently had the distinct pleasure of interviewing Mr. Cilella.  The following interview, like all of my author interviews, is divided into parts, so you can listen to it at your leisure.  This is a book that I recommend for any serious student of the Civil War, or anyone interested in what it meant to be foot soldier during the American Civil War.

Details about “Upton’s Regulars”
Written by: Salvatore G. Cilella, Jr.
Hardcover: 586 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: June 11, 2009
ISBN-10: 0700616454

Salvatore G. Cilella, Jr. Interview – 14 Parts
Total Time: 1 hour, 30 minutes, 42 seconds

Part 1: Sal Cilella Interview Part 1
Time: 7:35
Contents: Introductions | Sal’s interest in history and the Civil War | Authors and historians that influenced Sal’s interest in the Civil War | Alan Nolan’s influence on “Upton’s Regulars”

Part 2: Sal Cilella Interview Part 2
Time: 5:57
Contents: Discussion on “Upton’s Regulars” | Why the 121st New York Volunteer Infantry? | Otsego and Herkimer counties and the 121st New York | Recruiting the 121st New York

Part 3: Sal Cilella Interview Part 3
Time: 6:12
Contents: The “three phases” on the Civil War | Lincoln’s call for 300,000 soldiers in 1862 – 50,000 quick recruits can bring the war to an end?

Part 4: Sal Cilella Interview Part 4
Time: 7:39
Contents: The use of bounties to entice new recruits | A “patchwork” of bounties in New York | Mustering in at Camp Schuyler with Colonel Richard Franchot

Part 5: Sal Cilella Interview Part 5
Time: 4:09
Contents: Transferring to Washington, D.C. | The Maryland Campaign – hard marching and disease | Colonel Franchot leading his men shows his limited knowledge of the military arts

Part 6: Sal Cilella Interview Part 6
Time: 5:21
Contents: Franchot’s resignation and the forgotten commander – Charlie Clark | Emory Upton’s promotion to regimental command and his visits to convalescing soldiers | Clark prepares the 121st New York for command by West Pointer, Emory Upton | Cross-training the line officers of the 121st

Part 7: Sal Cilella Interview Part 7
Time: 8:28
Contents: Severe level of disease in the 121st New York during its first year of service | The use of firsthand accounts and primary source material in telling the soldiers’ stories | Researching “Upton’s Regulars”

Part 8: Sal Cilella Interview Part 8
Time: 6:03
Contents: Emory Upton’s drilling and training molds the 121st New York | Caught in a ambush – the 121st and its terrible losses at the Battle of Salem Church and enduring their first large scale engagement

Part 9: Sal Cilella Interview Part 9
Time: 8:20
Contents: Upton’s misstep in recruiting veteran soldiers for the depleted ranks of the 121st | The trying march to Gettysburg | Pursuing Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia | Desertion and the execution of Thomas Jewett | The 5th Maine Infantry – sister regiment of the 121st New York

Part 10: Sal Cilella Interview Part 10
Time: 4:53
Contents: To go into winter camp or not to? | The Battle of Rappahannock Station | Rappahannock Station a defining battle for the 121st New York

Part 11: Sal Cilella Interview Part 11
Time: 4:29
Contents: Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant and the Overland Campaign | Egbert Olcott assumes command of the 121st with Upton’s promotion to brigadier general | The Battle of the Wilderness | Upton’s Charge of the Mule Shoe salient at Spotsylvania Court House | Decimation at the Mule Shoe and the “Bloody Angle”

Part 12: Sal Cilella Interview Part 12
Time: 5:26
Contents: The 121st arrives in Washington to protect against CSA Lt. General Jubal Early’s advance into Maryland | Serving under US Major General Philip Sheridan in the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign | The battle of Cedar Creek and Sheridan’s brilliant counter attack

Part 13: Sal Cilella Interview Part 13
Time: 8:28
Contents: The terrible winter months of 1865 in front of Petersburg, Virginia | The battle of Hatcher’s Run | The collapse of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and the battle of Sailor’s Creek | The decades long controversy of who captured CSA Major General G.W.C. Lee | Harris Hawthorne receives the Medal of Honor – the controversy still smolders | The VI Corps delayed arrival in Washington D.C. after Appomattox Station and suffers through their own “Grand Review”

Part 14: Sal Cilella Interview Part 14
Time: 7:42
Contents: Saving the best for last – post Civil War history of the 121st New York Volunteers | Future projects Mr. Cilella is working on | Wrap up and closing

Other Great Civil War titles from the University Press of Kansas

Details about “Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era”
Written by: Nicole Etcheson
Paperback: 370 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: December 31, 2003
ISBN-10: 0700614923

Details about “Citizen Sherman: A Life of William Tecumseh Sherman”
Written by: Michael Fellman
Paperback: 504 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: July 9, 1995
ISBN-10: 0700608400

Details about “Commanding the Army of the Potomac”
Written by: Stephen R. Taaffe
Hardcover: 284 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: February 23, 2006
ISBN-10: 0700614516

Details about “Guide to the Atlanta Campaign”
Written by: Jay Luvas (editor) and Harold W. Nelson (editor)
Paperback: 383 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: May 7, 2008
ISBN-10: 0700615709

 
Details about “Jefferson Davis, Confederate President”
Written by: Herman Hattaway and Richard E. Beringer
Paperback: 566 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: April 30, 2002
ISBN-10: 0700612939

Details about “Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond”
Written by: Steven H. Newton
Hardcover: 278 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: November 1998
ISBN-10: 0700609210

Details about “Lincoln Seen and Heard”
Written by: Harold Holzer
Hardcover: 226 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: February 2000
ISBN-10: 0700610014

Details about “Stonewall of the West: Patrick Cleburne and the Civil War”
Written by: Craig L. Symonds
Paperback: 328 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: February 28, 1997
ISBN-10: 0700609342

Details about “The Confederacy’s Greatest Cavalryman: Nathan Bedford Forrest”
Written by: Brian Steel Wills
Paperback: 457 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: April 1998
ISBN-10: 0700608850

Details about “The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat”
Written by: Earl J. Hess
Hardcover: 288 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: September 9, 2008
ISBN-10: 0700616071

Details about “The War Within the Union High Command”
Written by: Thomas Joseph Goss
Hardcover: 320 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: August 2003
ISBN-10: 0700612637

 
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The 121st New York Infantry, often called Upton’s Regulars after their second commander, Emory Upton, had been decimated during the Chancellorsville Campaign while fighting in US Major General John Sedgwick’s VI Corps, at Salem Church.  Upton, desiring to fill out his regiment requested all the able bodied three year men he could obtain.  Knowing of the 16th New York Battalion, Upton petitioned VI Corps headquarters for the men.  The men of the 16th were given the option of joining a Massachusetts battery, a Federal battery of the 121st.  Most of the men chose the 121st.  On June 16, 1863, Hall took command of Company F, 121st New York.  While the VI Corps saw little action in the Battle of Gettysburg, they were engaged in the pursuit of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia during his retreat from Gettysburg.  Seeing action during the Bristoe Campaign, from October 9–22, they would find themselves facing the Army of Northern Virginia, on opposite sides of the Rappahannock River, as winter approached. 

Many of the soldiers believed Army of the Potomac commander, US Major General George Gordon Meade, would enter the winter months with no additional fighting.  However, Meade had different ideas.  Believing he could out maneuver Lee along the Rappahannock River line, he determined to push across the river.  During the upcoming battle, Hiram Hall would provide his most valuable service to his country.

Robert E. Lee had constructed a strong bridgehead at Rappahannock Station with two artillery redoubts and connecting trenches, on the north bank.  CSA Major General Jubal Early’s 2d Corps Division manned the works, with the rest of Lee’s army south of the river commanding all the major fords.  He believed that any significant attack, by Meade, would require him to divide his forces.  Lee’s plans proved quite prescient.  On November 6, Meade ordered the I, II and III Corps to cross the Rappahannock River at Kelly’s Ford, while the V and VI Corps would push across at Rappahannock Station.  They were ordered to move on the morning on November 7.  Major General William French would command the left wing, while Sedgwick would command the right wing.  Meade’s tactical plan was to have French’s wing push across the river, at Kelly’s Ford, in an effort to divert Lee’s attention from the main attack by Sedgwick.(ii)  Once across, they would push west to join the rest of the army that had crossed at Rappahannock Station.  From there, the Army of the Potomac would push south towards Brandy Station.

On the morning of November 7, the 121st New York, with the rest of the V and VI Corps pushed south from Warrenton.  Emory Upton was commanding the Second Brigade of US Brigadier General Horatio Wright’s First Division.  With Sedgwick commanding the right wing, Wright commanded the VI Corps and US Brigadier General David Russell commanded the First Division.  Opposing them at Rappahannock Station were two brigades commanded by CSA Brigadier Generals Robert F. Hoke and Harry Hays.  Hays’ Louisianans had earned the moniker, “Louisiana Tigers,” for their fighting prowess.  Both brigades were seasoned veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia.  Once Sedgwick had his forces in place he began to pound Early’s Confederates with artillery.  He maintained this fire throughout the afternoon, causing much consternation, and many casualties at the bridgehead.  Meanwhile, Upton’s brigade, consisting of the 121st New York, 5th Massachusetts, 95th and 96th Pennsylvania were joined by US Colonel Peter Ellmaker’s Third Brigade, consisting of the 6th Maine, 5th Wisconsin, 49th and 119th Pennsylvania.  Commanded by David Russell, they were assigned the unenviable task of carrying the works manned by Hays’ “Louisiana Tigers” and Hoke’s North Carolinians.  With dusk beginning to blanket the field, Russell’s division pushed out of the woods and towards the bridgehead.  Partially protected by the railroad embankment, the division was able to get very close to the fortifications before they were engaged by Hays’ soldiers.  Upton would detach companies B and D, as skirmishers.  They were commanded by Captain John Fish.  Upton was very clear in his orders to Fish, “When the line advances upon your right, you will advance – you will drive the enemy off that crest, you will use your judgment and act as if you had a separate command: but remember one thing – I want my brigade line to get there as soon as any of them.”(iii)  Clinton Beckwith described the action, “We moved forward briskly and soon discovered the Rebel skirmish line.  They waited a good while, an age I thought, before they fired on us, and I knew someone would get hit.  Finally they let go and we started on a run after them, and they skedaddled.  One fellow waited until Jack Marden, one of our boys, got close to him, and then fired and hit Jack.  But the ball, striking something in Jack’s pocket, glanced off.  The Rebel shouted, ‘I surrender,’ but Jack shot and wounded him badly….The artillery in the fort was now firing rapidly and the cannon shots flew over us and went after our fellows who were coming up behind.  The Reb skirmishers kept falling back, but kept up a sharp fire.”(iv)  Soon, Fish and his skirmishers, along with the rest of the 121st New York, were upon the works.

Hiram Hall’s Company F was part of the attacking column.  Upon reaching the Rebel works, he was able to reform his lines.  The fighting became hand-to-hand, with several casualties coming from bayonet wounds.  With darkness quickly covering the battlefield, the action is described in “Upton’s Regulars,” by Salvatore Cilella: “(the Louisiana brigade remained) sanguine and defiant….Upton could see their colors in the gathering night, inscribed with “Cedar Run,” “Manassas Second,” “Winchester,” “Harpers Ferry,” “Sharpsburg,” “Fredericksburg,” “Chancellorsville,” and “Gettysburg.”  Without waiting for Russell for further instructions, Upton sent Capt. Seymour Hall to tell Russell that he had accomplished his mission and had reformed his lines parallel to the rifle pits that were still crawling with rebel soldiers.  He intended to attack again.”(v)  Upton had advised his men, “Boys, or rather Old 121st, I am with you again.  We are going to make a charge, and some of you will fall, but you will all go to heaven.  And I am going with you over the works.”  With that, Hall’s Company F, and the rest of the 121st New York stormed the rifle pits, performing a left face they rolled up the flank of the 6th, 54th and 57th North Carolina regiments.  Many of the Confederates surrendered and the 121st New York was able to capture a regimental flag.  All told, with the 5th Maine at their side, the 121st New York was able to capture seven Confederate flags, 103 officers, 1,300 enlisted men and 1,200 weapons.  One captured Rebel asked how many corps were involved in the attack.  When he was told only two regiments carried out the assault the “mortification” was “extreme.”  After the battle Upton reported, “The success at Rappahannock had a most electrifying effect throughout the army.”(vi)

Hall would continue to lead Company F, 121st New York Infantry, through some of the most bloody battles of the Eastern Theater: The Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, the North Anna and Cold Harbor.  In April 1864, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the 43d United States Colored Troops.  He would lead these men at the Battle of the Crater, Weldon Railroad, Boydton Plank Road, Hatcher’s Run and the Appomattox Campaign.  He would receive a brevet promotion to brigadier general on March 13, 1865.

After the war, Hall would move with his wife, Augusta, to Carrollton, Missouri and finally to Kansas.  She bore him five children: Clarence, Harry, John, Mabel and Augusta.  Seymour H. Hall would die on July 1, 1908 in Kansas City, Kansas and is buried at Oak Hill Cemetery in Lawrence, Kansas.

For his bravery, and gallant leadership, Hall would receive two Medals of Honor on August 17, 1891 – one for his actions at Gaines’s Mill and the other for his heroism at Rappahannock Station.  The official citation reads:

Although wounded at Gaines Mill, Va., he remained on duty and participated in the battle with his company.  At Rappahannock Station, Va., while acting as an aide, rendered gallant and prompt assistance in reforming the regiments inside the enemy works.(vii)

Captain Seymour Hall is a true American HERO.

(i) Cilella, Salvatore G., Upton’s Regulars: The 121^st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 184.
(ii) Cilella, Salvatore G., Upton’s Regulars: The 121^st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 235.
(iii) Cilella, Salvatore G., Upton’s Regulars: The 121^st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 237.
(iv) Best, Isaac O., History of the 121^st New York State Infantry, published by Lieut. Jas. H. Smith in 1921, Pgs. 100–101.
(v) Cilella, Salvatore G., Upton’s Regulars: The 121^st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 240.
(vi) Cilella, Salvatore G., Upton’s Regulars: The 121^st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 243.
(vii) R.J. (Bob) Pfoft, Editor, United States of America’s Medal of Honor Recipients, Fifth Edition, Pg. 883.

Battle of Cold Harbor

Location: Cold Harbor, VA
Dates: May 31, 1864 – June 12, 1864
Union Commander:  Ulysses S. Grant, Lieutenant General
Confederate Commander:  Robert E. Lee, General

Battle Summary:
Earlier in May, Grant stated to the administration, “I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.”  Obviously aware of the mood of the country, during George B. McClellan’s days leading the Potomac, Grant was determined to get ahead of Lee, during the Overland Campaign of 1864.

After tangling with Lee in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Court House, Grant met Lee at the North Anna River.  Grant recognized this as a dangerous place for his army.  After performing a daring retreat, back across the North Anna River, he moved his army south, across the Pamunkey River.  After a serious cavalry engagement at Haw’s Shop, Grant finds Lee at a dusty crossroads village called Cold Harbor.  In the time it took Grant to reach Cold Harbor, Lee, on a shorter line from the North Anna River, had time to build earth works and trenches.  He deemed these necessary as his smaller army was now backed up against Richmond.  Grant believed the field better for a battle and moved his army into position.

Believing he could punch through Lee’s army, deliver a lethal blow, and move into Richmond, Grant attacked Lee on June 1.  Throwing two corps (US Major Generals Horatio Wright’s VI Corps and William F (Baldy) Smith’s XVIII Corps) into Lee’s entrenched lines, Grant had some success late in the afternoon.

With both armies up, on June 2, the line of battle was seven miles long.    The armies had throughly entrenched their positions, creating the most elaborate line of trenches used thus far in the war.

In position, on the morning of June 3, Grant had three corps (Winfield Hancock’s II Corps, “Baldy” Smith’s XVIII Corps and Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps) attack the Army of Northern Virginia.  The Union assault was repulsed along the entire line, causing huge casualty lists.  In his memoirs, Grant stated that the second assault at Cold Harbor was the one decision he made, that he later regretted.

The Army of the Potomac stayed in position for another week, before Grant decided he needed to continue his push around Lee’s right flank.  Once again, Grant was able to pull out of his works and leave, unnoticed by Lee. 

Campaign: Overland

Outcome: Confederate Victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 117,000
Confederate: 60,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 13,000 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 5,000 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
Cold Harbor would mark the end of the Overland Campaign.  Grant would relocate his army south of the James River and settle in for a quasi siege of Petersburg (there were several significant battle beside the siege).  While the siege of Petersburg took place over 10 months, Lee knew his army, and the Confederacy, could not survive a siege south of the James.  While the Union had a huge amount of troops they could feed into the Army of the Potomac, Lee could not replace lost troops. 

For additional reading, please refer to the following articles on the Overland Campaign and Cold Harbor.

1. 2nd Regiment Connecticut Heavy Artillery
2. The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – A New Level of Fighting
3. Battle of the Wilderness – Grant Takes it to Lee

(i) See The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – A New Level of Fighting at The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – A New Level of Fighting.
(ii) Refer to the Overland Campaign at Wikipedia.com.

Battle of Spotsylvania Court House(i)

Location: Spotsylvania County, VA (near Spotsylvania, VA)
Dates: May 8 – 21, 1864
Union Commander:  Ulysses S. Grant, Lieutenant General
Confederate Commander:  Robert E. Lee, General
                                        
Battle Summary:
In early March, 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was called to Washington, D.C.  Congress had recently reinstated the rank of lieutenant general, regular army.  It was widely speculated that Grant would receive promotion to that rank while there.  On March 9, in a formal ceremony, at the White House, Grant received his commission, to Lieutenant General – the first person to hold that rank, since George Washington. 

As Lieutenant General, Grant would be the supreme commander of all U.S. land based forces, the largest force ever commanded – nearly 600,000 men.  Grant went right to work, placing his friend, William T. Sherman, in command of all armies, in the west.  Determining to be near the action, Grant chose to have a remote headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, currently camped in northern Virginia.  Upon arriving at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, Grant met with its commander, Major General George Gordon Meade.  Meade immediately offered to step aside, allowing Grant to place one of his confidants in charge.  After meeting with Meade, Grant determined that it would be better for troop morale to keep Meade in place.  In his first order to Meade, he made things very clear, “Lee’s army will be your objective.  Where he goes, there you will go also.”

Grant’s overall strategy was one of action.  His armies would no longer focus on capturing points, it would focus on annihilating the opposing armies.  Meade would focus on Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, US Major General William T. Sherman would focus on CS General Joseph Johnston’s Army of Tennessee, now in Georgia.  There would be simultaneous assaults, starting when the weather broke, that would keep Lee off balance, and not allow Confederate President Jefferson Davis to redirect forces to other theaters.

On May 5 and 6, 1864, the Army of the Potomac went into action.  Again crossing the Rapidan River, into Spotsylvania County, Meade’s army met Lee for two days of fighting in what would be called the Battle of the Wilderness.  This battle took place on nearly the same ground that one year earlier witnessed the most brilliant victory of Lee’s career.  In May 1863, Lee would divide his army, hitting US Major General Joseph Hooker’s Army of the Potomac, in the flank and rear.  Hooker would suffer a terrible defeat in the Battle of Chancellorsville.  It was Grant’s desire to quickly cross the Rapidan and push through the tangle of the Wilderness, meeting Lee somewhere in the open.  Instead, Lee was one step ahead of him and hit Grant before all of his army was prepared.  The toll on both sides was terrible.  Many of the wounded, that were unable to walk, or crawl, were burned alive from fires created overnight, by artillery shells.  In the end, the battle waged two days, with neither side gaining much ground.

The North, and the South, would soon realize that U.S. Grant was not like the previous generals, in the east.  In the past, when “Bobbie Lee” would attack the eastern troops, the army would retreat across the river to “lick its wounds.”  Grant was determined to press Lee.  On May 7, Grant issued Meade a simple directive, “General:  Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at Spotsylvania Court-House.”  During the early morning hours of May 8, the troops pulled back from their lines at the Wilderness and started marching east.  Many of the troops were sure that Grant, like previous commanders, would retreat north of the Rapidan River.  However, when the army turned south on the Brock Road, many cheers were given up for Grant.  No longer would this army retreat in front of the foe.

The Overland Campaign, as the battles starting with the Wilderness, would be known, would usher in a new age for the fighting troops.  Grant would continue to pound away on his foe, in an unrelenting fashion, for six unremitting weeks.  Civilians on both sides, of the Mason Dixon Line, would be appalled by the blood shed.

Troops from US Major General Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps and Major General John Sedgwick’s VI Corps would arrive near Spotsylvania Court House on May 8.  Upon arriving, they would find portions of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had already arrived and blocked the Brock Road near the Spindle farm.  Fighting would start during the mid-morning, on May 8, and would last through most of the day.  On May 9, troops from US Major General Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps would arrive along with Confederate CS Lieutenant General A.P. Hill’s 3rd Corps.  Hancock would send two divisions, under Major Generals David Birney and Francis Barlow, to aide Warren’s V Corps, placing them on the right flank.  These troops were opposed by one brigade under CS Brigadier General William Mahone and a division under CS Major General Henry Heth.

Earlier in the day, on May 9, the U.S. Army would lose the highest ranking officer, killed in action, during the entire Civil War.  While assisting in placing his troops, Major General, regular army, John Sedgwick was chiding his lieutenants for attempting to “dodge” sharpshooter musketry.  Speaking to his lieutenants, Sedgwick said, “What!  What!  Men dodging this way for single bullets!  What will you do when they open fire along the whole line?  I am ashamed of you.  They couldn’t hit an elephant at this distance.”  At this, Sedgwick laughed, “All right, my man.  Go to your place.”  Then a dull thud was heard, with the general slowly rotating as he fell.  He had been hit by an sharpshooter’s minie ball, below the left eye.  It is said that his lips were curled in a smile as he died, perhaps frozen there, upon death, while bantering with his troops.  Sedgwick would be succeeded by Brigadier General Horatio Wright, who would command the VI Corps for the remainder of the war.

On May 10, Hancock ordered Barlow, and Birney, to disengage, and pull north of the Po River, to assault another section of the rebel line.  Francis Barlow’s division would be viciously attacked by Heth’s division while crossing the Po.  Wright’s VI Corps, and Warren’s V Corps, would unsuccessfully assault Laurel Hill, while further northeast, at a salient that would forever be known as the “Mule Shoe,” Grant would send twelve regiments into a strongly entrenched foe.  While salients were not always the preferred battle line formation, due to being easily enveloped by enfilade fire, Lee’s salient would continue to be a force over the next several days of fighting.

On May 11, Grant would continue to prepare his lines for the next offensive against R.E. Lee.  However, south of Spotsylvania, at a crossroads called Yellow Tavern, the largest cavalry engagement, to that point in the war, was being waged.  Before leaving the Wilderness, Major General Phil Sheridan, commander of the Union Cavalry, had pushed Meade to let him move independently on the Confederate cavalry, commanded by CS Major General J.E.B. Stuart.  Meade was adamant that he needed Sheridan’s force on hand as they moved to Spotsylvania, but Grant overrode Meade and told him to send Sheridan.  Sheridan repulsed Stuart’s cavalry at Yellow Tavern and rode close to Richmond, causing much consternation amongst her citizens.  The largest loss, at Yellow Tavern, was J.E.B. Stuart.  Stuart would die from his wounds, on May 12, and would be grieved in the south, nearly as much as Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, who died, almost to the day, one year before, at Guinea Station, Virginia.  Stuart’s death would usher in a new era of Union cavalry supremacy. 

Grant believed that the weakest point, in Lee’s line, was the apex of the “Mule Shoe.”  His plan called for a simultaneous attack, to be launched early on May 12, against the north and east sides of the salient.  Winfield Hancock’s II Corps would lead the attack on the north face, while the east face would be attacked by the IX Corps, commanded by Major General Ambrose Burnside.  At 4:30 AM, Hancock’s Corps started marching across the fields, in front of the Mule Shoe.  They quickly reached the Mule Shoe, carrying approximately 1/2 mile into the salient, where they captured approximately 3,000 of CS Lieutenant General Richard Ewell’s 2nd Corps, before being repulsed all the way back to the outside of the salient.  Grant would feed additional troops, from Wright’s VI Corps, against the west face of the salient.  This area became known as the “Bloody Angle.”

Meanwhile, Burnside’s IX Corps was late starting and ran into a very strong attack by CS Brigadier General James Lane’s, and CS Colonel David Weisiger’s troops, near Spotsylvania Court House.  Now, instead of a coordinated attack, against two sides of Ewell’s troops, U.S. Grant settled for an all out attack by Hancock’s Corps, and would feed Wright’s VI Corps into the west side, more or less piecemeal.  We are left wondering, 140+ years later, what the outcome would have been, had Burnside’s attack been coordinated with Hancock’s?  Could they have kept the ground that was gained early in the day?  We’ll never know.

The action at the salient was not done.  All along the works, at the Mule Shoe, the II and VI Corps continued to slug it out with Ewell’s troops.  The fighting became hand-to-hand, in many areas, with soldiers firing through the works, at point blank range, into their foe.  In many cases, they would use their empty muskets to club the enemy or would ram their bayonet through the works, into an unseen rebel.  Early the next morning, a II Corps soldier wrote, “The trench on the Rebel side of the works was filled with their dead piled together in every way with their wounded.  The sight was terrible and ghastly.”  The area, near the Bloody Angle, would be so “hot” with musketry, that a 22 inch oak tree would be cut in two.  Its stump now rests in the Smithsonian Institute, and the spot it was felled is prominently marked, on the west face of the Mule Shoe, where New Jersey troops from the VI Corps fought.  In later years, this battle would be compared to the trench warfare used 50 years later, during World War I.

R.E. Lee would be forced to move his lines back to the base of the salient, in the overnight hours, of May 13.  This position would be easier for him to defend.  At dawn on May 13, Wright informed Meade that they were in the salient, and the Confederates had pulled back.

Overnight, on May 14, the Union V and VI Corps pulled out and moved to the east side of the salient, joining with Burnside’s IX Corps.  From this position, Grant would attack Lee’s new position, on May 17. 

In a desperate move, on May 19, Lee would send Ewell’s 2nd Corps on a  reconnaissance mission, to find the Union right flank.  It would be a circuitous route, from the base of the east side of the salient, around the north side, and would end with a bitter engagement with fresh Union troops, under Brigadier General Robert Tyler, at the Harris Farm.  Tyler’s troops were “green,” having just arrived from garrison duty at Washington City.  These troops were artillery men by trade and had been pushed into service, at Spotsylvania, as infantry.  They fought gallantly, losing close to 1,500 casualties, compared to the 900, that Ewell would lose.  This would end the fighting at Spotsylvania.

Campaign: Overland

Outcome: Draw (While Grant did not shatter Lee’s Army, and move onto Richmond, Lee also did not keep Grant bottled up at the Rapidan River line.)

Troop Strengths
Union: 111,000
Confederate: 63,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 18,000 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 9,000+ (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
Once again, after Spotsylvania, Ulysses S. Grant would disengage his army, and move around R.E. Lee’s right flank.  The armies would meet again, a few miles southeast of Spotsylvania, on the North Anna River.  Lee, working on interior lines, would beat Grant there, and entrench south of the North Anna.  Grant would come very close to sacrificing his army at the North Anna River.  If it were not for a masterful disengagement, Grant’s army would have been separated, by the Confederates and the North Anna River, where they could have been beaten separately.  During Spotsylvania, Grant would set the tone for the entire Overland Campaign, when he stated, “I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.”  It would.

In the end, Grant was fighting a battle of numbers.  Grant had a supply of fresh troops to continue replacing his casualties, Lee did not.  After Cold Harbor, Mary Lincoln would call Grant a butcher, a description that would be repeated throughout the rest of the war.  However, Grant did not deserve this characterization.  The numbers do not bear it out.  In a terrific book, by Edward H. Bonekemper III, “A Victor, Not a Butcher,” total Union casualties during the Overland, Petersburg and Appomattox campaigns, were 116,954.  Confederate losses in R.E. Lee’s opposing army, during the same period, were 106,573.  A significantly higher proportion of loss, than Grant suffered.  Bonekemper’s analysis lists total casualties, as a percentage of troops engaged, for each of the primary generals, during the course of the war.  Grant had a significantly lower number, and lower percentage of loss than Lee.  Grant’s total was 15%, while Lee’s was 20%.  Bonekemper’s conclusion is that while the losses were staggering, during Grant’s Overland Campaign, they were acceptable based on the overall situation in the north.  Grant knew he had to be on the offensive.  It was an election year, and in order for Lincoln to be re-elected, against the “Copperheads,” and Peace Democrats, victories would need to happen.

Grant’s strategy worked.  Lee had informed Richmond, that he could not win a war against Grant, if it came to a siege, below Richmond.  This would become Grant’s exact battle plan.  Separate Lee, and Richmond, from their base of supplies in the deep south, and lay siege to their lines.  It would take time, but Grant’s tactical plan would work.  After another masterful disengagement, and flanking move, after Cold Harbor, Lincoln would telegraph Grant, “I begin to see it: you will succeed.  God Bless you all.”

The Overland Campaign would be the opening act for U.S. Grant, that would take him all the way to Appomattox Court House, eleven months later, where he would receive the surrender of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. 

(i) Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, at BattlefieldPortraits.com.

In early May, Grant had the Army of the Potomac camped north of the Rapidan River.  His plan, to be carried out by Meade, was to quickly cross the Rapidan and push through the “Wilderness” before Lee could move in and attack.  The Wilderness was a dense forest of thick brush, mixed with newer growth forest and farm fields.  In May 1863, US Major General Joseph Hooker was thrashed by Lee, during the Battle of Chancellorsville, in the same dense forest.  Grant had that in mind when he planned his battle, not wanting to give Lee an opportunity to strike his army there.

Robert E. Lee had camped his Army of Northern Virginia, during the winter months, west of Chancellorsville.  Anticipating Grant would make a move towards Richmond, Lee sent CS Lieutenant General Richard Ewell’s 2nd Corps, and CS Lieutenant General A.P. Hill’s 3rd Corps, to counter such a move.  Lee knew it was in his best interest to engage Grant in the Wilderness, where his smaller army would have a better chance against the 100,000+ Federal troops.  Additionally, Lee had ordered CS Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s 1st Corps, less CS Major General George Pickett’s Division, to join him west of Chancellorsville.  Unfortunately, by the morning of May 5, Longstreet had not arrived.

Meade had ordered his three corps to cross the Rapidan River, on May 4.  US Major Generals Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps, and John Sedgwick’s VI Corps crossed at Germanna Ford.  US Major General Winfield S. Hancock’s II Corps crossed further east, at Ely’s Ford.  On May 5, the two Confederate corps engaged the Yankee army.  Ewell’s Corps attacked Warren’s troops, battling throughout the day, along the Orange Turnpike.  Later in the afternoon, A.P. Hill’s Corps attacked Hancock’s II Corps, and a portion of Sedgwick’s VI Corps.  Hill would be roughly handled along the Orange Plank Road.  Grant would receive additional reinforcements, with the arrival of US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps.  Grant positioned him between the two wings of the army.  Overnight, on May 5, the two armies held roughly the same positions.  Grant, speaking to reporter Henry Wing, told him to relay to Lincoln, “(Grant) told me I was to tell you, Mr. President, that there would be no turning back.”(iv)

The battle would resume on May 6, with Lee still waiting for Longstreet’s Corps to arrive.  To the north, Ewell would continue to contain Sedgwick and Warren’s corps along the Orange Turnpike.  Further south, along the Plank Road, Hancock’s II Corps aggressively pushed Hill’s 3rd Corps nearly two miles west.  Hill was again suffering large losses.  Lee was in a serious predicament.  He was in jeopardy of being flanked, on his right, and pushed against the Rapidan River.  Fortune would once again shine on Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia when Longstreet’s 1st Corps arrived, around 12:00 noon.  With Hancock’s corps fatigued by six hours of fighting, Hill’s troops would start pushing him back.  Longstreet’s 12,000 troops were sent to the aid of Hill.  Finding an unfinished railroad cut, south of Hill’s flank, Longstreet pushed his corps quickly towards Hancock’s left flank.  There they would slam into Hancock, pushing him back to the intersection of the Plank Road, and Brock Road.  After two terrible days of fighting, both sides were essentially at a stalemate.  While Lee had momentum, and had taken the offensive, he was still badly outnumbered.  Additionally, Lee once again suffered the loss of one of his most trusted lieutenants – James Longstreet – who was seriously wounded by friendly fire.  He would recover several months later, but would leave Lee with a vacuum in his senior leadership.  Grant held a strong position and could continue to battle Lee in the tangle of the Wilderness.

Overnight, on May 6, Grant made preparations to move around the right flank, of Lee, heading south for Spotsylvania Court House.  After fighting for two days in the Wilderness, Grant told Lieutenant Colonel Horace Porter, “I do not hope to gain any decided advantage from fighting in this forest.”(v)  As the Army of the Potomac disengaged from Lee, on May 7, many of the soldiers had resigned to another retreat.  One Federal soldier stated it was not, “another Chancellorsville….another skedaddle…,” as the army turned south, “our spirits rose.”(vi)  However, the carnage was terrific.  Artillery shells set the forest ablaze.  Porter recalled the terror of the battle, “Forest fires raged; ammunition trains exploded; the dead were roasted in the conflagration; the wounded, roused by its hot breath, dragged themselves along, with their torn and mangled limbs, in the mad energy of despair, to escape the ravages of the flames; and every bush seemed hung with shreds of blood stained clothing.”(vii)  Indeed, many wounded soldiers could not escape the slowly advancing flames, and were burned to death.  Some soldiers were able to load and fire their muskets, taking their lives before the flames could do their grizzly work.

In what would become known as the Overland Campaign, the carnage had only begun.  Grant would continue to attempt flanking moves, around Lee’s right flank.  Eventually, he believed he could reach Richmond before Lee.

Statistics for the Battle of the Wilderness(viii)

Combat Strength:
Federal: 115,000
Confederate: 60,000

Casualties:
Federals: 18,000
Confederate: 10,800

Result: Inconclusive

(i) The Battle of the Wilderness, at Wikipedia, was used to research this article.
(ii) Grant’s written order to Meade, April 9, 1864, Grant, Ulysses S., Grant Memoirs and Selected Letters, published by The Library of America 1990, Pg. 482.
(iii) Grant’s written order to Meade, April 9, 1864, Grant, Ulysses S., Grant Memoirs and Selected Letters, published by The Library of America 1990, Pg. 481.
(iv) Bonekemper III, Edward H., A Victor Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant’s Overlooked Military Genius, published by Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2004, Pg. 167.
(v) Rhea, Gordon C., The Battle of the Wilderness: May 5–6, 1864, published by Louisiana State University Press 1994, Pg. 436.
(vi) McPherson, James A., Battle Cry of Freedom, published by Oxford University Press 1988, Pgs. 635–636.
(vii) Rhea, Gordon C., The Battle of the Wilderness: May 5–6, 1864, published by Louisiana State University Press 1994, Pgs. 451–452.
(viii) Kennedy, Frances H., The Civil War Battlefield Guide, Second Edition, published by Houghton Mifflin Company 1998, Pg. 281.