This Mighty Scourge

One hundred forty-six years ago today, US Major General William T. Sherman attacked CSA General Joseph E. Johnston’s well entrenched Army of Tennessee at Kennesaw Mountain.  This battle came after a long string of flanking maneuvers by Sherman, all aimed to uncover the coveted city of Atlanta.  I visited the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park in April 2010.  The battlefield has excellent examples of field works and is wonderful to visit if you are in the Atlanta area.  It is near Marietta, Georgia and is approximately 40 minutes from the airport and 25 minutes from downtown.  To see my Kennesaw Mountain photo essay, on my Flickr site, click on the following link.

Mike’s Photo Essay on Kennesaw National Battlefield Park

If you are interested in visiting Atlanta area battlefields, I also recommend visiting the Pickett’s Mill Battlefield State Historic Site.  It is also north of Atlanta and is one of the better state park battlefields I’ve visited.  I also have a photo essay on this battlefield that can be accessed by clicking in the following link.

Mike’s Photo Essay on Pickett’s Mill Battlefield State Park

The following short narrative on the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain appears on my other website, BattlefieldPortraits.com.

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Battle of Kennesaw Mountain

Location: Kennesaw, Georgia
Dates: June 27, 1864
Union Commander:  William T. Sherman, Major General
Confederate Commander:  Joseph E. Johnston, General

Battle Summary:

For over six weeks Major General William “Tecumseh” Sherman has been maneuvering his army, attempting to outflank Joseph Johnston’s Army of Tennessee.  His goal being Atlanta – the jewel of the south.  He has maintained his proximity to the railroads in an effort to provision his massive army, but had pulled south of the railroad to fight at Dallas, Georgia and at New Hope Church.  Now, in late June, he finds his army hungry - and very near Atlanta.  He has one problem: an entrenched rebel Army of Tennessee at Kennesaw Mountain, near Marietta, Georgia.

Sherman, known for his aggressiveness, decided to send a portion of his army to the right to attack Johnston’s left flank and another portion to the east to hit his right flank.  Meanwhile, the rest of his army would be ready to attack the center when appropriate.  Major General John Schofield would be command the right flank and would lead the charge against Major General John Bell Hood’s Rebels.  Major General James B. McPherson would feint toward the rebel right, held by generals William Loring and Joe Wheeler.  Lastly, Major General George Thomas would command the center, attacking Confederates under generals Patrick Cleburne and Frank Cheatham.

At 8:00 a.m. on the morning of June 27, after an opening cannonade from 200 Federal guns, McPherson’s troops, under the command of generals Francis P. Blair, Grenville Dodge and John Logan moved towards Pigeon Hill and Kennesaw Mountain.  They ran into well entrenched rebel troops and suffered direct and enfilade fire.  Further south, Thomas’ Corps, under divisional command by generals John Newton, Charles Harker, Daniel McCook and Jefferson C.Davis , crossed a creek to the approach of what is now called Cheatham Hill.  There they ran squarely into a blistering fire of musketry from troops under Cleburne and Cheatham.  Running a full hour late, Schofield’s divisions, commanded by Joseph Hooker, Alpheus Williams and Milo Hascall, assaulted troops under the command of John Bell Hood near Kolb’s Farm.

With the exception of Cheatham Hill, the Federal forces were unable to hold any of the ground they fought so desperately to obtain.  The attack ended by 10:45 AM with the Federals retiring to their camps.  Federal troops did remain at Cheatham Hill for five days – a place that will forever be known as the “Dead Angle.”  These troops were within 30 yards of the rebel works and even attempted to tunnel under them.  Today, the Illinois Monument commemorates the struggle of her sons at the “Dead Angle.”  The tunnel entrance remains at the famous monument.

Campaign: Atlanta

Outcome: Confederate Victory

Troop Strengths:
Union: 110,000
Confederate: 65,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 3,000 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 1,000 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:

William T. Sherman learned a hard lesson about attacking an entrenched army on superior ground.  His army could not dislodge Joseph Johnston’s much smaller Army of Tennessee.  While the Battle of Chickamauga is considered the Army of the Tennessee’s “High Water Mark,” Kennesaw Mountain was a glorious victory that was tarnished by Johnston’s continual retreat towards Atlanta.  In the end, the rebels were doomed.  Sherman continued his flanking moves knowing he would eventually uncover Atlanta.  Johnston would be removed from command, with John Bell Hood acceding to overall command of the unlucky Army of Tennessee.  This would be good for the Union cause due to his impetuosity and overly bold moves.  Sherman would take Atlanta in the early part of September and start his “March to the Sea.”  And as he told Grant, “I intend to make Georgia howl” –  and he did just that.

For more information on John Bell Hood’s Atlanta Campaign refer to my essay, “From Atlanta to Spring Hill: John Bell Hood’s 1864 Franklin-Nashville Campaign.”

One hundred forty-seven years ago, while US Major General Joe Hooker was reeling from his thrashing at Chancellorsville, Major General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, was marching through Mississippi.  On this day in the Civil War, Grant issued orders through his aide, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Rawlins, “Corps commanders will immediately commence the work of reducing the enemy by regular approaches.  It is desirable that no more loss of life shall be sustained in the reduction of Vicksburg, and the capture of the Garrison.  Every advantage will be taken of the natural of the ground to gain to gain positions from which to start mines, trenches, or advance batteries…”(i)  And so it became a siege.  After successive victories at Grand Gulf (April 29), Port Gibson (May 1), Raymond (May 12), Jackson (May 14), Champion Hill (May 16) and Big Black River Bridge (May 17) Grant’s army had reached the outskirts of Vicksburg on May 18, 1863.  Always the aggressor, Grant made direct assaults against the heavily entrenched Confederate Army of Mississippi, commanded by CSA Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, on May 19 and 22.  Both attacks would be unsuccessful and would dramatically lengthen the casualty lists.  For the next 41 days the Federal army would lay siege to Pemberton’s defenses probing with infantry – always looking for opportunities to break the Confederate lines.  On July 4, 1863, Grant would receive Pemberton’s unconditional surrender –  an event that would open the Mississippi River to the Gulf of Mexico.

For additional reading refer to the following articles I have published on Vicksburg:

Ulysses S. Grant Attacks Vicksburg

The Father of Waters Again Goes Unvexed to the Sea

(i) Simon, John Y. (editor), The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 8: April 1 –  July 6, 1863, published by Southern Illinois University Press in 1979, Pgs. 267–8.

On this day, one hundred forty-seven hears ago, US Major General Joseph Hooker put his Army of the Potomac in motion.  With flowering trees in full bloom, and spring temperatures warming the days, the 1863 campaign season had opened.  After assuming command of the Army of Potomac, in January 1863, Hooker had implemented many changes to his army.  While in winter camp near Falmouth, Virginia Hooker worked diligently to raise the morale of his men, granting much needed furloughs and instituting badges for each army corps so the soldiers could proudly be identified by their corps.  By March the morale in the Army of the Potomac had been significantly improved.

Hooker’s operational plans for the upcoming campaign were well devised and provided a terrific opportunity for success against CSA General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  Leaving US Major General John Sedgwick’s VI Corps at Fredericksburg, to deceive Lee of his true intentions, Hooker planned to march his remaining six infantry corps northwest of Fredericksburg, crossing the Rappahannock River at U.S. and Ely’s fords.  From there he would push south falling on Lee’s left flank and rear, preventing him from escaping towards Richmond.  Additionally, Hooker sent his cavalry corps, commanded by US Brigadier General George Stoneman, on a long circuitous route around Lee’s army to destroy his communications and provide an additional layer of of support to prevent Lee from escaping south.  According to Civil War scholar, Ernest B. Furgurson, “Hooker had sent most of his cavalry away from the battle; what was left was misused, and ignored when it did show initiative.”(i)  This would prove to be the undoing of Hooker.  While his plan confused Lee to his true intentions, Hooker was operating blindly.  Lee, in perhaps his best performance as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, would split his smaller army not once, but twice, in front of an army that had a two to one numerical advantage.  On May 2 Lee sprung his own trap sending CSA Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s 2d Corps on a long flanking march to fall on the right flank of Hooker’s army.  The surprise was complete, pushing US Major General Oliver O. Howard’s XI Corps more than two miles towards Chancellorsville.  On May 3 Hooker consolidated his position around the Chancellor tavern giving up the high ground held by US Major General Daniel Sickles’ III Corps at Hazel Grove.  This also proved disastrous as Lee’s artillery would use the high ground to pound the Federal position. 

Meanwhile, Hooker had ordered Sedgwick to dislodge CSA Major General Jubal A. Early’s 2d Corps division from Marye’s Heights at Fredericksburg.  While Early’s division was significantly outnumbered, he was able to delay Sedgwick’s advance long enough for CSA Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox to establish a trap at Salem Church, just east of Chancellorsville.  Arrayed in the woods, along the Orange Turnpike, Wilcox would halt Sedgwick’s VI Corps in their tracks as they were marching along the pike.  After the bloody fight at Salem Chuch, Sedgwick, like Hooker, consolidated his corps along the Rappahannock River at Scott’s Ford.  Having left Fredericksburg uncovered, Early marched his division back to his trenches on Marye’s Heights cutting off Sedgwick’s retreat route.  This essentially ended any opportunity Hooker had to defeat Lee.  No longer willing or able to take the offensive Hooker would retreat across the Rappahannock River in the overnight hours of May 5.

Chancellorsville would prove fatal to Hooker’s ambition.  He would be removed from command of the Army of the Potomac in June.  Suffering nearly 14,000 casualties at the Battle of Chancellorsville it be one of the worst defeats the Federal army would suffer in the eastern theater.  Lee’s army was also badly mauled, suffering approximately 10,000 casualties.  However, Lee’s most significant loss was Thomas Jackson.  The great Stonewall would be wounded during the May 2 flank attack.  Scouting between the lines, Jackson would be shot by one of his own soldiers while returning to his lines.  The wound, in itself not fatal, would require the amputation of his left arm.  While recovering, at Guinea Station, Jackson would contract pneumonia and die on May 10, 1863.

For a more complete narrative on the Battle of Chancellorsville, refer to the article I wrote last year: The Battle of Chancellorsville – Joe Hooker’s Legacy.

(i) Furgurson, Ernest B., Chancellorsville 1863: The Souls of the Brave, published by Vintage Civil War Library in 1993, Pg. 161.

Today marks the 146th anniversary of US Major General Joseph Hooker’s Chancellorsville Campaign.  After the terrible losses during the Battle of Fredericksburg, from December 11–15, 1862, the Northern populace was in a state of shock.  US Major General Ambrose Burnside had hurled his juggernaut Army of the Potomac, numbering 115,000, against CS General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  Entrenched above Fredericksburg, on Marye’s Heights, and extending south to Prospect Hill, Lee’s soldiers were well fortified.  Burnside would send wave, after wave, of soldiers against the works.  The Federal army would suffer 12,600 casualties, compared to 5,300 on the Confederate side.  After a failed flanking move, called the “Mud March,” Lincoln had had enough.  Burnside upset with the conduct of his lieutenants, who he felt were conspiring to have him relieved of command, offered Lincoln the choice of his resignation, or relieving the generals plotting for his removal.  Lincoln would choose the former.  On January 25, 1862, “Fighting” Joe Hooker took over command of the Army of the Potomac.  In a letter sent to Hooker, the day after his promotion, Lincoln offered some advice, “I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government need a Dictator.  Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command.  Only those generals who gain successes, can set up dictators.  What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.”(i)  Now to the story of Chancellorsville – Joe Hooker’s legacy.

Battle of Chancellorsville(ii)

Location: Chancellorsville, VA
Dates: April 30 – May 6, 1863
Union Commander:  Joseph Hooker, Major General
Confederate Commander:  Robert E. Lee, General

Battle Summary:
Abraham Lincoln, and the citizens of the United States, were ready for a change.  After a terrible defeat, in front of Marye’s Heights, at the Battle of Fredericksburg, the army was in disarray on the east bank of the Rappahannock River.  Being further demoralized, in mid-January 1863, while searching out CS General Robert E. Lee’s left flank, in what was dubbed the “Mud March,” the Army of the Potomac was a shadow of its former self.  Abraham Lincoln had had enough.  Promptly after the “Mud March,” Lincoln continued his search for a commanding general, that could win battles.  Unlike Irvin McDowell, George McClellan and John Pope, Burnside would continue in corps command, where he performed his best service.  Lincoln tapped First Corps commander, Joe Hooker to lead his army of the Potomac.

Hooker, who had earned the nickname, “Fighting Joe,” after a punctuation error in a newspaper, was known as a brave soldier who commanded respect.  Soldiers under his command, would fight for Hooker, as he would be there at their side.  However, outside of the First Corps, Hooker was not well known.  Hooker exhibited exemplary service, leading the First Corps, at the Corn Field, at Antietam, and the center Grand Division at Fredericksburg.  While Lincoln’s promotion of Hooker was not without reservations, he believed Hooker would exhibit the tempered aggressiveness he needed to get wins, in the east.

Hooker went to work immediately, bringing order, out of chaos.  He drilled his army, provided leave for soldiers, and brought pride back to an army that was demoralized, after the fiasco, in and around, Fredericksburg.  During February, March and early April, Hooker’s plan began to come together.  It called for a move north, along the east bank of the Rappahannock River, past Falmouth .  This move would be made by six of his seven infantry corps (I Corps, II Corps, III Corps, V Corps, XI Corps and XII Corps) and his Cavalry Corps, commanded by US Brigadier General George Stoneman.  His remaining infantry corps (VI Corps), commanded by US Major General John Sedgwick, would remain in the Fredericksburg area, in attempt to keep Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in the ridges behind Fredericksburg.

As March gave way to April, and the roads in northern Virginia firmed up, Hooker put his tactical plans in motion.  His plans called for Stoneman to go upriver, fording the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers, to get behind Lee, cutting his vital supply line: the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad.  Once this was accomplished, he would cross his six infantry corps at Kelly’s Ford, before Lee knew his intentions, and was able to challenge his crossing.  To further confuse Lee, Sedgwick would cross his VI Corps into Fredericksburg, in an effort to keep Lee engaged there, while the rest of Hooker’s Army of the Potomac would fall onto the rear of Lee’s unsuspecting army.

Unfortunately, Lee quickly deduced what Hooker’s plans were.  Sending a portion of his 1st Corps from Fredericksburg, Lee rushed two brigades, commanded by Brigadier Generals Carnot Posey, and William Mahone, to the area of a small crossroads tavern, Chancellorsville.  They were told to hold the Union army at bay, until Hooker’s plans could be better understood.  Lee was in a quandary, he could not leave Fredericksburg unguarded, as the road to Richmond would be wide open to the Federals across the river.  However, he was faced with growing danger to his north.  Fortunately, for Lee, the area near Chancellorsville was heavily wooded, with small scrub oaks, and other dense vegetation.  This gave him the advantage of being able to plan his offensive away from the prying eyes of the quickly gathering Federal force.

Hooker’s flanking forces arrived on west side, of the Rappahannock, on April 30, most having crossed at Germanna, and Ely’s Fords.  There, he deployed his army, with US Major General George Meade’s V Corps, US Major General Darius Couch’s II Corps and US Major General Henry Slocum’s XII Corps all in the vicinity of the Chancellorsville Tavern.  Additionally, US Major General Oliver O. Howard’s XI Corps arrived and was deployed along the Orange Plank Road, west of Chancellorsville.

On May 1, Hooker had fully enveloped the Chancellorsville Inn, and was faced by all of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  With Lee’s army well protected by the Wilderness, the armies tangled during the afternoon, with neither side gaining a significant advantage.  Additional troops had also arrived, for the action on May 1, as US Major General Dan Sickles had brought his III Corps into action, via U.S. Ford.  Having probed forward, toward Fredericksburg, along the Orange Plank Road, Hooker ran into stiffer resistance than he had anticipated, from Lee’s entrenched army.  As the battle sputtered to a standstill, Hooker determined to defend his position, around the Chancellor house, protecting his retreat route at U.S. Ford.

By late day, on May 1, Lee had ordered the last defenders from Fredericksburg – Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s 2nd Corps division, of CS Major General Jubal Early – to join the rest of the army.  Sedgwick’s VI Corps would follow them out the Orange Turnpike, with little or no energy, even after Hooker had ordered him to move with alacrity, pushing Early’s Division into Lee’s rear, now holding the rest of his army, at Chancellorsville.

Late in the evening, Lee would meet with his most trusted subordinate, Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, behind the lines in Chancellorsville.  This would be their last meeting, but the outcome of the meeting would be one of the most daring military moves in history.  Had it failed, Lee would be forever second guessed.  If it were successful, Lee would be able to crush Hooker’s larger force (Hooker held close to a 2:1 advantage at Chancellorsville), destroying it against the banks of the Rappahannock River.  In this late night conference, upon learning of a back road through the Wilderness, Lee determined to split his army, sending Jackson’s Corps on long march around Hooker’s right flank.

As May 2 dawned, Jackson put his corps in motion.  It would be a long route to Hooker’s right flank, which CS Major General J.E.B. Stuart’s Cavalry Corps had determined was “in the air.”  In order to ensure surprise, Jackson stayed well south of the Orange Plank Road, so far that he actually turned south along the Brock Road, heading away from the prying eyes of the Federals.  This caused Hooker to believe that Lee’s army was in the process of retreating, to Richmond. 

With sporadic fighting throughout the day, Hooker determined to maintain his defensive posture in the area of the Chancellor homestead.  Further west, as supper was being prepared, in Howard’s XI Corps camps, the soldiers were relaxing, inevitably talking about the far off rattle of musketry, near Chancellorsville.  As the soldiers rested, around 5:20 PM, some troops noticed deer running towards them, from the thicket of the Wilderness, northwest of their camps.  Within moments, the “Rebel yell” was heard as their camps were stormed by Jackson’s infantry corps.  The resulting panic led to a headlong retreat, towards Hooker’s headquarters near the Chancellor house.  Hooker was able to rally his troops, counter attacking Jackson’s Corps, before darkness fell over the blood soaked fields, of the Wilderness. 

Overnight, Hooker would contract his lines, bringing order, out of disorder. However, it was apparent that Lee had more than answered Hooker’s flanking move, neutralizing a vastly superior force, and was in position to destroy the Federal army, on May 3.

While Hooker was engaged in repairing his damaged lines, Lee suffered the most devastating loss of the entire war.  After pushing the Federal XI Corps, from their camps, “Stonewall” Jackson was reconnoitering his position, between the enemy lines, to make preparations for the final “mop up,” on May 3.  Riding on his trusted horse, “Little Sorrel,” Jackson would be shot, in the left shoulder, by his own troops, as he approached his lines.  Jackson would have his left arm amputated and was expected to recover over the coming months.  However, pneumonia would set in, and Thomas Jackson would die, at Guinea Station,on May 10, 1863.  Lee would later be quoted as saying, “He lost his left arm; but I have lost my right arm.”

On May 3, Robert E Lee further tightened the vice, that Hooker found himself trapped in.  After pushing Sickle’s III Corps,from the heights, near Hazel Grove, Lee’s artillery came to life, bombarding Hooker’s, ever more precarious position, at the Chancellorsville Inn.  With Sickle’s retreat from the Hazel Grove position, CS Major General J.E.B Stuart, commanding Jackson’s 2nd Corps, pushed forward into the ever shrinking Union lines, from the west, while CS Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s 1st Corps pushed them from the east.  The fighting on this day would be some of the most intense of any battle in the eastern theater, of the Civil War.

On May 4, with Stuart’s Corps holding Hooker’s main army at U.S. Ford, Lee turned his attention to US Major General John Sedgwick’s tardy VI Corps.  Sedgwick would be pushed back to Fredericksburg, and was in a similar position as Hooker’s army, just a couple miles away.  His lines formed a “U” shape, backed up against Scott’s Ford – the only escape route.

With very few offensive options, remaining open, Hooker withdrew his forces, on May 5 and 6, closing one of the most disastrous campaigns for the North, during the entire Civil War.

Campaign: Chancellorsville

Outcome: Confederate victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 130,000
Confederate: 60,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 18,000 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 12,800 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
The Battle of Chancellorsville was considered Robert E. Lee’s most spectacular victory.  Lee was able to achieve victory, dividing his much smaller army in two, in front of a very aggressive adversary.  Unfortunately, Lee was never fully able to overcome the loss of his most trusted lieutenant – Stonewall Jackson.  After decimating Hooker, Lee went back on the offensive, pushing north into Pennsylvania, towards a fateful meeting with the next commander of the Union’s Army of the Potomac: US Major General George Gordon Meade.  While this offensive move was designed to alleviate some of the pressure in western theater, where CS Lieutenant General John Pemberton, at Vicksburg, was under a siege by US Major General Ulysses S. Grant.  Gettysburg, and Vicksburg would both be Confederate losses, by July 4.

(i) Sears, Stephen W., Chancellorsville, published by Houghton Mifflin Company 1996, Pgs. 57–58.
(ii) This entire essay is published on my website, BattlefieldPortraits.com.