Within days of CSA General Robert E. Lee’s victory over US Major General John Pope, at the Second Battle of Manassas (Bull Run), Lee would cross his Army of Northern Virginia into Maryland. Lincoln had just placed Major General George B. McClellan in command of the armies at Washington City (Potomac and Virginia). Lee, unable to strike a deadly blow to Pope’s retreating army after the Battle of Chantilly, believed it essential that he maintain the momentum his army achieved after the Seven Days battles and Second Manassas. His plan called for a movement to the Frederick area where he could await the Federals on a field of his own choosing. Unfortunately, US Colonel Dixon S. Miles’ garrison at Harper’s Ferry posed a threat to the rear of his army. Additional Federal troops near Martinsburg, Virginia (present day West Virginia) could sever his supply line – effectively crippling the entire campaign. With roughly 60,000 soldiers in his army, he was severely outnumbered by whatever combined army the U.S. War Department sent to pursue him. Simply put, Lee found himself in a very precarious position.

In an audacious move, believing the Union troops would be slow in pursuit, Lee separated his army sending Major General James Longstreet’s command through Boonsboro to Hagerstown, Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s command to capture Harper’s Ferry and leaving a portion of his cavalry, and Major General Daniel Harvey (D.H.) Hill’s division, to guard the passes in South Mountain, just west of Frederick. Putting his plan in motion, Lee issued Special Order 191 sending copies to Jackson, Longstreet, two division commanders (Lafayette McLaws and D.H. Hill) and cavalry commander, Major General J.E.B. Stuart. The armies were to move at first light on September 10.

McClellan would arrive in Frederick with the Army of the Potomac on September 13. His army would be met with cheers from the largely loyal population of central Maryland. While resting near the Monocacy River, a misplaced copy of Lee’s Special Order 191 would be found wrapped around three cigars by a soldier in the 27th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. Believing it significant, the soldier passed it to his commander where it would make its way to McClellan.

While McClellan would immediately notify President Lincoln of his find, explaining “no time would be lost” in taking advantage of the most important intelligence of the war, it would take time to get his massive army through Frederick. Orders were issued to his senior lieutenants, major generals Ambrose E. Burnside and William B. Franklin, to move with alacrity at first light, September 14. Burnside was to push towards the northernmost gap, Turner’s, on the National Road. He was to clear the gap and push after Longstreet’s command. Mclellan’s orders to Bill Franklin were explicit and detailed, believing his role crucial to rescuing Miles’ garrison at Harper’s Ferry. He was to waste no time pushing through Burkittsville before first light, and using the Gapland Road, force his way through Crampton’s Gap. Once the gap was cleared he was to enter Pleasant Valley and march south toward’s Maryland Heights, relieving Miles. Unfortunately, the timing was not achieved and precious time would be lost reaching the gap.

The Battle of South Mountain was crucial for each army commander. Lee needed to delay any incursion into Pleasant Valley to provide Jackson time to consummate the capture of Harper’s Ferry. If McClellan did not push through the gaps quickly, Harper’s Ferry would eventually fall and any hope of defeating Lee piecemeal would vanish. The fate of both armies hinged on the defense which D.H. Hill could muster at the gaps. Lee’s Maryland Campaign and the future of the Union hung in the balance.

To read my complete essay on the Battle of South Mountain, click HERE.

To listen to a recent interview I had with Dr. Tom Clemens, editor of “The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 1: South Mountain,” click HERE.

To view a short photo essay on South Mountain, click HERE.

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Lee’s orders to his lieutenants, detailing the movement on Harper’s Ferry and the division of his army, would find their way to the commander of the Army of the Potomac, Major General George B. McClellan.  The so called “Lost Orders” represented perhaps the largest security breach of the Civil War.  General Orders 191 would reach McClellan after a soldier found the orders wrapped around three cigars near the Monocacy River.  While the soldier inevitably believed the cigars to be a wonderful discovery, McClellan would be the ultimate beneficiary of the find.  He knew that Jackson’s Wing was separated from CSA Major General James Longstreet’s Wing and that a small force, at South Mountain, was all that stood in his way to a potentially decisive victory against Robert E. Lee.

McClellan issued orders for a two pronged attack against the Confederate forces holding South Mountain on the evening of September 13.  Major General William B. Franklin was to attack Crampton’s Gap at first light on the following morning.  Once he had pushed the Confederate forces aside, he was to push south, down Pleasant Valley, to relieve Miles’ forces at Harper’s Ferry.  Further north, at Fox’s and Turner’s gaps, the IX Corps, commanded by Major General Jesse Reno, and the I Corps, commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker, were to push through D.H. Hill’s Division the same morning.  The Army of the Potomac was slow in moving and would face a much more daunting challenge than McClellan had foreseen.  The delay in the engagement would cost many casualties – including General Reno.  At the end of the day, Franklin held Crampton’s Gap and Major General Ambrose E. Burnside’s wing (I and IX corps) had only a badly mauled force in their front.  After the fighting had ended, Lee recognized that the day had gone against him and ordered his army to reunite at Sharpsburg, Maryland – west of the banks of Antietam Creek.  In the coming days, the opposing forces would meet and fight the largest single day battle, by casualties, in the history of the United States.  While the engagements at South Mountain would pale against the upcoming Battle of Antietam, the results were sanguinary: 4,500 combined casualties.

There has been much written about the deliberate movements of McClellan after the discovery of Lee’s “Lost Orders.”  Most scholars have been critical of how slowly he moved to attack Hill at South Mountain.  However, in a recent interview with Tom Clemens, I learned that McClellan acted appropriately based on the information he had available to him on September 13.  He had no solid intelligence on the size of the forces arrayed against him at South Mountain.  Additionally, Frederick posed a problem for the movement of his large army – creating a 19th Century traffic jam.  It took Lee a couple of days to move his smaller army through the city while it only took McClellan one day.  While criticism can judiciously be piled on McClellan for his failure to act with alacrity on September 15, his movements against South Mountain were handled professionally.

For additional information refer to the following:

Mike’s Interview with Tom Clemens, editor of “The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 1: South Mountain”

Mike’s Photo Essay on Fox’s Gap

John David Hoptak, a National Park Service Ranger at Antietam, brings his terrific knowledge of the Maryland Campaign to his new book, “Our Boys Did Nobly: Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, Soldiers at the Battles of South Mountain and Antietam.”  Hoptak provides a wonderful narrative of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam – many details which I have never read before.  While not a complete narrative of these battles, “Our Boys Did Nobly,” provides many new details from these battles that were gathered during years of research.  Much of the new information is primary source material, from the soldiers, that  has previously been untapped.  Hoptak’s book focuses on the soldiers from Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania who fought in the 48th Pennsylvania, 96th Pennsylvania and two companies of the 50th Pennsylvania Infantry.  By the fall of 1862 most of the soldiers in these regiments had seen active service in the Carolinas and Virginia.  The young men came from farms, coal mines, dry goods stores and colleges.  They would fight bravely and many would pay the ultimate sacrifice, for their beloved Country, at Fox’s Gap, Crampton’s Gap and the fields along Antietam Creek.  The 48th and 50th Pennsylvania would be assigned to US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps and would fight at Fox’s Gap and in Burnside’s attack on the Southern sector of Antietam.  Many of the young men would not muster out until the end of the Civil War, participating the the final Grand Review in May 1865.  The 96th Pennsylvania would fight in US Major General William Franklin’s VI Corps and were severely punished at Crampton’s Gap.  They would muster out of service during US Major General Philip Sheridan’s 1864 Shenandoah Campaign.

For those of you, like me, that have an unquenchable thirst for the Maryland Campaign, this book will be a fascinating page turner, from an expert on Lee’s first invasion of the North.  For novice Civil War enthusiasts, the book is written in such a way that is easy to follow, and understand.  Written in terrific prose, the book is both fun to read and very detailed.  The epilogue provides Hoptak’s report card on the commanding generals and details of McClellan’s missed opportunities.  I would definitely recommend that you purchase this book as it will make an excellent addition to your Civil War library.

I recently had the opportunity to speak with John, who being from Schuylkill County, is very passionate about the soldiers from his home.  Hoptak provides insights into his research, stories of the soldiers during the Maryland Campaign and his assessment of the overall campaign.  As with all of my interviews, I’ve separated it into multiple parts so you can easily listen to them, at your leisure, and come back to the next part when you are ready.

About “Our Boys Did Nobly”
Author: John David Hoptak
Paperback: 358 pages
Distributed by: Ten Roads Publishing, LLC
ISBN-10: 0557088968

John David Hoptak Interview – 10 Parts
Total Time: 54 minutes, 53 seconds

Part 1  John Hoptak Interview Part 1
Time: 4:44
Contents: Welcome and introductions | About John Hoptak | Becoming a Park Ranger at Antietam | Background on “Our Boys Did Nobly” | Distribution by Ten Roads Publishing

Part 2  John Hoptak Interview Part 2
Time: 5:05
Contents: George B. McClellan – delusional while at Antietam? | The changing view of McClellan over 14 decades

Part 3  John Hoptak Interview Part 3
Time: 5:22
Contents: The men of Schuylkill County at South Mountain | Redemption of Colonel Henry Cake

Part 4  John Hoptak Interview Part 4
Time: 5:17
Contents: The 96th loses Captain Lewis Martin and Lt. John Doherty and eight color bearers at Crampton’s Gap | Severe losses of the 96th at Crampton’s Gap | The 48th and 50th Pennsylvania at Fox’s Gap | The loss of US Major General Jesse Reno

Part 5  John Hoptak Interview Part 5
Time: 6:45
Contents: The maturation of the boys from Schuylkill County | South Mountain a tactical Union victory? | Researching “Our Boys Did Nobly” | New primary source material

Part 6  John Hoptak Interview Part 6
Time: 6:59
Contents: The 48th Pennsylvania’s surprise after crossing Burnside Bridge | Ambrose Burnside at Antietam

Part 7  John Hoptak Interview Part 7
Time: 6:29
Contents: Diversion or assault for the IX Corps | Tactical issues involving the IX Corps’ approach to Burnside Bridge | Bravery of the Schuylkill County boys

Part 8  John Hoptak Interview Part 8
Time: 5:52
Contents: The last charge at Antietam | The forgotten sector of Antietam Battlefield | Robert E. Lee: To fight or not to fight?

Part 9  John Hoptak Interview Part 9
Time: 6:05
Contents: Army of Northern Virginia faced destruction at Antietam | George B. McClellan’s lost opportunities

Part 10  John Hoptak Interview Part 10
Time: 2:15
Contents: Future plans and what’s in the works | Wrap up and closing

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