Jan
04
2010
0

2009 In Review – The Top 10 Articles on This Mighty Scourge

Happy 2010!  We have much to look forward to in the coming year.  But let us take a quick look at what happened in 2009.  According to Time magazine, the Top 10 ten news stories of 2009 were:

10. The end of Sri Lanka’s Civil War

9. H1N1 – The Swine Flu

8. Mexico’s Bloody Drug War

7. Pakistan: On the Verge of Breakdown

6. The Death of Michael Jackson

5. Massacre at Fort Hood

4. The Divisive Debate Over Healthcare Reform

3. Iran’s Tumultuous Election and Its Aftermath

2. Afghanistan: Can the U.S. Avoid a Quagmire?

1. America’s Economic Crisis

While most news stories, that would make an annual Top 10 list, are going to involve bloodshed, or death, two of last year’s top stories, at Time magazine, did not: “The Divisive Debate Over Healthcare Reform” and “America’s Economic Crisis.”  Obviously these stories will continue to make news headlines over the coming year.

After reading Time Magazine’s Top 10 list of news stories for 2009, I decided to assemble my own list.  The Top 10 most popular articles on This Mighty Scourge for 2009.  While totally unscientific, it certainly points out which articles my readers liked the most.  As I have done in previous lists, I have left out the articles on the Wilderness Wal-Mart, and other “calls to action,” as they always tend to enjoy a huge spike with little follow-up readership after a couple of days.  My top 10 list for 2009 are articles that have enjoyed consistent readership over long periods during the year.  If you haven’t read all of these articles, they are each hyperlinked so you can do so today.

2009 Top 10 List of Articles on This Mighty Scourge

10. Interview with James A. Hessler, author of “Sickles at Gettysburg” (Click HERE to Read)

9. The Battle of the Crater (Click HERE to Read)

8. Interview with Sally Jenkins & John Stauffer co-authors of “The State of Jones.” (Click HERE to Read) This article has been quite controversial and has been picked up by many news outlets due to the ongoing bickering between Stauffer & Jenkins and Vikki Bynum.

7. Gettysburg National Military Park – A Study in Contrasts (Click HERE to Read)

6. Interview with J. David Petruzzi, author of “The Complete Gettysburg Guide” (Click HERE to Read)

5. Antietam – One Bloody Day in September 1862 (Click HERE to Read)

4. Andersonville Prison – A Photo Essay and History (Click HERE to Read)

3. The Fighting 69th New York Infantry and the Irish Brigade (Click HERE to Read)

2. Interview with Earl J. Hess, author of “In the Trenches at Petersburg” (Click HERE to Read)

1. Interview with Jim Lighthizer, President of the Civil War Preservation Trust (Click HERE to Read)

It should be noted that a few articles had very impressive finishes, reaching the top 10 list over the past couple of weeks.  Obviously articles that were published earlier in the year, had more time to gain readership.  For those of you interested in the articles that round out the top 20, on This Mighty Scourge, continue reading.  It’s interesting to note, that my mid-December article, on the Battle of Fredericksburg, came in at 14.  A very respectable position for only being available for two weeks.

Filling Out the Top 20 at This Mighty Scourge

11. The Battle of Chancellorsville – Joe Hooker’s Legacy (Click HERE to Read)

12. William T. Sherman – US Major General (Click HERE to Read)

13. Second Manassas – Again the Fields Turned Red (Click HERE to Read)

14. Battle of Fredericksburg – Ambrose Burnside’s First Foray (Click HERE to Read)

15. Robert E. Lee, General – CSA (Click HERE to Read)

16. Battle of the Wilderness – Grant Takes it to Lee (Click HERE to Read)

17. Robert E. Lee Surrenders the Army of Northern Virginia (Click HERE to Read)

18. Wilson’s Creek – the Civil War Breaks Out in the West (Click HERE to Read)

19. Interview with Scott L. Mingus, Sr. – Author of “Flames Beyond Gettysburg” (Click HERE to Read)

20. Albert Sidney Johnston – CSA General (Click HERE to Read)

Thank you for making 2009 a successful year at This Mighty Scourge!

Mike Noirot

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Nov
15
2009
0

Seymour H. Hall – Captain Co. F 121st New York Infantry

Seymour Hiram Hall - Captain of Company F 121st New York Volunteer InfantrySeymour “Hiram” Hall was born in Barkersville, New York on September 26, 1835.  Little is known of Hiram’s early life.  With the outbreak of the Civil War, and Abraham Lincoln’s call for 75,000 state militia volunteers on April 15, 1861, Hiram would begin recruiting soldiers for the 27th New York Infantry.  On May 21, 1861 he would be commissioned second lieutenant of Company G and be mustered into Federal service on June 15, 1861 in Elmira, New York.  On April 25, he would be promoted to captain.  He would lead his company at First Bull Run, the Peninsula Campaign, Seven Days, South Mountain, Antietam and Fredericksburg.  The 27th New York would officially muster out of Federal service on May 31, 1863.  The three year soldiers in the 27th would be assigned to the 16th New York Battalion, commanded by Hall.(i)

The 121st New York Infantry, often called Upton’s Regulars after their second commander, Emory Upton, had been decimated during the Chancellorsville Campaign while fighting in US Major General John Sedgwick’s VI Corps, at Salem Church.  Upton, desiring to fill out his regiment requested all the able bodied three year men he could obtain.  Knowing of the 16th New York Battalion, Upton petitioned VI Corps headquarters for the men.  The men of the 16th were given the option of joining a Massachusetts battery, a Federal battery of the 121st.  Most of the men chose the 121st.  On June 16, 1863, Hall took command of Company F, 121st New York.  While the VI Corps saw little action in the Battle of Gettysburg, they were engaged in the pursuit of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia during his retreat from Gettysburg.  Seeing action during the Bristoe Campaign, from October 9–22, they would find themselves facing the Army of Northern Virginia, on opposite sides of the Rappahannock River, as winter approached. 

Many of the soldiers believed Army of the Potomac commander, US Major General George Gordon Meade, would enter the winter months with no additional fighting.  However, Meade had different ideas.  Believing he could out maneuver Lee along the Rappahannock River line, he determined to push across the river.  During the upcoming battle, Hiram Hall would provide his most valuable service to his country.

Robert E. Lee had constructed a strong bridgehead at Rappahannock Station with two artillery redoubts and connecting trenches, on the north bank.  CSA Major General Jubal Early’s 2d Corps Division manned the works, with the rest of Lee’s army south of the river commanding all the major fords.  He believed that any significant attack, by Meade, would require him to divide his forces.  Lee’s plans proved quite prescient.  On November 6, Meade ordered 121st New York Infantry Monument at Gettysburgthe I, II and III Corps to cross the Rappahannock River at Kelly’s Ford, while the V and VI Corps would push across at Rappahannock Station.  They were ordered to move on the morning on November 7.  Major General William French would command the left wing, while Sedgwick would command the right wing.  Meade’s tactical plan was to have French’s wing push across the river, at Kelly’s Ford, in an effort to divert Lee’s attention from the main attack by Sedgwick.(ii)  Once across, they would push west to join the rest of the army that had crossed at Rappahannock Station.  From there, the Army of the Potomac would push south towards Brandy Station.

On the morning of November 7, the 121st New York, with the rest of the V and VI Corps pushed south from Warrenton.  Emory Upton was commanding the Second Brigade of US Brigadier General Horatio Wright’s First Division.  With Sedgwick commanding the right wing, Wright commanded the VI Corps and US Brigadier General David Russell commanded the First Division.  Opposing them at Rappahannock Station were two brigades commanded by CSA Brigadier Generals Robert F. Hoke and Harry Hays.  Hays’ Louisianans had earned the moniker, “Louisiana Tigers,” for their fighting prowess.  Both brigades were seasoned veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia.  Once Sedgwick had his forces in place he began to pound Early’s Confederates with artillery.  He maintained this fire throughout the afternoon, causing much consternation, and many casualties at the bridgehead.  Meanwhile, Upton’s brigade, consisting of the 121st New York, 5th Massachusetts, 95th and 96th Pennsylvania were joined by US Colonel Peter Ellmaker’s Third Brigade, consisting of the 6th Maine, 5th Wisconsin, 49th and 119th Pennsylvania.  Commanded by David Russell, they were assigned the unenviable task of carrying the works manned by Hays’ “Louisiana Tigers” and Hoke’s North Carolinians.  With dusk beginning to blanket the field, Russell’s division pushed out of the woods and towards the bridgehead.  Partially protected by the railroad embankment, the division was able to get very close to the fortifications before they were engaged by Hays’ soldiers.  Upton would detach companies B and D, as skirmishers.  They were commanded by Captain John Fish.  Upton was very clear in his orders to Fish, “When the line advances upon your right, you will advance – you will drive the enemy off that crest, you will use your judgment and act as if you had a separate command: but remember one thing – I want my brigade line to get there as soon as any of them.”(iii)  Clinton Beckwith described the action, “We moved forward briskly and soon discovered the Rebel skirmish line.  They waited a good while, an age I thought, before they fired on us, and I knew someone would get hit.  Finally they let go and we started on a run after them, and they skedaddled.  One fellow waited until Jack Marden, one of our boys, got close to him, and then fired and hit Jack.  But the ball, striking something in Jack’s pocket, glanced off.  The Rebel shouted, ‘I surrender,’ but Jack shot and wounded him badly….The artillery in the fort was now firing rapidly and the cannon shots flew over us and went after our fellows who were coming up behind.  The Reb skirmishers kept falling back, but kept up a sharp fire.”(iv)  Soon, Fish and his skirmishers, along with the rest of the 121st New York, were upon the works.

Hiram Hall’s Company F was part of the attacking column.  Upon reaching the Rebel works, he was able to reform his lines.  The fighting became hand-to-hand, with several casualties coming from bayonet wounds.  With darkness quickly covering the battlefield, the action is described in “Upton’s Regulars,” by Salvatore Cilella: “(the Louisiana brigade remained) sanguine and defiant….Upton could see their colors in the gathering night, inscribed with “Cedar Run,” “Manassas Second,” “Winchester,” “Harpers Ferry,” “Sharpsburg,” “Fredericksburg,” “Chancellorsville,” and “Gettysburg.”  Without waiting for Russell for further instructions, Upton sent Capt. Seymour Hall to tell Russell that he had accomplished his mission and had reformed his lines parallel to the rifle pits that were still crawling with rebel soldiers.  He intended to attack again.”(v)  Upton had advised his men, “Boys, or rather Old 121st, I am with you again.  We are going to make a charge, and some of you will fall, but you will all go to heaven.  And I am going with you over the works.”  With that, Hall’s Company F, and the rest of the 121st New York stormed the rifle pits, performing a left face they rolled up the flank of the 6th, 54th and 57th North Carolina regiments.  Many of the Confederates surrendered and the 121st New York was able to capture a regimental flag.  All told, with the 5th Maine at their side, the 121st New York was able to capture seven Confederate flags, 103 officers, 1,300 enlisted men and 1,200 weapons.  One captured Rebel asked how many corps were involved in the attack.  When he was told only two regiments carried out the assault the “mortification” was “extreme.”  After the battle Upton reported, “The success at Rappahannock had a most electrifying effect throughout the army.”(vi)

Hall would continue to lead Company F, 121st New York Infantry, through some of the most bloody battles of the Eastern Theater: The Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, the North Anna and Cold Harbor.  In April 1864, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the 43d United States Colored Troops.  He would lead these men at the Battle of the Crater, Weldon Railroad, Boydton Plank Road, Hatcher’s Run and the Appomattox Campaign.  He would receive a brevet promotion to brigadier general on March 13, 1865.

After the war, Hall would move with his wife, Augusta, to Carrollton, Missouri and finally to Kansas.  She bore him five children: Clarence, Harry, John, Mabel and Augusta.  Seymour H. Hall would die on July 1, 1908 in Kansas City, Kansas and is buried at Oak Hill Cemetery in Lawrence, Kansas.

For his bravery, and gallant leadership, Hall would receive two Medals of Honor on August 17, 1891 – one for his actions at Gaines’s Mill and the other for his heroism at Rappahannock Station.  The official citation reads:

Although wounded at Gaines Mill, Va., he remained on duty and participated in the battle with his company.  At Rappahannock Station, Va., while acting as an aide, rendered gallant and prompt assistance in reforming the regiments inside the enemy works.(vii)

Captain Seymour Hall is a true American HERO.

(i) Cilella, Salvatore G., Upton’s Regulars: The 121st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 184.
(ii) Cilella, Salvatore G., Upton’s Regulars: The 121st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 235.
(iii) Cilella, Salvatore G., Upton’s Regulars: The 121st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 237.
(iv) Best, Isaac O., History of the 121st New York State Infantry, published by Lieut. Jas. H. Smith in 1921, Pgs. 100–101.
(v) Cilella, Salvatore G., Upton’s Regulars: The 121st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 240.
(vi) Cilella, Salvatore G., Upton’s Regulars: The 121st New York Infantry in the Civil War, published by the University Press of Kansas in 2009, Pg. 243.
(vii) R.J. (Bob) Pfoft, Editor, United States of America’s Medal of Honor Recipients, Fifth Edition, Pg. 883.

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Jul
30
2009
1

The Battle of the Crater

The Crater at Petersburg National BattlefieldOn July 24, 1864, commanding general, Ulysses S. Grant approved US Major General George Gordon Meade’s request to detonate a mine under the Confederate lines at Petersburg.  In his order, Grant stated, “If this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at that point in the enemy’s line we expect to penetrate.  All officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy’s present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through.”(i) 

Centered near Pegram’s Salient (also called Elliott’s Salient for the infantry brigade commanded by Stephen Elliott), the tunnels, and galleries took several weeks to build.  The 48th Pennsylvania was tasked with building the tunnels, adding supports and placing the galleries in the correct places.  Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants, many of the men of the 48th Pennsylvania were miners by trade.  With the mine excavations completed on July 27, Grant ordered the mine to be detonated at 3:30 A.M., on July 30.  Packed with 8,000 pounds of black powder, evenly placed Pleasants' Mine Entrance at Petersburgin separate magazines in the galleries, they were connected with wooden troughs half filled with powder.  Common blasting fuses were used to light the explosives, and ran 98 feet to a wall, constructed of logs and sandbags.  This wall was designed to keep the powerful explosion centered under the Rebel line.(ii)

On July 30, Pleasants lit the fuse at 3:15 A.M., after which he walked calmly out of the shaft.  The mine did not explode at 3:30 A.M.  Deciding to give it one hour to detonate, Pleasants asked for volunteers when the mine had not exploded by 4:15 A.M.  Sergeant Henry Reese, and Lieutenant Jacob Douty, both of the 48th Pennsylvania, volunteered to enter the shaft.  Entering the shaft, they found that all three fuses had been extinguished at a splice.  The fuse was repaired, and the men quickly exited the shaft.(iii)

The mine exploded at 4:44 A.M., with devastating results.  US Captain Thomas W. Clark, describing the blast stated, “There flashed out a lily-shaped fountain of dark red and yellow fire, with brown streaks in it.”(iv)  The explosion was strong enough to lift many of the prone Federal soldiers off their bellies in front of the Federal lines.  It created a “crater” in the earth, 30 feet deep, 50 feet wide and 125 feet long that would be described as resembling “a long Irish potato.”(v)  It is estimated that between 275–300 Confederate soldiers were instantly killed in the blast – or buried alive while they slept.

Ambrose BurnsideTasked with leading the infantry charge against Pegram’s Salient was US Brigadier General James H. Ledlie.  Commanding a division in US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps, Ledlie had a less than stellar reputation – having been found drunk during the action at the North Anna River.  Burnside had originally planned on using US Brigadier General Edward Ferrero’s Fourth Division, consisting of United States Colored Troops (USCT), for the attack, but was overruled by Meade.  Burnside’s reasoning was that Ferrero’s division was better rested than his other veteran divisions.  Meade was concerned with how the “green” USCT troops would react under severe pressure on such an important operation.  Grant sustained Meade and the matter was put to rest.(vi)

After an opening salvo of artillery fire, from US Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt’s batteries, Ledlie ordered his troops forward – approximately ten minutes after the blast. His division quickly pushed towards the crater.  Two brigades, commanded by colonels William F. Bartlett and Elisha G. Marshall, streamed into the crater.  Ledlie, not possessing the best communication skills, did not issue clear orders for his brigade commanders resulting in the brigades entering the crater and not pushing to the ultimate target - the high ground beyond the Confederate lines.  Confusion reigned within the crater as the soldiers had no way of scaling the wall on the Confederate side.  Following Ledlie’s brigade were portions of US Brigadier General Robert B. Potter’s Second Division.  These troops, aligned on the right of Ledlie’s division, pushed to the Rebel lines north of the crater.  Due to the confusion of battle, some of US Colonel Simon Griffin’s Second Brigade veered left into the crater – creating additional mayhem.  Following Ledlie and Potter’s division was a portion of US Brigadier General Orlando Willcox’s Third Division.  Forming a second line of battle, Willcox’s first brigade, commanded by US Colonel John Hartranft, entered the crater, further compacting the mass of men, while the remainder of the division pushed to the south of the crater.

Opposing the Federal troops were Confederate troops under the command of CSA Brigadier General Stephen Elliott.  Consisting of men from South Carolina, Elliott’s Brigade included the 17th, 18th, 22d, 23d and the 26th South Carolina infantry regiments.  South of the crater was CSA Colonel J.T. Goode’s brigade of veteran Virginians.  Elliott’s Brigade would receive the thrust of Potter’s Federal division, while Goode’s Brigade would defend against Willcox’s Confederate fortifications behind the Craterdivision.  While portions of Elliott’s brigade streamed to the rear, the 49th North Carolina, of CSA Brigadier General M.W. Ransom’s Brigade pushed to the face of the crater.  They quickly began emptying their muskets into the mass of men stuck in the crater.  The action was vividly described by North Carolina infantryman Thomas R. Rouhac, “Our men aimed steadily and true, and as each rifle became too hot to be used another gun was at work by one who took the place of the first, or supplied him rifles that could be handled.”(vii)

Meade, growing impatient with the stagnated fighting ordered Burnside to, “push your men forward at all hazards (white and black) and don’t lose time in making formations, but rush for the crest.”(viii)  Burnside immediately issued orders to all division commanders to push forward.  Meade, not directly witnessing the action in the crater, would become incensed when he learned of the confusion in the crater.  He further ordered Burnside to use troops from the V and XVIII Corps, as necessary. 

On the Confederate side, much of Elliott’s Brigade had scattered in the confusion of the blast, with the remaining troops all that separated Burnside from successfully penetrating the line.  These South Carolinians fought bravely holding back a much larger force.  Elliott, after ordering a charge around 6:00 A.M., was shot as soon as he stepped out of the trench.  Command of the brigade passed to CSA Colonel Fitz W. McMaster, of the 17th South Carolina, who placed the brigade in position north, and south, of the crater.  McMaster’s efforts were greatly augmented by artillery which poured a deadly fire into the crater, and its approaches.

William MahoneAbout this time, CSA General Robert E. Lee learned of the action at Pegram’s Salient.  He immediately dispatched his staffer, Colonel Charles Venable, to CSA Brigadier General William Mahone, ordering two of his brigades to support Elliott and Goode.  Federal signal officers quickly noticed this movement and alerted Meade, who believed he might have an opportunity west of the Jerusalem Plank Road.  Ordering US Major General Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps to determine the feasibility of an attack south of Burnside, they quickly determined that it would be impractical.  Burnside was on his own and Mahone’s brigades now made their presence known at the crater.

Communication on the Federal front was terrible.  Meade felt that Burnside was deliberately keeping him uninformed, while Ledlie provided Burnside no communication.  When he sent his division forward, Ledlie quietly retired to a bombproof behind the lines.  Complaining of malarial symptoms, the surgeon of the 27th Michigan provided Ledlie with rum.  When he received orders from a Burnside staffer to send his division to the ridge behind Pegram’s Salient, Ledlie directed the staffer to spread word to his division.(ix)  Ledlie would later be cashiered for being intoxicated during the battle.

By 9:00 A.M. the Federals held roughly 300 yards of the Confederate trenches.  With all of his troops now in the fray, Ferrero’s Fourth Division, composed of the USCT’s troops, were leading the push towards the ridge, and the Jerusalem Plank Road.  With the tangled mass of men in the crater, only the 30th and 43d USCT regiments managed to break through.  Colonel Delavan Bates, of the 30th USCT, urged his men forward, “Remember Fort Pillow!”(x)  Bates, shot in the face, would survive his wound and be awarded the Medal of Honor on June 22, 1891.

Facing Ferrero’s USCT troops were Mahone’s two brigades which he took personal command of.  Leading his old brigade, commanded by Brigadier General David Weisiger, he would send them to support Elliott’s 200 soldiers north of the crater.  Much hand-to-hand combat took place between Weisiger’s Virginians and the US Colored Troops.  After about twenty minutes the Federal troops had been cleared from the captured trenches.  Meanwhile, south of the crater, Hartranft ordered his men back to a portion of Pegram’s Salient that was still intact.  With the arrival of Mahone many of the Federal troops in the crater retreated in disorder for the Union lines.  However, approximate 600 men remained in the crater, many of them black troops.  They would claw their way to the top of the precipice and would either be shot, or clubbed, inevitably rolling back down the face into the soldiers under them.  The men writhing in the bottom of the crater were mercilessly picked off by Mahone’s Confederates, with little means of defending themselves.

By this time, at Federal headquarters, both Grant and Meade had determined to call off the attack.  Between 9:30 and 10:00 A.M. Burnside received two orders to call off his offensive.  Determined to resurrect his plan, Burnside rode to headquarters to plead his case with Meade.  Meade Mahone monument at the Craterwas unmoved, but allowed Burnside to wait until dark to pull his men back.  Upon returning to his headquarters, at Fourteen Gun Battery, Burnside issued ambiguous orders for retreat, leaving the timing up to his division commanders.  Before these orders reached the field, Mahone issued orders to Hall’s Georgia brigade to attack south of the crater.  This proved a dismal failure as the Georgians, under heavy fire from the crater, pushed towards the left, behind Weisiger’s brigade.  Undeterred, Mahone ordered Sanders’ Brigade to attack south of the crater, at 1:00 PM.  While waiting for the arrival of Sanders, the Federal troops received their orders from Burnside.  Determining that it would be too dangerous to retire during daylight, they stayed in the crater.  Sanders attack started at 1:00 P.M., as planned.  They arrived at the edge of the crater, but advanced no further, for fear of falling into the mass of Federals in the hole.  Resorting to throwing their bayonet tipped muskets into the crater, or throwing dirt clods, they were ineffective.  Finally they pushed into the crater.  They immediately started killing the black soldiers – even after many of them had surrendered.  After about thirty minutes, the crater was completely commanded by Sanders’ brigade.  They captured 500 men and three regimental flags.  The debacle at the crater was finally over.(xi)

All told, the Federals suffered 3,800 casualties at the Battle of the Crater – over 500 were killed.  On the Confederate side, losses were approximately 1,500 of which there were 200 killed in action.  Grant clearly made his opinion known, “The effort was a stupendous failure.  It cost us about 4,000 men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault.”(xii)  For the next eight months, the combatants would continue to attempt to outmaneuver each other in front of Petersburg.  Finally, on April 2, 1865, Grant would break Lee’s lines at Petersburg, ending in the surrender of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865.

Earl J. Hess’ scholarly work on Petersburg, “In the Trenches of Petersburg,” was used to research this article.  This is a wonderful analysis of all the actions at Petersburg, during the ten month offensive.  For more information on this book, please read my review on the book by clicking here.  Included is an in-depth interview with Mr. Hess that is very enlightening.

(i) Grant, Ulysses S., Grant Memoirs and Selected Letters, published by The Library of America 1990, Pg. 611.
(ii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pgs. 84–85.
(iii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 90.
(iv) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 90.
(v) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 91.
(vi) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pgs. 87–88.
(vii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 92.
(viii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 93.
(ix) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 97.
(x) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 98.
(xi) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pgs. 98–103.
(xii) Grant, Ulysses S., Grant Memoirs and Selected Letters, published by The Library of America 1990, Pg. 613.

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