Union Casualties = 2,700 (507 killed, 1,876 wounded, 208 missing/captured)

Confederate Casualties = 13,800 (327 killed, 1,126 wounded, 12,392 missing/captured)

The Federal killed and wounded was significantly higher than the Confederate numbers because they were required to attack prepared fortifications – most of which were uphill. Federal gunboats were also seriously damaged, with many sailors killed and wounded, by the heavy sea based artillery crowning the river side of the fort.

As mentioned earlier, Grant, earned notoriety, north and south, after the battle. Early on the morning of February 16, Buckner would send Grant a letter seeking an armistice in hostilities while a surrender was negotiated. Ironically enough, Grant and Buckner were old friends from their days in the Regular Army. Grant wasted no time sending his reply, “Yours of this date proposing Armistice, and appointment of Commissioners, to settle terms of Capitulation is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.” While Buckner considered Grant’s demands ungracious, he was forced to meet Grant at the Dover Hotel where he would formally surrender his forces. Grant would go on to capture two more armies during the Civil War – the only general on either side to do so.

For more information on the battles of forts Henry and Donelson, check out the following articles I have previously published:

Fort Henry is Surrendered – February 6, 1862

Fort Donelson Surrenders – February 16, 1862

Fort Donelson – 149th Anniversary of its Surrender

You can also view my photo essays on the Battle of Fort Donelson by clicking HERE.

###

Later, Colonel Seawell L. Fremont was assigned to Fort Fisher with the 1st North Carolina Volunteer Artillery and Engineers. New Inlet, the entrance to the Cape Fear River, was the focus of much of his attention. Under Fremont’s guidance, several new artillery batteries were built on what became known as Federal Point at Fort Fisher.

In July 1862, Colonel William Lamb was assigned command of Fort Fisher. He immediately recognized the importance of the fort and set to work constructing the remainder of the fort. “I determined at once to build a work of such magnitude that it could withstand the heaviest fire of any guns in the American Navy,” – William Lamb. Lamb’s design incorporated huge earthen walls that would ultimately stretch from Sheperd’s Battery, near the Cape Fear River, to the Atlantic Ocean. A sea facing wall would be built and stretch south to Battery Lamb – a forty-three foot tall earthen work near New Inlet. For the next 2 1/2 years, the fort commanded the inlet to the Cape Fear River and was so formidable that no major Federal attacks occurred. That would change in December 1864.

The United States government, and military command, recognized the importance of Wilmington’s port. Throughout the war, the U.S. Navy was able to close all of the major ports of the Confederacy – with the exception of Wilmington. Blockade runners were able to enter the port and bring valuable supplies to the Confederate forces. While the U.S. Navy was able to sink many of the blockade runners, they were unable to close the port due to Fort Fisher’s commanding presence. US Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant also knew the importance of the port and assigned Major General Benjamin F. Butler to command an amphibious assault against the fort in December 1864. Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter, a Grant confidant, was assigned to command the naval forces tasked with transporting Butler’s infantry. The plan, as devised by Butler, was to shock the Confederate fort with the explosion of the USS Louisiana near the works. Laden with 200 tons of powder, it was hoped that the explosion would destroy a portion of the sea wall and allow the infantry to storm into the fort’s interior. While well conceived, the plan would ultimately fail when the ship was exploded, too far from the wall, on December 23. The explosion did not damage the fort and the preceding bombardment caused only small amounts of casualties. Butler, still convinced that a land attack might succeed, landed a division north of the fort on Christmas morning. Butler soon lost his nerve and called the attack off, ending the First Battle of Fort Fisher.

Undeterred, Grant ordered a second assault to capture Fort Fisher. Planned for mid-January 1865, it would include the entire North Atlantic Blockading Squadron – 52 ships – again commanded by Porter. US Major General Alfred H. Terry was in command of the ground forces – a provisional corps of 9,000 troops divided among six infantry brigades and siege artillery. An additional naval landing party of marines, commanded by Captain Kidder R. Breese, would be used as a landing party to secure the beach for Terry’s infantry.

Fort Fisher, still under the command of Colonel Lamb, would be reinforced and would reach of strength of 1,900 soldiers. CSA Major General Robert F. Hoke’s division of 6,400 troops were located further north of the peninsula, bringing the entire Rebel force to a combined strength of slightly more than 8,300 troops.

On January 13, Terry would land his provisional corps on the beach north of Fort Fisher – between Hoke’s division and the garrison at Fort Fisher which was now commanded by Whiting himself. Concerned about opening the route to Wilmington, Hoke made no attempt to prevent the landing of Terry’s forces. On the morning of January 15, Porter’s gargantuan naval flotilla opened a devastating bombardment of Fort Fisher and by noon had silenced the majority of the sea facing batteries. Hoke, hearing the distant shelling, detached 1,000 soldiers from his command to reinforce Whiting. However, with Terry’s much larger command blocking much of the way, only 400 men would ever reach the fort.

Lieutenant Commander Kidder’s landing force attacked the section of the fort where the land and sea sides connected – known as the Northeast Bastion. While this assault would be repulsed, it would pull critical troops away from the point which Brigadier General Adelbert Ames’ division attacked on the land side of the fort. While Kidder’s attack was in progress, Ames ordered his first brigade to attack the fort. It was 2:00 p.m. The first brigade was able to storm through the abatis and reach the first traverse. Wanting to keep the momentum going, Ames ordered his second brigade against the works near the river side gate at the western edge of the fort. With his first brigade stalled near the fourth traverse, Ames ordered his third brigade into action. By this time, the Confederate defenders at Battery Buchanan, located at the south edge of the fort, near New Inlet, turned their heavy guns on the north wall. Additionally, Whiting led a counterattack against the Federals and was severely wounded after receiving several demands for his surrender.

Porter’s attack squadron was also busy, taking out numerous gun placements as the Federal infantry continued to swarm along both walls of the fort. Ordering all of his troops to counterattack again, Colonel Lamb was severely wounded and taken, along with Whiting, towards Battery Buchanan. Department commander, General Braxton Bragg, never realized how untenable the situation at Fort Fisher had become. Tiring of repeated calls for reinforcements from Whiting, Bragg ordered Brigadier General Alfred H. Colquitt to the fort to relieve Whiting. He arrived at Battery Buchanan as Whiting and Lamb were being evacuated. The situation Colquitt found himself in proved untenable and General Terry knew this to be true. With his forces inside the fort, and the artillery on both faces haven fallen silent, he determined to capture the rest of the fort that evening. Ames, in command of the forces in the fort, sent a portion of his command in a flanking movement to the rear of the Confederate position. Colquitt would leave the fort before the surrender in a rowboat. Left behind, the soldiers in the fort, now commanded by Major James Reilly, would be forced to surrender. Around 10 p.m., General Terry would ride to Battery Buchanan and receive the official surrender from General Whiting.

The fall of Fort Fisher was a terrible blow to the dying Confederacy. With no other Atlantic ports available for the blockade runners, it became a matter of time for the Rebel armies as supplies quickly began to dwindle. Little more than three months later, CSA General Robert E. Lee would surrender the Army of Northern Virginia to Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House.

Today, Fort Fisher State Historic Site stands near the original land wall of the fort. Much of the land wall fortifications have been rebuilt to look much as they did in 1865. The trail leading from the visitors center winds through the position of the west river gate. Shepard’s Battery has a large cannon on its precipice. Battery Buchanan still sits over New Inlet – albeit with no cannon. If you find yourself in the vicinity of Wilmington, North Carolina, I would encourage you to make the drive to Kure Beach to visit this wonderful historic site.

To view my photo essay from my visit to Fort Fisher State Historic Site, click on the following link.

Mike’s Photo Essay on Fort Fisher State Historic Site

###

To learn more about the Battle of Chickamauga, click HERE.

To view my collection of photos from Chickamauga National Military Park, click HERE.

###

To view my photo essays on the Antietam National Battlefield Park, click HERE.

###

Within days of CSA General Robert E. Lee’s victory over US Major General John Pope, at the Second Battle of Manassas (Bull Run), Lee would cross his Army of Northern Virginia into Maryland. Lincoln had just placed Major General George B. McClellan in command of the armies at Washington City (Potomac and Virginia). Lee, unable to strike a deadly blow to Pope’s retreating army after the Battle of Chantilly, believed it essential that he maintain the momentum his army achieved after the Seven Days battles and Second Manassas. His plan called for a movement to the Frederick area where he could await the Federals on a field of his own choosing. Unfortunately, US Colonel Dixon S. Miles’ garrison at Harper’s Ferry posed a threat to the rear of his army. Additional Federal troops near Martinsburg, Virginia (present day West Virginia) could sever his supply line – effectively crippling the entire campaign. With roughly 60,000 soldiers in his army, he was severely outnumbered by whatever combined army the U.S. War Department sent to pursue him. Simply put, Lee found himself in a very precarious position.

In an audacious move, believing the Union troops would be slow in pursuit, Lee separated his army sending Major General James Longstreet’s command through Boonsboro to Hagerstown, Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s command to capture Harper’s Ferry and leaving a portion of his cavalry, and Major General Daniel Harvey (D.H.) Hill’s division, to guard the passes in South Mountain, just west of Frederick. Putting his plan in motion, Lee issued Special Order 191 sending copies to Jackson, Longstreet, two division commanders (Lafayette McLaws and D.H. Hill) and cavalry commander, Major General J.E.B. Stuart. The armies were to move at first light on September 10.

McClellan would arrive in Frederick with the Army of the Potomac on September 13. His army would be met with cheers from the largely loyal population of central Maryland. While resting near the Monocacy River, a misplaced copy of Lee’s Special Order 191 would be found wrapped around three cigars by a soldier in the 27th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. Believing it significant, the soldier passed it to his commander where it would make its way to McClellan.

While McClellan would immediately notify President Lincoln of his find, explaining “no time would be lost” in taking advantage of the most important intelligence of the war, it would take time to get his massive army through Frederick. Orders were issued to his senior lieutenants, major generals Ambrose E. Burnside and William B. Franklin, to move with alacrity at first light, September 14. Burnside was to push towards the northernmost gap, Turner’s, on the National Road. He was to clear the gap and push after Longstreet’s command. Mclellan’s orders to Bill Franklin were explicit and detailed, believing his role crucial to rescuing Miles’ garrison at Harper’s Ferry. He was to waste no time pushing through Burkittsville before first light, and using the Gapland Road, force his way through Crampton’s Gap. Once the gap was cleared he was to enter Pleasant Valley and march south toward’s Maryland Heights, relieving Miles. Unfortunately, the timing was not achieved and precious time would be lost reaching the gap.

The Battle of South Mountain was crucial for each army commander. Lee needed to delay any incursion into Pleasant Valley to provide Jackson time to consummate the capture of Harper’s Ferry. If McClellan did not push through the gaps quickly, Harper’s Ferry would eventually fall and any hope of defeating Lee piecemeal would vanish. The fate of both armies hinged on the defense which D.H. Hill could muster at the gaps. Lee’s Maryland Campaign and the future of the Union hung in the balance.

To read my complete essay on the Battle of South Mountain, click HERE.

To listen to a recent interview I had with Dr. Tom Clemens, editor of “The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 1: South Mountain,” click HERE.

To view a short photo essay on South Mountain, click HERE.

###

After suffering a terrible defeat after the Second Battle of Bull Run, US Major General John Pope pulled his Army of Virginia back towards Centreville. His army was spread out to protect the approaches to Washington City, where the majority of US Major General George B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac was garrisoned. Lee wanted to inflict more damage on the Union army before they had a chance to join up with McClellan. He devised a flanking movement that would send CSA Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s Left Army Wing around Pope’s right flank. They would be preceded by Major General J.E.B. Stuart’s Cavalry Division which would scout the approach and provide warning to Jackson of the enemy’s dispositions. Meanwhile, US Army General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck had ordered Pope to attack Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Unfortunately for Pope, Lee attacked first.

By 3:00 p.m., Jackson had reached Ox Hill near the junction of the Warrenton Turnpike and Little River Turnpike. US Brigadier General Issac I. Stevens’ IX Corps Division was situated east of the hill. Severely outnumbered, Stevens decided to attack before the III Corps Division of Major General Philip Kearny, Jr. was on the battlefield. While initially successful, Stevens’ attack, during a driving rainstorm, was doomed. The topography was not in his favor – nor was his battle strength. Marching uphill, he ran directly into the center of the Confederate line and the division of CSA Brigadier General Alexander Lawton. Stevens led from the front and would be killed by a bullet wound to his head. It was 5:00 p.m.

Federal reinforcements were at hand, with the arrival of General Phil Kearny’s III Corps Division. Arriving about the time of Stevens’ death, he deployed Brigadier General David B. Birney’s brigade on the left of Stevens’ demoralized troops. Running headlong into CSA Major General A.P. Hill’s Division, the fighting devolved into a hand-to-hand struggle. Kearny would accidently ride into the Confederate lines and would also be killed. With the arrival of the remainder of the Kearny’s brigades, Birney pulled back and the fighting ended.

While a small battle compared to Second Bull Run, it was still costly. Federal losses were 1,300 combined casualties of all types, including the deaths of Stevens and Kearny. Confederate losses were 800 combined casualties of all types. During the overnight hours the Union forces would pull back to the area of Fairfax Court House and combine with McClellan’s forces. Lee, concerned that he could not successively attack the forces at Washington City, decided the the time for bold action was at hand. On September 4, 1862 he would cross the Potomac River into Maryland. New battlefields awaited him which would be covered with the blood of both armies.

To see my photo essay on the Chantilly Battlefield click HERE.

###

For a more detailed narrative on the Battle of the Crater, check out my essay by clicking HERE.

###

As McDowell marched his army of nearly 35,000 men from Washington City on July 16, 1861, CSA Brigadier General Pierre Gustave Toutant (P.G.T.) Beauregard was aware of the tenuous situation facing his Army of the Potomac. With roughly 22,000 troops, Beauregard was concerned that he would be overrun by the larger Federal army before reinforcements could arrive from the Shenandoah Valley. McDowell’s tactical plan was to march his army in three columns towards Bull Run Creek and place the largest portion south of the Confederate right flank – effectively severing the Confederate supply line with Richmond and forcing the Confederate general to move his army south of the Rappahannock River – the next defensible line available to him. This would serve to provide some relief for the beleaguered national capital and demonstrate the power of the Federal forces Lincoln had assembled to “save the Union.”

On July 18, in an effort to put his plan in motion, McDowell ordered Brigadier Daniel Tyler to initiate a flanking movement against the southern flank of Beauregard’s forces. This would result in what would best be described as a skirmish at Blackburn’s Ford. Tyler would retreat after his division was beaten back by Confederate forces under the command of CSA Brigadier General James Longstreet. While total losses would be less than 200, McDowell was forced to change his battle plan.

On July 21, McDowell put his new plans in motion. Orders were drafted for Tyler’s Division to make a demonstration at the Stone Bridge, along the Warrenton Turnpike, while two other divisions, commanded by brigadier generals David Hunter and Samuel Heintzelman, would utilize Sudley Springs Ford to turn the left flank of the Confederate line. The battle would begin at approximately 5:15 a.m. with artillery rounds being fired from Tyler’s Division into the Confederate forces guarding the Stone Bridge. The Rebel field commander, Colonel Nathan “Shanks” Evans, quickly realized the bombardment was a feint and sent the majority of his command west to protect against a movement from the north. By 11:30 a.m., Evans new position, near Matthews Hill, was hard pressed by Federal forces. Pulling back from the Warrenton Turnpike, he would return to the main Confederate line near the Henry House. McDowell believed victory was within his grasp with his forces closing in around the small hill dominated by the Henry residence. Unfortunately, the momentum of the battle changed drastically with the arrival of CSA Brigadier General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of the Shenandoah.

Johnston had been tasked with preventing a large scale incursion of the Shenandoah Valley by forces under the command of US Major General Robert Patterson. Patterson had received a similar directive in anticipation of McDowell’s advance on Manassas Junction: keep Johnston’s forces engaged in the Shenandoah Valley to prevent a move to reinforce Beauregard. In this Patterson failed miserably. Johnston was able to quickly mobilize his army and arrived at Manassas Junction late on the morning of July 21. This quick deployment was made possible by the first successful military use of a railroad. Thus, when Confederate fortunes appeared bleak near Henry House Hill, the tide turned.

Recently promoted and little known Brigadier General Thomas J. Jackson would arrive at Henry House Hill around noon. With the vastly overwhelmed Confederate line now disintegrating, the timing could not have been better. Jackson quickly conferred with Brigadier General Barnard Bee, who would soon be killed in action, and was advised, “The enemy are driving us.” To this Jackson responded, “Then, Sir, we will give them the bayonet.”(iii) Jackson’s brigade quickly entered the confused fray, surprising the Federal forces and quickly changing the complexion of the battle. By 4:00 p.m., repeated Confederate assaults along the Henry House Hill line would force the retreat of the Union line. Realizing the fight had turned against him, and unable to organize his fear stricken army, McDowell ordered a general retreat across Bull Run Creek. Thus ended the First Battle of Bull Run which would repeat itself fourteen months later when another Federal force, the Army of Virginia, would retreat pellmell all the way back to the defenses of Washington City.

With news of the battle reaching the general population, moods changed. The combined losses at Manassas were staggering: nearly 5,000 killed, wounded, missing and captured. No longer was it believed that the war would be over quickly. Patriotic fervor would quickly swell the ranks of armies north and south, east and west. Across the south people rejoiced in the streets while its commanders, Beauregard, Johnston and Jackson were extolled as heroes. And while the Confederate victory was not solely the result of the actions of Thomas Jackson, he would earn the sobriquet, Stonewall – a moniker that would become synonymous with him – even today. Meanwhile in the north a quiet determination took hold. Quickly, a new army leader would emerge: Major General George B. McClellan. While he brought order to the somber, defeated ranks a new mantra would appear in the press and be voiced by northerners, “On to Richmond.” Little did the populace know, nor could they in their worst dreams imagine, the toll the war would take over the coming three years: 620,000 dead Americans and many more disfigured and forever scarred. July 1861 would forever herald the start of a new phase in the story of America – a story that still defines us today – a story of death, anguish and brothers fighting brothers – but most importantly a new birth of freedom.

While I could not attend today’s sesquicentennial activities at Manassas National Battlefield Park, my heart will never forget the last and final sacrifice which our patriots made on the bloody fields near Henry House Hill.

For a more in depth narrative of the First Battle of Bull Run click HERE.

To view my collection of photos of Manassas National Battlefield click HERE.

(i) Gipson, Lawrence H., Third Millennium Library paper, “The Collapse of the Confederacy.” To read this paper, click HERE.
(ii) McPherson, James M., Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, published by Oxford University Press on November 6, 2003, Pg. 336.
(iii) Robertson, James I, Jr., Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend, published by MacMillan Publishing in 1997, Pg. 264.

###

Over the intervening fourteen decades, the landscape around Gettysburg has changed significantly. These changes were not only created by buildings, commercial development and urban sprawl. Much of it has been caused by the slow creep of the landscape. Fields becoming woodlots, woodlots becoming open fields and orchards vanishing into prairie grass. On this anniversary of the sanguinary fight at Gettysburg, I thought it might be appropriate to offer a link to an article which I wrote in October 2009: Gettysburg National Military Park – A Study in Contrasts. This article highlights the National Park Service’s efforts to restore the sight lines which existed in the 1860′s. If you have not been to Gettysburg recently, I would recommend you review this article. The park service has done a fine job at Gettysburg.

Gettysburg National Military Park – A Study in Contrasts

Shortly after this article was published, the National Park Service provided an update on the rehabilitation efforts at Gettysburg. To review this article click on the following link:

Gettysburg National Military Park – Rehabilitation Update

###

With his army united along the Brock Road, Grant quickly realized Lee had arrived first, blocking his path. The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House began in earnest on May 9 when US Major General Winfield Scott Hancock attempted to cross the Po River at the Block House Bridge. A pitched battle occurred which ultimately kept Hancock from crossing the river and flanking Lee’s position. Calamity befell the Army of the Potomac that day when US Major General John Sedgwick was killed by a sniper’s bullet while inspecting his lines. Sedgwick would be one of the most senior generals killed during the Civil War and would be sorely missed by his VI Corps. He would be replaced by another competent general, Horatio G. Wright.

One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the Confederate field works was a large salient, near their right flank. Dubbed the Mule Shoe, it would witness some of the most intense fighting of the Civil War – fighting that often times would be hand-to-hand as the opposing forces fought in the trenches along the field works of the salient. Grant, however, believed the salient was the weakest link in Lee’s line. He would send two successive attacks against it. The first attack was during the late afternoon of May 10 when he sent US Colonel Emory Upton’s brigade into the northwest face of the Mule Shoe. Upton’s attack proved successful but was not promptly supported by Wright’s VI Corps. After breaking through the lines, the Confederates would regroup and push the small force out of the salient. Grant was not one to pass up what he believed to be an opportunity and would launch a second assault against the Mule Shoe on May 12. Believing Upton’s attack failed because there were not enough troops involved, he ordered W.S. Hancock to lead the assault with his entire II Corps. After breaking through the earthworks, Hancock was to be supported by US Major General Ambrose E. Burnside’s independent IX Corps on the east side of the salient, with Major General Gouverneur K. Warren’s V Corps and Wright’s VI Corps on the west side of the works. The attack was launched before sunrise on May 12 and would be successful. Over 3,000 Confederate soldiers and officers would be captured. Unfortunately, the support from the IX and VI corps was not timely and would ultimately lead to the repulse of the II Corps once the Rebels regained their balance. May 12 was a very bloody day, with nearly 17,000 combined casualties – including the aforementioned capture of 3,000 Rebels.

After the near defeat on May 12, Robert E. Lee pulled his lines back, nearly a half mile, from the mule shoe. This served to compact his lines and make them easier to defend. The most severe fighting at Spotsylvania was over. Skirmishing would continue for days near the abandoned Mule Shoe and one large scale attack at Harris Farm, near the Federal left flank, would be fought on May 19. This pitched engagement was not expected and pitted heavy artillery units, recently converted to infantry, which had been brought from the Washington City defenses, against CSA Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell’s veteran 2d Corps. While green, the artillerist fought with zeal, commanded by US Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler. They would eventually be reinforced by veteran infantrymen and would hold the field. Casualties continued to mount at Spotsylvania.

Over the next several days Grant weighed his options. He finally determined to push around Lee’s right flank again, leaving the bloodied fields of Spotsylvania Court House on May 21. Once again, Grant disengaged his forces secretly and stole the march on Robert E. Lee. The fighting at Spotsylvania added another 31,000 combined casualties to the rapidly growing list of Civil War losses. Five general officers, including Sedgwick, would be part of the gruesome casualty list: Sedgwick, James C. Rice and Thomas Stevenson (Union) with Confederate generals Junius Daniel and Abner M. Perrin becoming casualties and adding to an already depleted list of general officers on the Rebel side. Most telling to the sanguinary Battle of Spotsylvania Court House was the fact that 43 Union soldiers would receive the Medal of Honor for their heroism.

Grant would next face Lee at the North Anna.

For more information on the Battle of Spotsylvania check out my previous articles:

The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House – A New Level of Fighting

Mike’s Photo Essay on Spotsylvania Court House Battlefield

###