This Mighty Scourge

Today is an important day in Civil War history.  US Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant received the “unconditional surrender” of Fort Donelson.  Meeting him at the Dover Hotel, was his old friend, CSA Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner who surrendered his entire garrison – nearly 12,400 Confederate soldiers were surrendered and would make their way to Cairo, Illinois, in route to Federal prisons.  Buckner’s soldiers would suffer another 1,450 killed and wounded.  Grant’s Federal forces would suffer nearly 2,700 killed and wounded – a number that is understandable as they had to storm significant field works during a protracted battle on February 15.

To view a narrative on the Battle of Fort Donelson, that I wrote on last year’s anniversary of the battle, click HERE.

To view a photo essay on the Battle of Fort Doneslon, at my Flickr site, click HERE.

Today would be Abraham Lincoln’s 201st birthday.  Our 16th president went from the most humble beginnings, in northern Kentucky, to the highest office in United States.  With an insatiable thirst for knowledge, Lincoln was able to educate himself and eventually become an attorney, in Springfield, Illinois.  Before being killed, by John Wilkes Booth, he would guide his beloved country through civil war and abolish human slavery in the south.

While I am pleased to have a three day weekend, this weekend, I wish Abraham Lincoln’s birthday was a National holiday.  Not to take anything away from the other 41 presidents, Uncle Abe deserves it.

Click HERE to read an article I wrote, “What Abraham Lincoln Means to Me,” on his 200th birthday.

147 years ago this week, US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s Army of the Potomac fought Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in one of the most bloody, one sided engagements, of the entire American Civil War.  This was Burnside’s first major engagement as commander of Abraham Lincoln’s largest army.  It would also be his last full scale battle.  To say that Burnside was a reluctant commander is an understatement.  When Lincoln decided to relieve US Major General George B. McClellan from command, after failing to arrest Lee’s retreat into Virginia, after the Battle of Antietam, he had few choices.  It came down to Burnside or US Major General Joe Hooker – a behind the scenes schemer of the first order.  Burnside would have turned down the command if Lincoln’s second choice had been anyone other than Hooker.  The following short narrative is the story of Burnside’s first foray in command of the Army of the Potomac.  I wrote this a couple of years ago, for my other website, Battlefield Portraits and it is reprinted here in its entirety.

Battle of Fredericksburg

Location: Fredericksburg, VA
Dates: February 11-15, 1862
Union Commander:  Ambrose Burnside, Major General
Confederate Commander:  Robert E. Lee, General

Battle Summary:
In late September, 1862, the Union’s Army of the Potomac, commanded by US Major General George B. McClellan, expelled Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia from Sharpsburg, Maryland.  On September 17 these armies engaged in what would become the bloodiest single day in United States history -a battle that would be named after a lazy creek that runs through Sharpsburg – Antietam. While the battle was essentially a draw, it was greeted in the north as a resounding victory, prompting Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

Lincoln’s excitement turned to despair, however, as he tried to nudge McClellan into the offensive, while Lee’s army was most vulnerable to attack.  Finally, in late October, 1862, McClellan put his army in motion, entering into Virginia, skirting the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains.  Unfortunately, he moved very sluggishly.  Lincoln, in an effort to speed McClellan, wired his commander that his army was closer to Richmond than Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  At the same time, Lincoln made private vow to remove “Little Mac” if he let Lee’s army get between him and Richmond.  On November 7, Lincoln had had enough.  He sent US Brigadier General C.P. Buckingham to McClellan’s headquarters, at Rectortown, with orders to remove McClellan.  The same orders placed US Major General Ambrose Burnside in command of the Union’s Army of the Potomac.

Ambrose Burnside, was a reluctant commander.  Friends with McClellan, he preferred to have a supporting role in the east, rather than overall command.  Fearing the commanding role would devolve, upon his nemesis, Joe Hooker, Burnside accepted the new position.  Burnside would be the third commander of the Army of the Potomac, and was an 1847 graduate of West Point.

Burnside wasted little time.  By November 15, he had his army in motion.  His plan was to flank Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, crossing the Rappahannock River above, and below, Fredericksburg.  By choosing Fredericksburg as his point to launch into the Rebel army, he would only have to cross the Rappahannock River.  If he were to take the more direct route, he would have two formidable rivers to cross – the Rappahannock and the Rapidan.  A quick movement would assure surprise and would catch the Army of Northern Virginia in a vulnerable position - as it was falling back to protect Richmond.

Burnside also changed the organizational structure of his army.  While retaining the overall Corps structure, he organized his Corps into three grand divisions.  The Right Grand Division, commanded by US Major General Edwin Sumner, would include the II Corps, commanded by Major General Darius Couch, and the IX Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Orlando Willcox.  The Center Grand Division, commanded by US Major General Joseph Hooker, would include the III Corps, commanded by Brigadier General George Stoneman, and the V Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Daniel Butterfield.  The Left Grand Division, commanded by US Major General William Franklin, would include the I Corps, commanded by Major General John Reynolds, and the VI Corps, commanded by Major General William F. “Baldy” Smith.

By November 17, the flanking move seemed to be working.  Sumner’s Grand Division had arrived on the east bank of the Rappahannock and were at Stafford Heights, immediately opposite Fredericksburg.  The rest of Burnside’s army arrived shortly afterwards.  Unfortunately, a mix up at the war department slowed the arrival of the pontoon bridging equipment necessary to ford the Rappahannock.  Burnside would wait a week for his pontoons to arrive.  It was at this same time that Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was also arriving at Fredericksburg.  This effectively made Burnside’s plan, for an unopposed crossing of the river, impossible.

The mighty Army of Northern Virginia was clearly arrayed behind Fredericksburg.  Facing Burnside was the powerful 1st Corps of CSA Lieutenant General James Longstreet.  His Corps was occupying the high ground, beyond Fredericksburg, known as Marye’s Heights.  Fearing a feint at Fredericksburg, and a general movement downstream, Lee had positioned much of his 2d Corps, commanded by CSA Lieutenant General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, 20 miles downstream.  Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was close to 80,000 troops strong, facing a very impressive Union army of over 110,000 troops.

During the overnight hours of December 11, Burnside deployed his engineers to build pontoon bridges at three crossings: the Upper, Middle and Lower.  Work went smoothly until the first rays of sun started to burn through the fog.  Once the engineers were visible, they became easy targets for the single brigade assigned to guard against such a crossing.  CSA Brigadier General William Barksdale’s Brigade, comprised of soldiers from Florida, and Mississippi, was posted in the lower downtown area.

After Barksdale’s Brigade started its deadly shooting, Burnside determined to use his heavy artillery, posted at Stafford Heights, to force them out of town.  For over an hour, the big Union guns fired into the town of Fredericksburg.  All told, over 7,000 shells were fired, by 150 heavy guns, into the town of Fredericksburg.  Unfortunately, Barksdale’s Brigade was unharmed by the massive bombardment.  When the engineers went back to work, they were picked off easily by the Rebel infantry.  Finally, it was decided that Federal infantry would use the pontoons as boats, to storm the opposite bank.  The small “shock” force quickly dislodged Barksdale’s Brigade, pushing them through the streets of Fredericksburg in some of the only urban street fighting during the Civil War.  Burnside’s engineers quickly finished the pontoon bridges, allowing Federal infantry to occupy Fredericksburg on the evening of December 11.

In the meantime, Lee, recognizing that there would not be a crossing further downstream, recalled Jackson’s 2d Corps, assigning them to an area due south of Longstreet.  This line, stretching south of Fredericksburg, was naturally strong as Jackson’s troops could dig into the hillside of a long bluff, Prospect Hill, under the cover of trees.  Jackson was confident that his position would be very strong.

On December 12 the majority of the Army of the Potomac crossed into Fredericksburg.  Unfortunately, the abandoned town was too much for the men with looting, vandalism and drinking commonplace throughout the streets, parlors and homes of Fredericksburg.  After the main battle, when questioned about how he would handle the Union debauchery, Stonewall Jackson said, “Kill them, sir, kill every man!”

On the unusually warm, and foggy morning, of Saturday, December 13, US Major General William Franklin’s Left Grand Division was tasked with assaulting the heights, south of town, held by Jackson’s 2d Corps.  Due to rather ambiguous language in Burnside’s orders, Franklin was given discretion on how he would feed his grand division into battle.  With close to 60,000 soldiers at his disposal, he determined to send in only one division, commanded by US Major General George G. Meade.  Later in the battle he would receive support from two other divisions, commanded by brigadier generals Abner Doubleday, and John Gibbon.  Moving into position, to attack Jackson’s line, Meade’s division was enfiladed by one battery of Rebel cannon, commanded by CSA Major John Pelham.  The fire from the guns was very accurate, and destructive.  Gibbon would dispatch one brigade, of Wisconsin and Indiana troops, to silence Pelham’s Horse Artillery.  These troops, the only all Western brigade in the Army of the Potomac, had earned the well deserved moniker, “Iron Brigade,” during their action at the Battle of South Mountain.

After dislodging Pelham’s artillery, Meade sent his troops against Jackson’s entrenched infantry and artillery.  The area they struck was a sliver of woods that crossed the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad tracks.  While they had heavy casualties in crossing the open ground, to these woods, they did enjoy a breakthrough near the tracks.  In this area the Confederates would forever lose the services of CSA Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg.  He would be mortally wounded during Meade’s breakthrough.  Jackson immediately funneled new troops into the area of Meade’s breakthrough, and having very little support, Meade was forced to pull back beyond the tracks, and the Richmond Stage Road.

The second phase – and the better known phase of the Battle of Fredericksburg – against Longstreet’s 1st Corps started when Burnside observed Meade’s repulse.  Originally designed to start when Franklin’s Left Grand Division had started to roll up Lee’s right flank, Sumner’s Right Grand Division was to assault Longstreet’s Corps, approximately 1/2 mile beyond Fredericksburg, on Marye’s Heights.  Wave, after wave, of Union soldiers marched through Fredericksburg, across the open fields, the Canal Ditch and up the hill, only to be annihilated before they reached the stone wall, beyond which was a sunken road.  Here CSA Brigadier General Thomas R.R. Cobb’s Georgia brigade poured out a withering fire.  While Cobb would be mortally wounded by an artillery shell, his brigade would mow down successive waves of divisions and brigades.  Even the vaunted Irish Brigade would be chewed up trying to reach the Sunken Road.

By sunset, the fighting had sputtered to an end.  The weather, however, changed for the worst.  Soldiers who had thrown aside their jackets, and blankets, in the balmy weather of December 13, were greeted with sub-freezing temperatures overnight.  The area between Marye’s Heights, and Fredericksburg, became a “no man’s land,” where the slightest movement by a Federal soldier would illicit a shot from the Confederates.  Besides dying from their injuries, Union soldiers also froze to death where they had fallen.  On December 14, CSA Sergeant Richard R. Kirkland, of the 2d South Carolina Infantry regiment, asked CSA Brigadier General Joseph Kershaw if he could aid the wounded Federal soldiers begging for water.  At first Kershaw declined Kirkland’s request, but later would allow him to move into the “no man’s land.”  However, he refused his request to carry a white flag, which would have protected him.  Nineteen year old Kirkland gathered as many canteens as he could, filling them with water, and stepped out over the wall.  Sporadic musketry failed to hit him and when the Federal soldiers understood his humanitarian intentions they, along with many Confederate soldiers, cheered him.  He walked among the wounded soldiers giving them water and helping those he could.  After his canteens were emptied, he returned back to his post and his duties as an infantryman.  Known as the “Angel of Marye’s Heights,” Kirkland would continue to fight with the 2d South Carolina until he was killed charging Snodgrass Hill, during the Battle of Chickamauga.

During the Battle of Fredericksburg, Robert E. Lee was quoted, “It is well that war is so terrible – lest we should grow too fond of it.”  How right he was.

While Burnside was determined to make additional attacks against Marye’s Heights, even stating he would lead them himself, he would decide to heed his lieutenants’ advice against doing so.  While the two armies held their positions through the day of December 15, Burnside would retreat across the Rappahannock River during the early morning hours of December 16.  Thus ended the horrific battle of Fredericksburg, an unequaled rout of the Army of the Potomac that ultimately provided no benefit to the Union arms.

Campaign: Fredericksburg

Outcome: Confederate victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 115,000
Confederate: 78,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 12,600 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 5,300 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
The butcher’s bill for Fredericksburg was very high.  The north was appalled at the waste of life that ultimately provided no advantage to the Union war effort.  On January 20, in an effort to resuscitate his career, Burnside tried one more flanking movement, this time against Lee’s left flank.  What would become known as the “Mud March” would further demoralize his army, and lead quickly to another change in commanders for the Army of the Potomac.  Both armies would remain in their relative positions for the remainder of the winter, before they would meet again, just a few miles west, at a sleepy crossroads called Chancellorsville. 

While Abraham Lincoln was not willing to lose the services of Burnside, he was compelled to remove him from the Eastern Theater.  Burnside, along with his IX Corps, would be transferred to the Department of the Ohio, which Burnside would command through 1863.  In early 1864 he would return to the Army of the Potomac, where he would continue to command the IX Corps through the Overland Campaign.  In front of Petersburg, in July 1864, Burnside would approve the explosion of the Crater on July 30.  Proving a debacle, US Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant would relieve him of command on August 14, 1864.  He would not command another field army during the Civil War.  On April 15, the day Lincoln would fall to an assassin’s bullet, Burnside officially resigned his army commission.  After the Civil War, Burnside would take executive positions with several railroads.  He would be elected to three one year terms as Governor of Rhode Island.  From 1871–1872 he would be the commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the Republic.  Burnside would serve as the first president of the National Rifle Association when it was formed in 1871.  His service to his country was still not concluded.  In 1874 Rhode Island would elect him U.S. Senator.  He would be re-elected in 1870 and would serve until his death on September 13, 1881.  He is buried in Swan Point Cemetery, in Providence, Rhode Island.

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The American tradition of Thanksgiving was given to us by Abraham Lincoln.  By the Fall of 1863 the Civil War had been waging for over two years.  While the summer of 1863 had brought victories to the Federal arms at Gettysburg, and Vicksburg, the patience of the American people was wearing thin.  Very few families were not impacted by the ongoing war between the states.  Prompted by a September 28, 1863 letter, from the editor of Ladie’s Magazine, Sarah Josepha Hale, asking him to make Thanksgiving a national holiday, Lincoln issued the Thanksgiving Proclamation on October 3, 1863.  Written by Lincoln’s Secretary of State, William H. Seward, the proclamation in its entirety is given below.

October 3, 1863

By the President of the United States  of America.

A Proclamation.

The year that is drawing towards its close, has been filled with blessings of fruitful fields and healthful skies.  To these bounties, which are so constantly enjoyed that we are prone to forget the source from which they come, others have been added, which are so extraordinary a nature, that they cannot fail to penetrate and soften even the heart which is habitually insensible to the ever watchful providence of Almighty God.  In the midst of a civil war of unequalled magnitude and severity, which has sometimes seemed to foreign States to invite and provoke their aggression, peace has been preserved with all nations, order has been maintained, the laws have been respected and obeyed, and harmony has been prevailed everywhere except in the theatre of military conflict; while that theatre has been greatly contracted by the advancing armies and navies of the Union.  Needful diversions of wealth and of strength from the fields of peaceful industry to the national defence, have not arrested the plough, the shuttle or the ship; the axe has enlarged the borders of our settlements, and the mines, as well as iron and coal as of the precious metals, have yielded more abundantly than heretofore.  Population has steadily increased, notwithstanding the waste that has been made in the camp, the siege and the battle-field; and the country, rejoicing in the consciousness of augmented strength and vigor, is permitted to expect continuance of years with large increase of freedom.  No human counsel hath devised nor hath any mortal hand worked out these great things.  They are the gracious gifts of the Most High God, who, while dealing with us in anger for our sins, hath nevertheless remembered mercy.  It has seemed to me fit and proper that they should be solemnly, reverantly and greatfully acknowledged as with one heart and one voice by the whole American People.  I do therefore invite my fellow citizens in every part of the United States, and also those who are at sea and those who are sojourning in foreign lands, to set apart and observe the last Thursday of November next, as a day of Thanksgiving and Praise to our beneficient Father who dwelleth in the Heavens.  And I recommend to them that while offering up the ascriptions justly due to Him for such singular deliverances and blessings, they do also, with humble penitence for our national perverseness and disobedience, commend to His tender care all of those who have become widows, orphans, mourners or sufferers in the lamentable civil strife which we are unavoidably engaged, and fervently implore the interposition of the Almighty Hand to heal the wounds of the nation and to restore it as soon as may be consistent with the Divine purposes to the full enjoyment of peace, harmony, tranquility and Union.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States to be affixed.

A. Lincoln (Signature)

Done at the City of Washington, this Third Day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States the Eighty-eighth.  ABRAHAM LINCOLN

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State(i)

I wish each of you a very blessed, safe Thanksgiving.  Please remember those who gave the ultimate sacrifice for their country - and our freedom.  God Bless the United States.

Mike Noirot

(i) Basler, Roy P., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 6, published by Rutgers University Press in 1953, Pgs. 496-497.

Today is the 146th anniversary of Abraham Lincoln delivering a “few appropriate remarks” at the dedication of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.  When Lincoln received an invitation, from David Wills, to attend the dedication, he believed it was an opportunity for him to connect with the American people, providing them with an explanation for the long, bloody war and his evolving position on the dreadful conflict.  Most importantly it was his desire to honor all of the casualties of the fratricidal war.(i)

Lincoln received Wills’ invitation on November 2, 1863, leaving him less than three weeks to prepare his speech.  There is some evidence to suggest that he was aware of the upcoming invitation a full month earlier.  However, at the time, there was speculation that Wills, and Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin, had ulterior motives for inviting the president so late.  This probably was not the case, as Wills also included a personal note, with the invitation, inviting Lincoln to stay at his home.

President Lincoln left for Gettysburg on November 18.  Popular myth has it that Lincoln wrote his famous address on the back on envelope, while on the train.  This has been dispelled over the years as several early drafts of the speech were found on White House stationery.  Arriving with his Secretary of State, William H. Seward and Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, they were greeted at the Gettysburg train station with ringing bells and well wishers, as dusk settled over the quaint town.  The president’s group was escorted to the home of David Wills.  While putting the finishing touches on his speech, Lincoln was encouraged by a throng of people to come out and make a short speech.  He did not.  Instead Seward came forward and spoke for several minutes about the solemn occasion.

The president was not the keynote speaker for the dedication of the National Cemetery.  This honor was given to Edward Everett.  Everett had been Secretary of State, U.S. Senator, U.S. Representative and Governor of Massachusetts.  Well known for his oratory skills, there was much anticipation ahead of his speech – a speech that would stretch to two hours.  Lincoln’s short address would officially set aside the ground as a National Cemetery.

At 9:30 a.m., on November 19, the dignitaries left Wills’ home.  Proceeding south to the cemetery, their group would also include six governors from the 24 northern states.  With a crowd estimated to be near 15,000 people, the events began with music by Birgfield’s Band and an invocation by Reverend T.H. Stockton.  Next, while Lincoln sat in his chair, observing the events, Everett delivered his long oration.  After Everett finished, with the crowds cheering, a hymn by B.B. French was sung.  Lincoln would slowly stand up, and walk to the podium.  While several versions of the Gettysburg Address exist, the so called Bliss version is accepted as the short speech he delivered.  Less than 300 words, the speech was said to take between two and three minutes to deliver.  In fact, it was so short that most of the crowd did not realize Lincoln had concluded until he stepped away from the podium.  As Lincoln started speaking, his high-pitched voice could be heard clearly by the gathered spectators….

“Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war testing whether that nation, or any nation, so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure.  We are met on a great battle-field of that war.  We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live.  It is altogether fitting and proper that we do this.

But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate - we can not consecrate – we can not hallow – this ground.  The brave me, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract.  The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here.  It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced.  It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us – that from these honored dead we take an increased devotion to the cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion – that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain – that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom – and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

It is said, that as Lincoln walked back to his seat, he believed that his speech would not be well accepted.  As might be expected, the opposition Democrat newspapers claimed it was parochial and embarrassing.  The Republican papers, however, offered much praise for Lincoln’s address.  But, Edward Everett summed it up best in a letter to Lincoln, on November 20, “I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion, in two hours, as you did in two minutes.”(ii)  After the speech, Lincoln provided two drafts and three copies of the speech.  One draft went to each of his secretaries, John Hay and John Nicolay.  Three copies were written for Edward Everett, historian George Bancroft and Bancroft’s stepson, Colonel Alexander Bliss.  The Hay and Nicolay drafts are located in the Library of Congress.  Everett’s copy is at the Illinois State Historical Library, in Springfield, Illinois, Bancroft’s is at Cornell University and the Bliss copy is in the Lincoln Room, at the White House.

The Gettysburg Address is considered one of the greatest speeches ever given in American history.  While it was given nearly 150 years ago, its tenets still ring true in the United States today, “Liberty,” “all men are created equal,” “freedom,” “government of the people, by the people for the people.”  These are the underpinnings that make the United States the best country in the world.  While I nearly know the Gettysburg address by heart, the words still move me – making me proud to say I am an American.  Thank you, Abraham Lincoln.

(i) The Gettysburg Address, at the Library of Congress, was used to research this article.
(ii) A Gracious Compliment, at the Library of Congress, for more information, click HERE.

The Battle of Belmont, Missouri is an often overlooked battle.  While the number of casualties were modest, compared to subsequent battles in the western theater, it was newly commissioned Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant’s first battle as an independent commander.  While the battle was nearly disastrous for his troops, Grant clearly demonstrated his ability to quickly respond to changing battlefield circumstances and act quickly to preserve his troops and salvage victory from disaster.  This maturation as an independent commander would serve him well at the battles of Fort Donelson, and Shiloh, in the coming new year.  At both battles, Grant would find himself separated from the fighting and return to chaos.  In both cases he would take advantage of the confusion the Confederate forces experienced after an initial success, and snare victory from defeat.  At Fort Donelson he would capture an entire army.

The following narrative is from my other Civil War website, BattlefieldPortraits.com.

For a complete photographic essay, on the Battle of Belmont, visit my Flickr site by clicking HERE.

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Battle of Belmont

Location: Belmont, MO
Date: November 7, 1861
Union Commander: Ulysses S. Grant, Brigadier General
Confederate Commander: Gideon J. Pillow, Brigadier General

Battle Summary:
Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to brigadier general on August 7, 1861.  His first assignment would be to command the garrison at Cairo, Illinois – the junction of the Mississippi, and Ohio Rivers.

CSA Major General Leonidas Polk commanded Department No. 2 of CSA General Albert Sidney Johnston’s Western Department.  In September 1861 Polk’s Confederate detachment occupied Columbus, Kentucky building an impressive fort that commanded the Mississippi River from the high bluffs. Considered by many to be the “Gibraltar of the West,” the fort was very impressive.  Polk had 17,000 Confederate troops and close to 150 heavy guns under his command.  With the incursion of Polk’s Confederates into the neutral state of Kentucky, Grant quickly positioned himself as a liberator of the state when he entered Paducah, in a bloodless affair.

Grant would quickly have an opportunity to prove himself as an independent commander.  Holding garrisons at Cape Girardeau, Cairo and Paducah he set his sights on Columbus, Kentucky.  Aware that CSA Brigadier General Meriwether “Jeff” Thompson was on the run in the “boot heel” area of Missouri, Grant formulated his strategy.  He would send two columns of troops from Cairo, and Paducah, to demonstrate against Columbus, while he would command the main attack force of 3,000 troops going downriver, to the Belmont area, to stop Thompson.

On November 7, Grant’s troops disembarked at Hunter Farm marching back east to the Confederate encampment at Belmont.  With his troops hidden in the woods, he prepared to attack Camp Johnston.  There awaiting him were CSA Brigadier General Gideon Pillow’s Confederate detachment.  Grant would move through a cornfield to attack Pillow.  The Confederates would counter with a terrific bayonet charge.  Pillow’s position was untenable and the entire Rebel line would collapse.

Excited with their win, the Federal troops quickly went about looting the camp.  Leonidas Polk observing the collapse of Camp Johnston dispatched two infantry regiments, under the command of CSA Brigadier General Frank Cheatham.  After arriving from Columbus, Cheatham would unite with the disorganized remnants of Pillow’s troops.  Once Pillow was reinforced by Cheatham, Polk unleashed the river guns in Columbus.  Federal troops quickly were caught in a crossfire from the big siege guns of Columbus, and a surprise flank attack by Cheatham.  Quickly surrounded, the Union line collapsed.  Grant would finally bring some order to his lines and fight his way out.  The Federal troops marched back to Hunter Farm, all the while being harrassed by the Confederates, and would make their escape aboard the USS Tyler gunboat.  U.S. Grant would be the last soldier to embark on the gunboat.

Campaign: Grant’s Campaign of the Confluence of the Ohio & Mississippi Rivers – 1861

Outcome: U.S. Victory

Troop Strengths (estimated):
Union: 3,000
Confederate: 5,000

Casualties:
Union: 498 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 966 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
Belmont was U.S. Grant’s first battle as a general officer.  While technically not a complete victory, it did prove Grant thrived under pressure.  After returning to Cairo, Grant set his eyes on other targets – the forts on the Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers.  Learning that Fort Henry was lightly defended, Grant received permission from his commander, Henry W. Halleck, to attack the fort.  Fort Henry would be captured by Grant on February 6, 1862, with Fort Donelson falling on February 16, 1862.  These were stunning Union victories that launched Grant into celebrity status.

With the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, department commander, CSA General Albert Sidney Johnston would determine his position in Kentucky was untenable.  Johnston would retreat from Kentucky, through Tennessee, consolidating his army near Corinth, Mississippi.  With this retreat, Nashville, and Memphis, would remain in Union possession for the remainder of the war.

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After CSA General Robert E. Lee pushed US Major General George B. McClellan from the peninsula, at the conclusion of the Seven Days, he pushed quickly after US Major General John Pope’s Army of Virginia.  The two adversaries would clash at Second Manassas from August 28–30, 1862.  While Pope had a numerical advantage for much of the battle, he failed to take advantage of it.  With the arrival of CSA Major General James Longstreet’s Right Wing, on the afternoon of August 29, Lee was able to completely defeat Pope, pushing him back towards the Washington City defenses.

After resting and resupplying his Army of Northern Virginia, Robert E. Lee set his sights north of the Potomac.  Northern Virginia had been ravaged by the Civil War for over a year.  The citizens of the commonwealth had been punished by the marauding armies – with their crops, livestock and other foodstuffs having been depleted.  Lee’s army, while achieving its goal of pushing McClellan from the Richmond area, and defeating Pope, had suffered significant casualties during three hard campaigns.  Lee believed there was widespread Confederate sympathies in Maryland, a slave state.  By invading Maryland Lee could find ample food for his army and recruit new soldiers for his army.  Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, believed a victory in Maryland would provide the impetus for England and France to recognize his fledgling country.  A victory would also hurt Lincoln’s Republican party during the midterm elections making it difficult for them to pursue the war against the South.  With the approval of the civilian government, Lee crossed the Potomac River, entering Maryland, on September 3.

The Armies Gather

Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia would cross the Potomac River using White’s Ford and Cheek’s Ford, after pushing through Dranesville and Leesburg, Virginia.  Pushing north to Frederick, Maryland Lee quickly learned that Confederate sympathies were not what he expected.  Writing Jefferson Davis on September 7, Lee stated, “I do not anticipate any general rising of the people in our behalf.”  While there were some kind acts, such as civilians giving the shoe less Confederate soldiers their shoes, or a drink of water, Lieutenant William Johnson summed it up well, “We were not received with cheers or songs or other evidences of approbation, but instead they looked at us in self-evident pity.”(i)

On September 9, Lee issued Special Orders No. 191, which detailed the operational plans for the upcoming campaign.  CSA Brigadier General John Walker’s two brigade division would turn around and counter march to Harper’s Ferry, while CSA Major General Lafayette McLaws would push through South Mountain with two divisions and take position on Maryland Heights.  Meanwhile, CSA Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s 2d Corps would approach Harper’s Ferry from the west, after the three divisions crossed the Potomac River into the Shenandoah Valley.  This three pronged attack would trap the Federal garrison without an escape route.  The rest of Lee’s army would leave Frederick, cross South Mountain and maintain a position at either Boonsboro or Hagerstown, Maryland.

George B. McClellan, now commanding an expanded army of over 100,000 soldiers, took the field on September 5 with approximately 75,000 men.  Using three roads to move his large army, he was able to move more efficiently.  Portions of the army pushed along the north bank of the Potomac River, through Poolesville, others pushed through Rockville and Gaithersburg, while the remainder pushed further north through Brookeville and New Market.  The destination was Frederick County, Maryland.  McClellan’s Army of the Potomac stretched from Frederick on the north, through Buckeystown, to Licksville on the south.  In the environs of Frederick were US Major General Joseph Hooker’s I Corps, US Major General Edwin Sumner’s II Corps, US Major General Joseph Mansfield’s XII Corps, US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps (under the command of Jesse Reno) and a division of US Major General Fitz John Porter’s V Corps commanded by US Brigadier General George Sykes.  Further south, at Buckeystown was US Major General William Franklin’s VI Corps.  Holding the Federal left flank was a division of the IV Corps commanded by US Major General Darius Couch.(ii)

On September 13, a copy of General Lee’s Special Orders 191 was found wrapped around three cigars along a fence row near Frederick (today this spot is marked across from the Monocacy National Battlefield’s Visitor’s Center on Urbana Road).  According to an examination by Stephen W. Sears, in his book “Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam,” the “Lost Orders” were found by Corporal Barton Mitchell of Company F 27th Indiana Infantry.  They would be sent by US Brigadier General Alpheus Williams through the XII Corps headquarters to McClellan, who received them by 12:00 p.m.  The copy was destined for CSA Major General Daniel Harvey (D.H.) Hill commanding a division in Jackson’s 2d Corps.  Hill claims to have never received the order and there was never any written evidence that he, or his adjutant, Major J.W. Ratchford, ever signed for the order.  Regardless of whether Hill received Special Orders 191 or not, the controversy still swirls today.  With the intelligence the “Lost Orders” gave McClellan - that Lee’s army was scattered from Harper’s Ferry to Boonsboro and possibly as far away as Hagerstown - McClellan had an opportunity to attack the Army of Northern Virginia and defeat it piecemeal before they could consolidate their commands.  Unfortunately, McClellan acting in his usual deliberate fashion did not put his army in motion for a full eighteen hours – truly missing an opportunity to completely defeat Lee.  So, in this author’s opinion, the real controversy is not whether Hill received the orders, but why McClellan waited so long to take advantage of the intelligence they offered.  For a detailed analysis of the controversy of the “Lost Orders” see Appendix I in Sears’ book.(iii)

On September 14, McClellan finally put his Army of the Potomac in motion.  Marching west on the National Road to Fox’s and Turner’s gaps were Hooker’s I Corps and Reno’s IX Corps.  Further south, Franklin’s VI Corps pushed west towards Crampton’s Gap.  In what would be called the Battle of South Mountain, they would be opposed by three divisions of Longstreet’s 1st Corps (McLaws, Hood and D.R. Jones), and Hill’s Division of Jackson’s 2d Corps.  The fighting would be in very close quarters, as the gaps were narrow, and would end with a Confederate withdrawal leaving the Federal forces in command of all three passes.  The battle would be costly, with the Federals suffering 2,300 casualties and the Confederates suffering nearly 2,700.(iv)

Robert E. Lee would move to consolidate his forces on the west side of Antietam Creek, around the village of Sharpsburg, Maryland.  Having captured Harper’s Ferry, Jackson would reunite with the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia by September 15.  Lee would create a fairly defensible position at Antietam.  His biggest weakness being that he was backed up against the Potomac River with one ford to cross his army if he needed to retreat. 

On September 15, McClellan would push after Lee, arriving on the east bank of Antietam creek.  He would have his entire army in place on September 16.  If he had attacked immediately, he would have had a numerically superior force.  Unfortunately, McClellan would continue to operate very deliberately. 

McClellan could easily see the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia from his headquarters at the Pry house.  Having lost the advantage of attacking Robert E. Lee’s army while it was separated, he would be forced to attack Lee where he was.  His plan was to attack Lee’s left flank with two corps (I and XII), rolling it up and allowing him to trap Lee against the Potomac River.  He would demonstrate against Lee’s right flank, at the lower bridge, with Burnside’s IX Corps, to keep him from reinforcing his other flank.  Additionally he would hold Franklin’s VI Corps in reserve, utilizing it where necessary.  In preparation for his attack, McClellan had ordered Hooker’s I Corps to cross Antietam Creek, utilizing the upper bridge, late on September 16, probing the Confederate defenses.  The stage was set for the bloodiest single day of fighting in American history. 

The Battle Opens – 5:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. – September 17

Hooker’s I Corps pushed down the Hagerstown Pike early on September 17.  Crossing through the North Woods they would enter a field of brown corn, ready for harvest.  US Brigadier General Abner Doubleday’s division was on the right flank, US Brigadier General James Rickett’s Division was on the left flank and US Brigadier General George Meade’s Division was behind them.  As the made their way through the Corn Field, the waiting Confederates could see them coming – their muskets glistening above the corn in the early morning light.  Facing them were CSA Brigadier General John Jones’ division from Jackson’s 2d Corps and CSA Brigadier General John Bell Hood’s division from Longstreet’s 1st Corps.  As the Federals exited the Corn Field they were met with a terrific blast of musketry from the two Confederate divisions.  The battle would rage back-and-forth for close to three hours with control of the Corn Field changing hands several times.  McClellan would order Mansfield’s XII Corps to support Hooker with the corps pushing through the East Woods towards the fighting in the Corn Field.  They would engage Hood’s Texans as they approached the southeast corner of the Corn Field.  During this action Mansfield would be killed and command of the XII Corps would pass to the senior brigadier, Alpheus Williams.  US Major Rufus Dawes, of the 6th Wisconsin, would pick up their regimental colors after four color bearers had fallen, urging his men forward.  The 6th Wisconsin was part of US Brigadier General John Gibbon’s Iron Brigade and was in the thick of the fighting at the Corn Field.  Dawes described the action that morning, “When I took that color in my hand, I gave up all hope of life.  It did not occur to me as possible that I could carry that flag into the deadly storm and live.  I felt all that burning throng of thoughts and emotions that always comes with the presence of Death.”(v)

The Corn Field was strewn with the dead and wounded.  Each side fought to control the small parcel of ground.  The corn would be mowed down from artillery and musketry fire.  While none of the Federal divisions gained much ground, Gibbon’s Iron Brigade would have some success on the far right flank.  Pushing south astride the Hagerstown Pike, they would enter the West Woods where they would encounter Jackson’s troops.  Pushing them aside the Iron Brigade would continue to push towards the Dunker Church.  With two Confederate brigades, commanded by CSA Brigadier General William E. Starke, arriving to reinforce Jackson’s 2d Corps, the Iron Brigade received a fierce volley from over 1,100 men.  While Gibbon’s soldiers were halted, they returned such a withering fire that Starke was killed and his brigade was forced to retreat.  A Confederate war correspondent, Felix de Fontaine would write about this action, “The fire now became fearful and incessant, (it) merged into a tumultuous chorus that made the earth tremble.  The discharge of musketry sounded upon the ear like the rolling of a thousand distant drums…”(vi)  Gibbon’s brigade was again pushing towards the Dunker Church, tearing a wide gap in Jackson’s reeling lines.

With continuing pressure from Hood’s Division, the battle for the West Woods and Corn Field continued to sway back-and-forth.  By 10:00 a.m., with US Brigadier George S. Greene’s XII Corps’ division arriving, between the Corn Field and the West Woods, the Federals were able to gain a solid footing near the West Woods.  In the melee of fighting, Hooker would be shot through the foot and command of the I Corps would be passed to the senior division commander, Brigadier General James Ricketts.  This would end the morning phase of fighting in the Corn Field and the West Woods.  While stalled, the Federal offensive had gained ground and placed Jackson’s 2d Corps in a tenuous situation.  The gains came at an extremely high price for the opposing forces.  Total casualties in this sector approached 13,000 men.

For a map of the late morning fight for the West Woods and Corn Field click HERE.

Battle for the Sunken Road – 10:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. – September 17

George B. McClellan recognized the dangerous nature of the battle waging near the Corn Field.  He was able to clearly see the battle from his headquarters at the Pry house on the east bank of Antietam Creek.  Having already committed the I Corps and XII Corps to the battle, he ordered US Major General Edwin V. Sumner’s II Corps into the fray at 7:30 a.m.  Riding with US Major General John Sedgwick’s division he pushed towards the action near the West Woods.  Sedgwick would be injured in the fighting there and ultimately the division would be pulled back by Sumner.  Inexplicably, his other division detailed to the attack, commanded by US Brigadier General William French, would lose contact with Sedgwick’s division and veer towards the southeast.  Sumner’s last remaining division, commanded by US Major General Israel Richardson, was to follow the first two divisions, providing support where necessary.  Following closely behind French, Richardson’s division would also veer away from the fighting raging near the Dunker Church.

French’s division quickly ran into enemy skirmishers from D.H. Hill’s division.  Hungry for a fight, the ever aggressive French pushed after the skirmishers pushing them back to their lines.  Hill’s 2,500 man division was posted on a slight rise just past a road that was sunken from years of wagon traffic.  Their position, while below the rise of ground the Federals would have to cross to reach them, was defensible.  Dressing their lines, French’s division, followed by Richardson’s division on the left, left the sheltered confines near the Roulette Farm.  Marching across a field, they would quickly begin climbing a rise.  As they approached the crest of the rise, they became silhouetted for Hill’s Rebels at the Sunken Road, below them.  Unleashing a withering volley into the Federals, CSA Brigadier General Robert Rodes Brigade slowed French’s Union soldiers.  On the left side of the Federal line, Richardson’s division, being led by US Brigadier General Thomas F. Meagher’s famed Irish Brigade, reached the crest and were also slowed by a musketry volley from CSA Brigadier General George B. Anderson’s North Carolina Brigade.  As the Federal troops pushed down the hill, towards the Sunken Road, additional Confederate reinforcements arrived to stabilize D.H. Hill’s line.  CSA Major General Richard Anderson’s 1st Corps division arrived from the direction of the Piper farm and provided relief for Hill’s battered division which had begun to pull back.  Under intense fire from the reinforced Rebel line, Richardson ordered Meagher’s Irish Brigade forward.  Armed with smoothbore muskets, Meagher’s Fenians unleashed a terrible blast from the crest of the hill.  Encouraging his brigade forward, Meaher yelled to his men, “Boys!  Raise the colors and follow me!”(vii)  With a yell the Irishmen poured down the hill and into the Sunken Lane.  The fighting was often hand-to-hand and the Irish Brigade would eventually have to pull back for additional ammunition.  Richardson’s last brigade would arrive as the Irish Brigade was pulling back.  Commanded by US Brigadier General John Caldwell, they provided the necessary reinforcements for the Federal line to not just hold, but defeat the Rebels in near the roadbed.  Approaching from the left side of the Federal line, Caldwell’s men were able to position themselves to enfilade the entire length of the Confederate line, making the Sunken Road untenable for the Rebels.  They would be forced to pull back to the Piper Farm around 12:30 p.m.  CSA Captain John Gorman of Company B 2d North Carolina described the fighting, “(the) lead was flying thick (making it) too hot (for reinforcements to come up).”(viii)

As the smoke cleared from the air along the Sunken Road, it became clear that the cost in life was terrible.  Besides nearly 5,600 combined casualties, each side would lose experienced commanders while fighting for the Bloody Lane.  Federal Division commander General Israel Richardson would be mortally wounded – the second Federal general officer that would die from his wounds at Antietam.  On the Confederate side, things were worse.  Major General Richard Anderson was wounded, Brigadier General George B. Anderson would be killed and his senior regimental commander, Colonel C.C. Tew, would be instantly killed moments after taking over brigade command.  Brigadier General Ambrose R. Wright would be seriously wounded and a rising star in the Army of Northern Virginia, Colonel John B. Gordon, would be seriously wounded.  As on the Federal right, the Union forces were able to move forward and capture ground held by the Confederates.  Robert E. Lee’s position was tenuous at best.  He was significantly outnumbered and his left and center were under brutal attack.  If matters were not bad enough for Lee, his right flank was beginning to be attacked at the lower bridge.  The entire outcome of the Battle of Antietam would be determined by the results of the fighting on his right.

Burnside’s Attack on the Confederate Left – 10:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. – September 17

McClellan’s battle orders for Burnside called for his IX Corps to divert attention from the fighting on the right flank (the Corn Field fight) to keep Lee from sending reinforcements from this sector to Jackson’s 2d Corps.  However, Burnside was told to wait for orders before he attacked.  These orders did not arrive until 10:00 a.m. – four full hours after the Hooker launched his attack.  By this time Lee had already pulled a significant amount of troops from his right flank to support Jackson.  With nearly 13,000 men, Burnside held a significant numerical superiority to the Confederates on the opposite bank of Antietam Creek.  By this time only two Georgia regiments held the opposite bank – the 20th and 2d infantry regiments.  Unfortunately, these regiments held a commanding position 100 feet above Antietam Creek.  This position allowed them to pour a deadly fire into Burnside’s troops as the moved towards the south bridge along Rorhbach Bridge Road.  The Federal troops would be under Confederate artillery and musket fire for several 100 feet along the road, and then have to cross the 125 foot bridge – all the while under heavy fire.

US Brigadier General George Crook’s brigade, from the Kanawha Division, was ordered to cross the bridge first, followed by two divisions commanded by US brigadier generals Samuel Sturgis and Orlando Willcox.  Burnside’s last division, commanded by Brigadier General Isaac Rodman were ordered to cross the Antietam at Snavely’s Ford, approximately two miles further downstream.

Crook had his brigade in motion shortly after McClellan’s orders arrived at 10:00 a.m.  He sent skirmishers from the 11th Connecticut to seize the bridge.  Within about 15 minutes time they would be roughly treated and forced back, suffering 139 casualties.  Unfortunately, Crook’s primary assault never materialized as he had led his men to a position nearly a 1/4 mile upstream.  By 11:30 a.m., with Rodman’s division attempting to cross at Snavely’s Ford, Burnside would send US Brigadier General James Nagle’s brigade forward to take the bridge.  These soldiers would also be turned away by the Confederate fire from the far bank.  At 12:30 p.m., under increasing pressure from McClellan to take the bridge, Burnside sent Sturgis’ other brigade, commanded by US Brigadier General Edward Ferrero to take the bridge.  These men, motivated by a promise of whiskey, quickly established a hold on the east bank of the creek and began shelling the Georgians with double canister.  CSA Brigadier General Robert Toombs, in overall command of the Georgians, knew his situation was bad.  He was running low on ammunition and at 12:30 p.m. had received word that Rodman’s Federal division had crossed Snavely’s Ford.  CSA Colonel Henry Benning described the situation, “The combined fire of infantry and artillery was terrific.”(ix)  With little ammunition left, and an entire Federal division on their flank, they were forced to withdraw.  The Federals cheered when they saw the Georgians retreat.

With the bridge open, and no Rebels in their front, Burnside now had another problem to contend with.  While his soldiers were bottle necked trying to cross the bridge, it became known that staff officers had not brought adequate ammunition forward.  This would cause another two hour delay as Burnside waited to get ammunition – and men – across the narrow bridge.  It was approximately 2:00 p.m.  Meanwhile, Lee could spare no men to shore up his crumbling right flank.  Burnside’s ammunition shortage could not have come at a better time.  At 2:30 p.m., A.P. Hill had reached Lee and advised him that his 3,000 man division would be on the field in the next hour.  Lee ordered Hill to place them on his right flank.  Burnside, planning for an attack west towards Sharpsburg, was unaware that Lee was being reinforced.  At 3:00 p.m., leaving Sturgis’ division to guard the bridge, Burnside pushed west with close to 8,000 troops and 22 heavy guns.  With only D.R. Jones small division separating Burnside from flanking the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, the situation was bleak.  Additionally Rodman’s division was pushing towards Jones’ flank from the south.  The residents of Sharpsburg were panic stricken.  Burnside’s troops had pushed the Confederate flank back to within a couple hundred yards of town.

Things changed rapidly.  At 3:30 p.m., A.P. Hill arrived with his light division.  Having marched at the double quick for 17 miles, they were worn out.  However, they became energized when they heard the sound of battle.  Separating his command in two columns, he would detach two brigades to protect his flank.  The remaining 2,000 soldiers marched quickly to the right of Jones’ shattered division.  Burnside was unprepared for the vigorous assault by A.P. Hill’s Division.  Some of the heaviest fighting would occur in John Otto’s corn field where CSA Brigadier General Maxcy Gregg’s South Carolinians attacked the 16th Connecticut of Rodman’s division.  These young men had barely been in the Federal service three weeks and were immediately routed, leaving 185 casualties on the field.  Lieutenant B.G. Blakeslee of the 16th described the initial contact with Gregg’s Brigade, “(the order to move on had just been given) when a terrible volley was fired into us from behind a stone wall about five rods in front of us….In a moment we were riddled with shot.”  Blakeslee added, “Orders were given which were not understood.  Neither the line-officers nor the men had any knowledge of regimental movements.”(x)  While the 16th Connecticut was receiving its baptism of fire, the 4th Rhode Island came up on their right.  They were confused as many of the Confederates were wearing Federal uniforms captured at Harper’s Ferry.  They quickly broke and ran leaving only the 8th Connecticut in Otto’s field.  They also were quickly driven from the field and towards Antietam Creek.  Other than one last counterattack by the Kanawha division, which was unsuccessful, the fighting was over.

For my photo essay on the Battle of Antietam click HERE.

Battle Summary

Campaign: Maryland

Outcome: U.S. Victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 75,000
Confederate: 38,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 12,410 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 10,300 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
While the battle was a technical “draw,” the North considered it a victory since the Army of the Potomac held the field, after Lee retreated.  After having written the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln held it, waiting for a victory on the battlefield.  Using Antietam as the victory, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862.  This proclamation is widely considered to have changed the North’s war goals of reunification of the Union, to a battle to eradicate slavery in the United States.  The South’s goals to receive European recognition, and fresh recruits, was never realized.  US Major General George McClellan, a model of deliberate action, did not pursue Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia quickly enough for Lincoln and was removed from command on November 7, 1862.

Recommended reading on the Maryland Campaign
 
Details about “The Landscape Turn Red: The Battle of Antietam”
Written by: Stephen W. Sears
Paperback: 464 pages
Publisher: Mariner Books
Date of First Edition: June 3o, 2003
ISBN-10: 0618344195

 

Details about “Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle”
Written by: John M. Priest
Paperback: 424 pages
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date of First Edition: January 20, 1994
ISBN-10: 0195084667

 

Details about: “Guide to the Battle of Antietam”
Written by: Jay Luvaas, Harold W. Nelson and the Army War College
Paperback: 310 pages
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Date of First Edition: August 1996
ISBN-10: 0700607846

 

(i) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 85.
(ii) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 127.
(iii) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pgs. 349–352.
(iv) Battle of South Mountain, at Wikipedia, was used to research this article.
(v) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 198.
(vi) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 194.
(vii) Priest, John M., Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle, published by White Mane Publishing Co., Inc. in 1989, Pg. 160.
(viii) Priest, John M., Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle, published by White Mane Publishing Co., Inc. in 1989, Pg. 162.
(ix) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 266.
(x) Sears, Stephen W., Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1983, Pg. 288.

Today marks the 147th anniversary of the start of the Battle of Second Manassas.  For three days in August 1862, death revisited the fields north of Manassas Junction, Virginia.  Barely a year after US Brigadier General Irvin McDowell was turned away, by CSA Brigadier General P.G.T. Beauregard, at the First Battle of Manassas, an even deadlier affair would be fought on the same rolling hills.

This time the Federal troops were commanded by US Major General John Pope.  Designated the Army of Virginia, they were opposed by CSA General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  Pope, strong willed and bombastic, was reeling from his bloody repulse at the Battle of Cedar Mountain on August 9, 1862.  With his army widely scattered, he was searching for CSA Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s Left Wing.  According to intelligence Pope received, Jackson was bivouacked at Centreville, Virginia – approximately five miles east of the plains of the First Manassas Battlefield.  Late in the afternoon, on August 28, portions of US Major General Irvin McDowell’s III Corps were attacked as the pushed east on the Warrenton Turnpike, near Groveton, Virginia.  Still west of the Manassas battlefield, US Brigadier General John Gibbon’s brigade was surprised by the volley of artillery slamming into their left flank – from the north.  Believing the fire was coming from Confederate horse artillery, Gibbon deployed his brigade and advanced north towards Brawner’s Farm, unaware that he was opposed by an entire division of Jackson’s detachment.  The fighting quickly escalated with Gibbon being reinforced by US Brigadier General Abner Doubleday’s brigade.  The Battle of Brawner’s Farm was extremely brutal, with some of the most desperate fighting of the war occurring while the Federal army was spread out and very vulnerable.  Brawner’s Farm, while considered a separate battle, was the prelude to one of the largest battles of the Civil War – Second Manassas.

Get comfortable, and relax.  Take a journey with me to August 1862, to the fields north of Manassas Junction where one of the bloodiest battles of the American Civil War took place.  The following essay comes from my other website, BattlefieldPortraits.com.  Enjoy.

Battle of Second Manassas
(also known as 2nd Bull Run)

Location: Manassas, VA
Dates: August 28 – 30, 1862
Union Commander:  John Pope, Major General
Confederate Commander:  Robert E. Lee, General

Battle Summary:
Robert E. Lee had accomplished the unimaginable.  He had pushed US Major General George B. McClellan’s massive Army of the Potomac, from the “Gates of Richmond.”  After CSA General Joseph Johnston was wounded, at the battle of Seven Pines, Robert Lee would take over command of the Army of Northern Virginia.  During the Seven Days battles, Lee would hammer McClellan’s larger army until it was pushed to Harrison’s Landing, on the James River.

In the west, after earning a victory at Island #10, US Major General John Pope would be brought east, by Abraham Lincoln.  Creating the Army of Virginia, Lincoln determined to pressure Robert E. Lee, from northern Virginia.  Lee would detach his 2d Corps, commanded by CSA Major General Thomas Jackson, to keep Pope from reinforcing McClellan.  This would culminate in the Battle of Cedar Mountain, where US Major General Nathanial Bank’s detachment, from the Army of Virginia, would be badly trounced by Jackson.

Pope would consolidate his army, north of the Rappahannock River, and await Jackson’s next move.  In the meantime, with George McClellan’s Army of the Potomac retreating from the peninsula, Robert E. Lee quickly moved to consolidate his army, and deal with John Pope.

For several days, in late August, after the consolidation of the Army of Northern Virginia, John Pope did not know where Lee’s army was.  Still camped near Culpeper, Virginia, Pope would learn quickly about the speed Thomas Jackson’s “foot cavalry.”  Having “forced marched” his 2d Corps northwest, through Thoroughfare Gap, Jackson attacked Pope’s supply line, at Bristoe Station.  Pope would not learn of this until a train, destined for Bristoe Station, would rapidly return to Pope describing the terrible destruction of his supply line.

This news broke John Pope’s lethargy.  He quickly put his Army of Virginia into motion, in an effort to defeat Jackson’s lone 2d Corps.  Using separate roads, Pope’s army quickly pushed north.  US Major General Franz Sigel’s I Corps, and Irvin McDowell’s III Corps, represented the left army wing.  Nathanial Bank’s II Corps would push north on the army’s right flank.  Additionally, US Major Generals Joseph Hooker and Jesse Reno’s divisions, from the Army of the Potomac, would be in the army’s right wing.

As McDowell’s III Corps pushed north, US Brigadier General James Ricketts would detach his division, from McDowell, and push west.  Ricketts’ concern with protecting the Army of Virginia’s left flank, would culminate in a short, but brutal battle, at Thoroughfare Gap, against CS Major General James Longstreet’s 1st Corps division, commanded by CS Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox.  Facing the entire 1st Corps, of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, Ricketts’ division did not stand a chance.  Once he was pushed aside, Robert E. Lee could consolidate his army to fight Pope.  Speed was essential as Lee recognized that Pope could defeat his two wings piecemeal.

Certain that he would find Jackson at Centreville, Virginia, John Pope pushed his army towards the familiar fields near the Bull Run Creek.  Late on August 28, approaching from the west along the Warrenton Turnpike, Irvin McDowell’s III Corps would find Thomas Jackson’s 2d Corps.  Marching east were US Brigadier General John Reynolds’ division of Pennsylvanians, followed by US Brigadier General Rufus King’s division.  Just west of the old battlefield, near Pageland Avenue, Union troops spotted what appeared to be Confederate cavalry, north of the turnpike, scouting their movements.  Soon thereafter, the Rebels disappeared and King’s division started to receive cannon fire from the same ridge.  The battle of Second Manassas had opened.  In what would later been known as the Battle of Brawner’s Farm, US Brigadier Generals John Gibbon, and Abner Doubleday, would engage the entire right flank of Jackson’s 2nd Corps.  These Federal brigades would hold Jackson to a draw, during a battle that would last long past sunset.  Gibbon’s all western brigade, then called the “Black Hat Brigade” (they wore black hats similar to the regular army) would start earning the reputation that would lead to their designation - after the battle of South Mountain – the Iron Brigade.  Absent from the field near Brawner’s Farm was division commander Rufus King, who suffered a seizure, corps commander, Irvin McDowell and army commander, John Pope.  Gibbon, and Doubleday, would fight this battle without any senior command structure.  The Confederacy would temporarily suffer a significant loss when CS Major General Richard Ewell would sustain an injury to his leg, that would require amputation.

When notified of the evening’s fighting, Pope and McDowell were sure that King’s division had fought a detachment of cavalry - and perhaps a small amount of infantry.  They were positive that Jackson’s Corps was in Centreville.  Overnight they would bivouac east of Sudley Road, near the Stone House, and move on Jackson the next day.  What they did not know was that Jackson’s entire Corps was hidden in an abandoned railroad cut, just west of their position.  From there, Jackson would fight much of Sigel’s I Corps, on August 29.  In what would be piecemeal attacks, Sigel would engage Jackson.  After the battle, Jackson would be criticized for not launching a larger attack against Sigel – perhaps collapsing Pope’s right flank, and quickly destroying his scattered Army of Virginia.  The day’s fighting would end with the two armies in essentially the same position as they started in – with the exception that Robert E. Lee had arrived with the rest of his army.  James Longstreet’s 1st Corps was positioned north to south along Chinn Ridge, south of the Warrenton Turnpike.  Late in the afternoon, CSA Brigadier General John Bell Hood would attack John Reynolds’ division, along Chinn Ridge.  Pope was still not convinced that he faced the entire Army of Northern Virginia – he would find out otherwise, the next day.

On August 30, John Pope would send a large force, nearly 10,000 men, against what he now believed was just Jackson’s 2d Corps.  Attacking north of the Warrenton Turnpike, against the railroad cut, Pope would experience some success.  Robert E. Lee, seeing his opportunity to crush John Pope, wheeled James Longstreet’s 1st Corps on its left flank, and like a giant scissors slammed into John Pope’s left flank – a direction Pope was warned to expect attack - but refused to believe a threat existed.  Pope’s entire army, including US Major General Fitz John Porter’s recently arrived V Corps, from the Army of the Potomac, were sent reeling.  The unexpected attack would rout Pope’s Army of Virginia, resulting in another retreat back to Washington DC along the Warrenton Turnpike – the same route that Irvin McDowell’s army took when defeated at First Manassas.

Additional Resources:

Mike’s Photographic Essay on Second Manassas
Second Manassas Battlefield Maps from the Civil War Preservation Trust

Campaign: Second Manassas

Outcome: Confederate Victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 63,000
Confederate: 55,000

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 13,826 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 8,353 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
With John Pope’s retreat back to Washington City, the Army of Virginia was badly dispirited and disorganized.  This army would be combined with the Army of the Potomac.  Lincoln, once again, would turn to George McClellan to straighten out the army tasked with protecting the nation’s capitol.

Robert E. Lee, in an effort to recruit new troops and move the fighting out of Virginia, would invade Maryland.  McClellan would chase Lee, fighting him at South Mountain on September 14.  On September 17, the two huge armies would again clash, this time near Sharpsburg, Maryland along Antietam Creek.  The fighting at Antietam would be brutal, providing the country its single bloodiest day of battle – a record that still survives today.  Lee would barely escape Antietam.  His primary goal of recruiting soldiers was a failure.  While modern historians consider the Battle of Antietam a draw, Lincoln used the quasi-victory as an occasion to issue his Emancipation Proclamation, altering the war’s objective from reunion of the states to reunion with slavery abolished.

Today marks the 148th anniversary of the Battle of Wilson’s Creek.  During the spring, and summer, of 1861, the Lincoln administration was very concerned with keeping the border states in the Union.  These states were slave states that had not seceded from the United States and were part of the upper south.  They included Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri.  Missouri had chosen to not follow her sister slave states out of the Union, but the state had many significant pockets of “secesh.”  During this same period Lincoln was working diligently to staff his growing volunteer army with capable general officers.  At the start of 1861, there were 1,105 officers in the regular army.  Of these, 824 were West Point graduates, the majority of which were lieutenants and captains.  From this number, 296 had already resigned from the regular army, most of which had chosen to pursue careers in the private sector or not fight in the war.  184 had resigned to receive commissions in the Confederate Provisional Army.  Lincoln was left with left with 754 West Point educated officers to man his rapidly growing army.(i)  These officers would fill ranks from lieutenants to major generals.  Another consideration, as Lincoln was working to add general officers was political.  He needed to keep the Radical Republicans and War Democrats well represented.  The War Democrats were very important as most of them would come from the border states.  Lastly, Lincoln was concerned with having an ethnic balance in his general officer ranks.  German and Irish immigrants topped his list of preferred ethnicities.

Even before the Confederates fired on Fort Sumter, Lincoln had his hands full in Missouri.  It was a sharply divided state that had a Confederate supporting militia – the Missouri State Guard – and extensive guerilla activities occurring throughout the state by Partisan Rangers.  To stabilize the St. Louis area, US Brigadier General Nathanial Lyon, with an ethnic blend of local militia, primarily of German descent, marched on Camp Jackson, in St. Louis, on the morning of May 10, 1861.  The Confederate militia general, D.M. Frost, facing a vastly larger force surrendered Camp Jackson.  Without a space to house the Confederate militia, Lyon determined to parole them, after they took an oath of allegiance to the United States.  However, instead of immediately releasing the Southern militia he decided to humiliate them by marching them through the streets of St. Louis.  This proved disastrous as Southern supporting civilians had begun throwing rocks, bottles and eventually fired guns into Lyon’s soldiers.  Before the melee was over, 28 civilians had been killed and 75 wounded.  Four soldiers were also killed.(ii)  While a debacle, the capture of Camp Jackson solidified the Federal government’s control on St. Louis the majority of eastern Missouri.

By early July, the majority of the fighting in Missouri had shifted to the southwestern portion of the state.  By this time, John C. Fremont had been appointed major general in the regular army, the third highest ranking general in the United States.  On July 3, 1861 he was officially appointed to command the Western Department – encompassing all of Illinois and all states west of the Mississippi River.  Assigned to his department was Nathanial Lyon and US Colonel Franz Sigel.  Sigel represented an important ethnic group for Lincoln.  Sigel received his military training in Germany and would fight with the revolutionary forces in Germany, against Prussia, rising to the rank of general.  After immigrating to the United States, in the 1840’s, Sigel would relocate to St. Louis and be very involved in the German community.  This appealed to Lincoln as he need the support of German Americans.(iii)

In early July, Sigel would push west from Springfield, Missouri, searching for the Confederate army.  He would find them north of Carthage.  With his 1000 man army camped at Carthage, he would be induced to attack 4,000 Confederates, in battle line, 10 miles north of Carthage, on July 5.  Sigel would be guilty of not scouting the terrain well enough, and would be attacked on the flanks, before he would be forced to retire.  The first major battle in Missouri, the Battle of Carthage, would end with a Confederate victory.

With Sigel defeated, General Nathanial Lyon would rush towards Springfield, Missouri to keep Sigel from being torn apart.  Reunited with Sigel, Lyon found himself at the end of a precarious supply line, that used a railroad from St. Louis to Rolla, and wagons from Rolla to Springfield.  While Fremont had still not arrived in St. Louis (he would not arrive until July 25), he issued clear orders to Lyon stating if his army “was not strong enough to maintain his position as far in advance as Springfield, he should fall back toward Rolla until reinforcements should meet him.”(iv)  Unfortunately, Lyon would not receive these orders until three days after they were written by which time the strategic situation in southwest Missouri had changed.

Lyon was now facing a significant army of Missouri State Guard, commanded by CSA Major General Sterling Price, and the Confederate Western Army, commanded by CSA Brigadier General Ben McCullough.  By August 1, Lyon’s Army of the West would be bivouacked south of Springfield, near the Ray Farm.  Southwest of his position was the highest ground in the area.  This hill would earn the moniker, Bloody Hill, during the coming battle.  Over the coming days, Lyon would receive reports of a growing Confederate presence to his south, and southwest.  Captured Rebel soldiers provided intelligence that McCullough’s forces numbered close to 15,000, many of them cavalry that could flank Lyon’s position.  Additionally the Missouri State Guard was somewhere to the southwest.  With only a light garrison at Springfield, Lyon would call a council of war on August 3.  With almost no food to feed his army, and a tenuous supply line, Lyon determined to pull back north to Springfield.  William Branson of the 1st Iowa Infantry vividly described the situation, “General Lyon has come to the wise conclusion that it is all foolishness to march his men any further south, as he is killing more men every day marching them through the hot sun than by bullets.”(v)  On the morning of August 4, Lyon would relocate his army to Springfield.  On August 5, Lyon received bad news from St. Louis.  Fremont, finally at his headquarters, had answered previous dispatches from Lyon requesting more troops.  There would be none sent.  Pulling back to Rolla would be the most prudent choice, but Lyon was determined to push the Confederate forces from Missouri.

The situation on the Confederate side was not much better.  Price and McCullough had been openly clashing.  After a small skirmish at Dug Springs, on August 2, McCullough began to question the bravery of the troops in Price’s Missouri State Guard.  Additionally, he was unsure of Price’s ability to command effectively.  On August 4, the relationship nearly ruptured between the two commanders when Price learned that McCullough was considering a retreat to Arkansas.  Price would ride to McCullough’s headquarters and issue an ultimatum, “…if you will consent to help us whip Lyon and to repossess Missouri, I will put myself and all my forces under your command, and will obey you as faithfully as the humblest of your men….if you refuse to accept this offer, I will move with the Missourians alone, against Lyon.”(vi)  While some of this dialog may be questioned, there is no doubt that there was at least a compromise between the two officers.  McCullough would issue orders to move towards Wilson’s Creek and engage the enemy, on August 5.  Moving out as planned, Price found the Federal camps abandoned and advised McCullough that the enemy was in full retreat.  Over the coming days, the Confederate army would move their camps to the area of Wilson’s Creek – for the primary reason that the creek offered a source of good drinking water.  Starting on August 7, he would use his cavalry to determine the Federal position and strength.  McCullough determined that he would push after them and strike them in the rear.

On the Federal side, Lyon’s forces back in Springfield, would receive supplies on August 6.  This allowed the men to get their fill of food, and rest.  With the improved supply line, and his commanders’ desire to not give up southwest Missouri without a fight, Lyon’s confidence began to increase.  By this time, the Federal commander also knew that the Confederates had set up camp at Wilson’s Creek.  On August 8, Lyon met with his officers for a council of war.  He asked them, “Shall we endeavor to retreat without giving the enemy battle beforehand and run the risk of having to fight every inch along our line of retreat?  Or shall we attack him in his position and endeavor to hurt him so he cannot follow?”(vii)  Lyon, always aggressive, favored the latter option.  Sigel offered another option, suggesting that Lyon split his force, with Sigel taking the smaller portion and moving around the Confederate right flank, he would attack them from the south, while Lyon would move and attack them from the north – catching them in a pincer.  On the afternoon of August 9, Lyon would call another council of war.  Turning the meeting over to Sigel, the German explained his plan for his proposed flank attack.  The officers in attendance voiced their concerns immediately, with the biggest concern being that the size of Sigel’s flanking column was too small to be of use.  Lyon sustained Sigel and overrode their concerns.  They would attack McCullough, hurting him badly enough that he could not pursue them when they pulled back to Rolla.  He issued orders for the Federal Army of the West to begin their march at 6:00 p.m. that evening.  The plans were now set for the first major battle in the Western Theater.

Sigel began his march on the evening of August 9.  Leaving Springfield with Company I 1st U.S. Cavalry, Company C 2d U.S. Dragoons, 3d and 5th Missouri Infantry and Franz Backof’s six gun battery of the Missouri Light Artillery he had an effective strength of 1,200.  He would march east of Wilson’s Creek, to a position south of the Confederate camps, before pushing west across the creek and attacking from the south.  Lyon would lead his remaining three brigades, with batteries containing ten guns, south from Springfield.  He planned to avoid the Wire Road, the route the Confederates would expect an attack from, and push cross country from due north.

At 5:00 a.m. on August 10, Lyon arrived on the north spur of Bloody Hill.  Immediately ordering a battery of his guns to fire a volley, it signaled the army to attack.  Immediately in their front was James Cawthorn’s Missouri State Guard Cavalry – 1,200 strong.  Leading the Federal infantry assault was the 2d Kansas, 1st Missouri, 1st Kansas, 1st Iowa and a battalion of the 1st U.S. Infantry.  The Missouri infantry regiment, near the center of the line, would encounter the most resistance from Cawthorn’s cavalry.  However, with their lines significantly overlapped, the the Rebel cavalry had no choice but to fall back.  Reaching the top of Bloody Hill, and surveying the Rebel camps, Lyon was confident, “In less than an hour they’ll wish they were a thousand miles away.”(vii)

Before dawn, Sterling Price sent his adjutant, Captain Thomas Snead, to McCullough’s headquarters.  He wanted additional information on the plans to attack Lyon at Springfield.  The Confederates were totally unprepared for what was about to happen.  McCullogh, having decided to speak directly to Price, after his conference with Snead, rode the short distance to Price’s headquarters at William Edwards’ farm.  Sitting down to have breakfast with Price, they were soon interrupted by John Snyder, from Colonel Rives’ Missouri State Guard cavalry stating that the Federals were “approaching with twenty thousand men and 100 pieces of artillery.”(viii)  With heavy skirmishing and artillery fire taking place directly to their north, both Price and McCullough were fooled by a physical anomaly caused by terrain and weather conditions: an acoustic shadow.  This acoustic shadow prevented them from hearing the sounds of battle, no more than 3/4 of a mile distant.  While not twenty thousand men, Lyon’s 3,900 men were about to surprise Rive’s First Cavalry regiment.  Coming over the crest of Bloody Hill, were the 1st Missouri and 1st Kansas Infantry regiments.  Additionally Captain James Totten’s six gun battery of Company F, 2d U.S. Artillery quickly unlimbered and joined the infantry in blasting away at Rive’s cavalry.  Rive would later describe the incoming fire as, “a tremendous shower of case-shot, grape and minie ball.”  Luckily enough for Rive, the Federal aim was not perfect and much of the incoming lead missed its mark.  This would give him time to split his cavalry into two columns and escape by each flank.  They would not reunite until late in the day, after the battle was over.  CSA Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Austin and two privates were were killed in the action that morning.(ix)

Approximate 1/3 of a mile to the east, on another hill, was the Winn house.  Having set up his headquarters there, McCullough also had Captain William E. Woodruff’s four gun Pulaski Light Artillery Battery nearby.  Woodruff witnessed what was taking place on Bloody Hill, as Cawthorn’s Missouri State Guard Cavalry were rapidly descending the hill.  While not too alarmed at this point, as McCullough’s forces doubted the elan of the state militia, that soon changed when he saw Totten’s battery unlimber and start firing into the retreating cavaliers.  Quickly unlimbering his four gun section, Woodruff brought them into battery.  Spotted by the Federal artillery, on Bloody Hill, they quickly positioned their guns and began firing into Woodruff’s men.  Fortunately the Federal fire was high.  Woodruff was able to get the range correct and began pouring a fire into Lyon’s forces on Bloody Hill.  This would hold the Union forces on the hill, buying much needed time for McCullough’s Confederate Western Army and Price’s Missouri State Guard.  It would take Lyon until 6:30 a.m. to bring his brigades into position, by which time Price’s State Guard, bivouacked closest to Bloody Hill, was able to get their lines in some order to accept battle.  Simultaneously, McCullough was getting his men in line, on the east side of Wilson’s Creek – just south of the John Ray farmhouse.

As McCullough was organizing his line, US Captain Joseph B. Plummer was pushing his three company battalion, of the 1st U.S. Infantry across Wilson’s Creek.  He had been ordered to detach from the main Federal line, by Lyon, and push the Confederate right flank.  He would cross the creek just south of John Gibson’s Mill.  The Gibson family took cover in their home while Plummer’s Regulars pushed through their property, to the north end of John Ray’s cornfield.  Seeing Woodruff’s Pulaski Artillery pounding Lyon’s forces on Bloody Hill, Plummer determined to storm the artillery.  McCullough, about this time learned that his forces south of the Missouri State Guard had been attacked from the south.  Franz Sigel’s brigade had entered the fight, primarily against Confederate cavalry, at the south end of Joseph Sharp’s cornfield.  Pushing them through the cornfield, Sigel’s small brigade was able to cross the Wire Road and approach the camps of McCullough’s regulars – where confusion reigned.  Most of the Confederate soldiers were quietly enjoying breakfast and had not heard the firing on Bloody Hill, due to the acoustic shadow. 

Farther north, close to the Ray home, CSA Colonel Louis Hebert got his men in order along the Wire Road.  His 3d Louisiana Infantry and CSA Colonel Dandridge McRae’s Arkansas Battalion began to push north, up the Wire Road.  CSA Colonel James McIntosh’s 2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin T. Embry (McIntosh was at this time acting as McCullough’s adjutant) quickly passed around Hebert and McRae’s infantry and pushed towards the Ray cornfield.  The combined Rebel infantry and cavalry passed near the Pulaski Battery, which was under heavy artillery fire from Bloody Hill.  Reaching a shallow area near the Ray spring house, they were able to organize their men before pushing up the hill to the cornfield.  As they came up the hill, they were surprised to see Plummer’s Regular U.S. Infantry on the other side of a fence, bordering the field.  Two companies of Hebert’s 3d Louisiana were able to deploy and push towards the Federals who were also surprised to see so many of the enemy within 15 paces of their position.  Both sides gathered on opposite sides of the fence, with many of the U.S. Regulars kneeling for cover.  Due to tall weeds, and the fence row, Plummer’s troops were immediately at a disadvantage, “men frequently asked, ‘Where are they?’ ‘What do you see?’”(x)  This bought Hebert time to bring his detachment into proper position, from which point they started to fire.  Instructed to fire “low,” the musketry took down many Federal soldiers.  Because of the length of his line, Hebert’s forces were able to pour an enfilade fire down Plummer’s left flank.  Plummer, pacing behind the lines, encouraged his men, “Keep cool, my boys, you are doing well, you are mowing them down.”  His enthusiasm had the proper effect and allowed the Regulars to maintain their position while suffering through a hail of lead.  Hebert’s right flank, reaching far past the left flank of the Federals, began to swing around, on their left, forming a 90 degree angle.  They would suffer miserably during this move, with, “(men) dropping all along the line; it was becoming uncomfortably hot.”(ix)  Plummer’s Regulars, by this time, were outnumbered three-to-one.  McIntosh, having arrived, ordered a charge.  While elements of McRae’s Arkansas Battalion did not receive, or understand the orders, the Federals were overwhelmed by the charge and retreated north, across the cornfield, in an organized fashion.  By now, disorganized by their success, the Rebel troops stormed north after the retreating U.S. Regulars.  Pausing to reorganize their lines, they threatened to flank Lyon’s main force on the other side of Wilson’s Creek.  Seeing the failing position on their left, US Lieutenant John Du Bois brought his battery into action.  Posted on Bloody Hill, to support Totten’s Battery, he immediately began raking Hebert’s Confederates while they chased after Plummer’s soldiers.  Du Bois who had believed, “the day lost,” would prove instrumental in holding the Rebels in position, allowing the Regulars to escape across the creek.  While only a few men became casualties, the heavy artillery fire had a dramatic effect on the men.  CSA Sergeant William Watson described the fire as “a storm of shrapnel and grape.”(xii)  Hebert immediately ordered a retreat to the woods, south of their position.  During the fighting at the Ray cornfield Hebert’s detachment lost about 100 men.  Plummer would suffer significantly worse, with 90 casualties – nearly 30% of his original strength.

On the other end of the battlefield, Franz Sigel’s small brigade reached their gathering point, a tall ridge east of Wilson’s Creek, before 5:30 a.m.  Hearing Lyon’s artillery fire, from the north, he dressed his lines and prepared to attack.  Sigel then ordered the “green” 1st Missouri Light Artillery to fire towards the Confederate camps.  Unfortunately, for Sigel, this announced to the opposing forces his presence south of their position.  With shells screeching through the tree tops, McCullough’s Confederates prepared for the attack.  The following cavalry regiments got into line: 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles, the 2d Kansas-Texas Cavalry, 1st Arkansas Cavalry, James P. Major’s Missouri State Cavalry and William Brown’s Missouri State Cavalry.  CSA Colonel Elkanah Greer’s mixed Kansas-Texas cavalry sported a company, Texas Hunters, that had Colt’s repeating rifles.  These guns were highly effective.  Captain Thomas Winston, commander of the Texas Hunters, wanted to use the company to anchor the Confederate formation.  Unfortunately, it was very difficult for these men to coordinate their lines, under the heavy fire Franz Backof’s Missouri Light Artillery were firing into the camp.  The Rebel cavalry panicked, pushing north along the Wire Road towards the ford on Wilson’s Creek.  Caught up in their baggage trains, and the Missouri State Guard Cavalry, the 2d South Kansas-Texas Cavalry ended up becoming separated – with one company crossing the creek, while the other two companies pushed north towards Bloody Hill.  With the melee that resulted, Sigel’s initial bombardment threw the entire Confederate cavalry into confusion.  Some heading towards Bloody Hill while others pushed across the ford of Wilson’s Creek.  These units would operate independently, attempting to protect individual batteries, and infantry units, throughout the coming battle.

Seeing the Confederate cavalry reeling, Sigel left four of Backof’s guns on the ridge, overlooking the creek, and pushed his 2d U.S. Dragoons, 1st Cavalry units and the 3d and 5th Missouri Infantry regiments across Wilson’s Creek, to the John Dixon farm.  While Backof’s guns continued to pound the enemy, US Captain Eugene Carr dismounted his 1st U.S. Cavalry company, with one men holding four horses, the other men acted in an infantry fashion, firing their carbines into the retreating Confederate forces.  Carr would continue to push north, over 1/2 mile from Sigel’s line, and nearly to the Rebel camps.  From this position he was shocked to see McCullough’s men reforming in line of battle – in the exact area that Sigel was marching the rest of his brigade.  If the opposing sides continued to march in the same direction, the Confederates would fall on Sigel’s left flank.  Sigel, stopped at this point, and issued orders for the remainder of Backof’s guns, still on the ridge behind them, to limber up and join the rest of his brigade.  Marching north on the Wire Road, Sigel maintained his brigade in column – the most efficient method of moving troops.  Unfortunately he was unaware of the potential threat on his left, as he was monitoring the Confederates to his right, along Wilson’s Creek.  From 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., Sigel rested his troops.  Once the remainder of Backof’s guns reached the field, Sigel resumed offensive operations.  Placing them along the Wire Road, Sigel ordered Backof to open on the enemy.  The artillery once again unnerved the Rebels as they sheltered in the woods.  Pushing his brigade north on the Wire Road, they arrived at the Sharp home.  By then, the Confederate cavalry had pushed east across Wilson’s Creek and the field was clear of the enemy.  Interestingly enough, the reforming Confederate line that Carr witnessed, north of Sigel’s position, never joined the fray.

While Plummer was being attacked, in Ray’s cornfield, and Sigel was attacking the Confederate southern flank, the situation on Bloody Hill was rapidly developing.  General Nathanial Lyon was rapidly trying to position his three brigades where they could take advantage of the terrain, on Bloody Hill, to launch an assault against McCullough and Price.  It became a race to see which side could launch an attack first.  By 6:30 a.m., Lyon had organized his forces at the top of the hill.  On the far left was the 1st Iowa Infantry, on their right were six companies of the 1st Kansas Infantry, Totten’s six gun battery of the 2d U.S. Artillery, the remaining four companies of the 1st Kansas, 1st Missouri Infantry and the 2d Missouri Infantry Battalion.  Du Bois had his four gun battery positioned to the rear of Totten and the 2d Kansas Infantry was placed in reserve.  Combined, Lyon had roughly 2,800 troops in place.  Facing them were the infantry of Sterling Price’s Missouri State Guard and Cawthorn’s disorganized mob of militia cavalry.  Price was valiantly attempted to get his lines organized.

Lyon would strike first.  Sending six companies of the 1st Kansas and the entire 1st Missouri Infantry surging down the hill, he was committing less than half of his force to attack the Missouri State Guard, which numbered nearly 5,000 troops.(xiii)  It is not known why Lyon decided to send such a small force, but is can be assumed that he wanted to keep a healthy reserve as he knew the attacking force would be enfiladed by the Pulaski Battery near the Winn house.  The 1st Missouri would push ahead first, followed on their left by the six companies of Kansas infantry. Because the Kansans had to maneuver around Totten’s guns, they were slow in organizing their ranks to push down the hill.  As they marched towards Price’s battle line, 800 yards distant, they would move on opposite sides of a wooded ravine, separate by perhaps sixty yards.  Confederates, after hearing Union officers giving orders, and soldiers coming through the ravine, prepared to meet them.  With only a portion of his line complete, and not enough ammunition for all his units, Price was content to wait for their arrival.  They did not have to wait long, as the Federal soldiers began to appear between the widely spaced trees, and above the scrub brush that dotted the hillside.  Scattered fire from the Missouri State Guard, many of which had not been issued proper muskets (some were using hunting guns), began to play on the Federals.  Causing little damage, they pushed on.  Once they were in range, however, the entire line of the Missouri State Guard opened fire on them.  The musket fire was hot, and heavy.  It was estimated that the distance between the opposing lines was between 40–100 yards.  Because the woodlot had separated the two Federal regiments, each fought separately.  After a short time, Lyon ordered the rest of the 1st Kansas into the fight.  White acidic smoke began to cover the battlefield.  The commanders in Price’s command ordered their troops to conserve their ammunition, “…save your ammunition; don’t fire without taking steady aim.”(xiv)  Over the next thirty minutes the battle would rage.  At the crest of Bloody Hill, with Totten’s Battery now having no infantry support after the departure of the Kansans, Lyon ordered up US Captain Frederick Steele’s regular army battalion.  This allowed the Federal artillery batteries to keep up a withering fire.  One Rebel soldiers last words were, “Scatter, boys, you are making a target for their cannon.”(xv)  At that second, incoming artillery rounds be-headed two Confederate soldiers.

With the artillery duel between the Federal artillery, and the Pulaski Battery, Lyon’s forces at the top of Bloody Hill were unable to move.  By this time, Henry Guibor’s Missouri Light Artillery (Confederate) had moved to a position on the left flank of the Missouri State Guard.  Once in battery, these guns proved very deadly for the 1st Missouri Infantry on the right Federal attacking flank.  With additional State Guard troops moving to the Federal right, US Lieutenant Colonel George Andrews’ 1st Missouri Infantry’s position was untenable.  They had been flanked.  They began a fighting retreat back towards the main line at the top of the hill.  Stopping to face the new threat, the 1st Missouri was positioned with its right flank refused, awaiting the Rebel infantry attack.  The portion of the line facing Guibor’s Battery continued to take artillery hits – fortunately many of the artillery shells did not explode.  Battlefield accounts during this first Confederate counterattack were sketchy.  However, it is believed that some of the artillery shells, the 1st Missouri were taking, were coming from Backof’s Federal battery, located in Sharp’s field.

Further to the Federal left, the remainder of the Missouri State Guard began to push towards the 1st Kansas.  The fire was intense.  Sergeant George W. Hutt, of Atchison’s All Hazard Company (1st Kansas), described the fire, “…a perfect hurricane of bullets.  For a few minutes the struggle was terrible and the anxiety was exhibited on all faces.”(xvi)  The brave Kansans would remain in their musketry raked position until the 1st Missouri began to retreat.  Soon they would follow.  Due to the disjointed, uncoordinated Federal attack, by 7:30 a.m. the Federals were back in their original position.  Confusion reined, as the 1st Kansas was now facing MSG Colonel Richard Weightman’s State Guard brigade – many of which wore similar blue uniforms as the Kansans.  Numbering over 1,000 men, Weightman’s Brigade seriously jeopardized the Federal position.  Lyon ordering the 2d Kansas from its reserve position, to support the main line, ordered the 1st Kansas to fix bayonets and charge Weightman’s Brigade.  Fewer than 200 soldiers actually pushed back down Bloody Hill, but the unexpected ferocity of the Kansans sent the State Guard troops reeling several hundred yards down the hill.  The commander of the 1st Kansas, US Colonel George Deitzler was wounded in the attack and would be carried off the field.  This left the lone Kansans separated from the rest of the Federal army, with no commander.  Lyon ordered them back to the main line, with the exception being the Leavenworth Light Infantry, commanded by Captain Powell Clayton, which did not hear Lyon’s recall order.  In what would be one of the most unusual events of the entire battle, Clayton’s men would dress ranks and continue their push down Bloody Hill.  Running into the 5th Missouri (MSG), of Weightman’s Brigade, they believed they were part of Sigel’s attacking column having pushed through the Confederate line.  They were wearing gray uniforms similar to Sigel’s men.  When the colonel of the 5th Missouri asked Clayton which direction the enemy was, Clayton pointed towards the southwest, at which point the two opposing forces marched off together!  Before they had marched thirty yards, Clayton realized he was amongst the enemy.  Ordering his men to separate, by a right oblique move, they began to separate from the Rebels.  The adjutant of the 5th Missouri (MSG), Captain Michael W. Buster, became suspicious and ordered the men to halt, and identify themselves.  Clayton halted his men, and grabbed Buster from his horse, pointing his pistol at his chest and commanding, “Now, sir, God damn you, order your men not to fire on us, or you are a dead man.”  Buster, turning to his commander, he said, “There sir, is my colonel.”  By then the 5th Missouri (MSG) had wheeled their position and faced Clayton’s Kansans.  The Missourians let loose a volley, and Buster was shot at close range by Clayton, but was not seriously injured.  Turning quickly to his men, Clayton ordered his men to, “…run for their lives.”(xvii)

By this time, the 2d Kansas had marched over the crest of Bloody Hill.  Taking position on the left flank of the 1st Missouri, they fired a nasty volley into the Missouri State Guard.  Equipped with old flintlock rifles, that had been converted to percussion, they fired buck-and-ball – essentially a shotgun type of charge.  The charge of the 2d Kansas, in conjunction with the 1st Missouri, took all the energy out of the attacking Missouri State Guards.  Retreating down the hill, Price would once again set to work organizing his line.

Around 7:15 a.m., CSA General Ben McCullough set off to appraise the situation of Sigel’s attack on the rear of his army.  Heading south on the Wire Road, he was able to assess the damage Sigel had done to his cavalry, but he was also able to see that Sigel’s troop placements were defective.  Additionally, Backof’s Battery was placed on a rise near the Sharp home, directing their fire on the slope of Bloody Hill.  Viewing the terrain surround the battery, McCullough quickly realized that Sigel was vulnerable.  Sigel, meanwhile, had started to reposition some of his artillery so the Wire Road was covered.  He could also view enemy movement on his left, that he believed pointed to a rout of the Missouri State Guard by Lyon.  Sigel was confident of success.  He never realized how perilous his position was, separated from Lyon’s forces, with a much larger enemy force between them.  He had a cavalry force, but he was not using it to scout the position between himself and Lyon.  McCullough was already planning his counterattack against Sigel.  On his way back north, towards his headquarters at the Winn house, McCullough came upon two companies of Louisiana troops – the Pelican Rifles and the Iberville Grays.  Urging them back across Wilson’s Creek, McCullough inspired the boys, “Come, my brave lads, I have a battery for you to charge and the day is ours.”  These were good soldiers and they followed his lead.(xviii)  Leading the soldiers across Skegg’s Branch, McCullough’s force of roughly 100 men pushed away Sigel’s skirmishers.  Sigel meanwhile had been given faulty intelligence that a dust cloud, coming down the road, was from Lyon’s troops and encouraged him to display the U.S. flag to identify themselves.  With all this going on, McCullough was able to organize the two companies at Skegg’s Branch, and additional reinforcements that were brought by Colonel McIntosh, and prepare them to charge Backof’s Battery.  Sigel, concerned about firing into his troops, urged his troops to not fire into them as they were approaching down the road.  With the 3d and 5th Missouri Infantry (US) advising their troops not to fire into the soldiers on the Wire Road, Sigel dispatch Private Charles Todt to go meet the friendly soldiers.  Approaching McCullough’s troops, young Todt quickly realized they were not friendly troops.  Raising his musket to McCullough, he was quickly killed.  At this, McCullough turned to Captain Vigilini and said, “Captain, take your men up and give them hell.”(xix)  The Louisianans and troops from the Missouri State Guard charged out of Skegg’s Branch.  They were greeted with intense artillery fire, but besides Backof’s Battery, there were only 250 men of the 3d Missouri to support a line several hundred yards wide.  The Confederate forces quickly overwhelmed Sigel’s scant force, with nearly 100 of the Federals becoming casualties.  The Yankee troops were caught by surprise and were not ready.  They were expecting these troops to be from Lyon’s force, and the gray uniforms caused them to believe they were the 1st Iowa – also wearing gray.  The situation for Sigel turned hopeless when Rosser’s Missouri State Guard appeared on the ridge on their left, launching into their flank.  Sigel tried valiantly to organize his troops, but many still believed they were facing a friendly regiment.  Soon, pandemonium broke out and Sigel’s brigade, roughly three times the size of their attackers, melted away with one thing on their mind – escape.  McCullough now controlled his southern line again, and the area around the Sharp house was free of Federals.  Still facing a crisis on Bloody Hill, McCullough did not order a pursuit of Sigel.  Sigel’s brigade did not stop their retreat until they reached Springfield.

On Bloody Hill, the lull in the fighting lasted until about 9:00 a.m.  Lyon made very few adjustments of his line during this time.  Plummer’s Regulars arrived to reinforce the lines - minus Plummer as he had been carried from the field, wounded.  Lyon now had around 3,500 men to face the entire Confederate Western Army and Price’s Missouri State Guard.  With renewed artillery fire from the Confederates, many of the Federal troops were prone, on the ground.  It was not long before Lyon’s forces saw the Confederate infantry approaching, and opened fire.  A desperate battle would continue for nearly an hour.  US Major Samuel Sturgis, commanding Lyon’s First Brigade would later state that the fighting became “almost inconceivably fierce along the entire line.”(xx)  With the Rebel forces pushing through a ravine, they appeared within thirty yards of Totten’s Battery, which began to suffer casualties.  They would continue a terrific cannonade into the approach Confederates, buying additional time.  By this time, Lyon was directing his troops on foot.  He would suffer two minor wounds, one to his leg and another grazing shot to his head.  He was said to have blood matted in his beard as he continued to direct is troops.  In the center of the Union line, the First Iowa became entangled with Kansans pulling back from the heavy fire.  With Lyon, now on horseback, commanding from behind the 1st Iowa, several Confederate horsemen appeared in front of their infantry.  Lyon believing it was Sterling Price, told his escort, “to draw pistols and follow.”(xxi)  Fortunately, his escorts talked him out of putting himself in such a vulnerable position.  With Sturgis organizing the 1st Iowa, Lyon brought the 2d Kansas out of line to charge the enemy stating, “Come my brave boys, I will lead you forward.”  As they were preparing to charge, a volley of Rebel musketry erupted from the brush.  Lyon would be shot through both lungs, and his heart.  Falling from his horse, his personal aide, Albert Lehmann would catch him.  Lyon’s last words were, “Lehmann, I am going.”  Lyon would be the first Federal general officer to die in the Civil War.(xxii)  He would be taken to the Ray house where he would be placed on a bed in their front bedroom.

The fighting would continue for some time, as the Federal troops reorganized their ranks.  The Confederates would finally pull back, allowing Lyon’s troops to recover their dead and wounded.  The Confederates would suffer a significant casualty when Colonel Richard Weightman fell mortally wounded.

Around 8:45 a.m., after nearly four hours of fighting at Bloody Hill, Sterling Price sent a staffer to find McCullough.  Finding him near the Sharp farm, he advised the general that the Missouri State Guard was extremely pressed on Bloody Hill, and that the line may collapse without immediate reinforcements.  McCullough immediately sent orders for all available units to move to the hill.  This included CSA Brigadier General Bart Pearce’s brigade of Arkansas State Troops and Samuel Hyman’s battalion of the 3d Louisiana Infantry.  It was McCullough’s desire to put all the available manpower on the last remaining threat – Lyon’s three brigades (now commanded by Major Samuel Sturgis) on the Bloody Hill.  “Old Ben” (McCullough) gave a rousing speech to his forces, “You have beaten the enemy’s right and left wings, only their centre is left, and with all of our forces concentrated upon that we will soon make short work of it.”(xxiii)  As Piston and Hatcher explain in their book, “Wilson’s Creek,” the work turned out to be anything but short.  With orders reaching Colonel Elkanah Greer, to use all his available forces, from the 2d South Kansas-Texas Cavalry, to turn the enemy’s right flank, he immediately set out to work.  Only having a portion of his command left, as several companies were separated after Sigel’s initial attack at the Sharp Farm, he trotted north with his battalion.  On his way towards his mission, he would meet Colonel DeRosey Carroll and his 1st Arkansas Cavalry, who would join him for the flank movement.  Reaching their staging point, and dressing his lines, Greer yelled to his command, “Draw your pistols, men, and charge!”  One of his cavaliers, Bugler A.B. Blocker recalled the charge, “With a yell, we went toward the line of blue, like a wind….On we went-pouring lead into the blue line that was standing there 50 yards in front of us, with fixed bayonets, prepared to receive the cavalry.  The next moment that blue line was a mass of running, stampeding soldiers trying to get out of the way of that mass of horses and men that were bearing down on them.”(xxiv)  While some men probably did retreat, the Federals made a good show of themselves, eventually turning away the cavalry charge.  With heavy musketry, and artillery fire from Totten’s Battery, Greer was fortunate to only suffer 24 casualties.

At the same time as Greer’s cavaliers were charging the Federal flank, Price pushed off with his Missouri State Guard.  Leading from the front, wearing a white duster and white hat, he was said to look more like a farmer than a commanding general.  This second attack, like the first, suffered from moving over uneven terrain, with little ability to attack from a unified front.  Price would have several bullets pass through his clothing before he was finally grazed by a bullet in his side.  Price commented to an officer near him, “That isn’t fair; if I were as slim as Lyon that fellow would have missed me entirely.”  Fortunately for Price, although painful, the wound did not require immediate medical care and he stayed on the field.  As before, the State Guard suffered from a shortage of ammunition, forcing them to move closely to Sturgis’ command before discharging their weapons, the result of which has been characterized as a series of jerky forward movements.(xxv)  Once again, Price’s largely “green” force was pushed back down the hill. 

While Sturgis dealt with his alignment, Price was working to coordinate the largest attack of the day.  McCullough had arrived with the reunited 3d Louisiana commanded by Louis Hebert and additional reinforcements came from near Ray’s cornfield: three companies of the 5th Arkansas Infantry, and Colonel John R. Gratiot’s 3d Arkansas.   Price had significantly more firepower to make a final charge.  Arrayed from left to right were the 3d Arkansas, seven companies of the 5th Arkansas, two regiments of the Missouri State Guard, 1st Arkansas Mounted Rifles, Guibor’s Battery, another Missouri State Guard regiment, the 3d Missouri (MSG), the 5th Missouri (MSG), remnants of Cawthorn’s Cavalry and one one additional Missouri State Guard regiment holding the right flank.  Opening with artillery fire, from Guibor’s Battery, the 3d Arkansas started forward.  Quickly, they not only ran into fire from the front, but enfilade musketry from their left and Totten’s Battery fire from their right.  The men were forced to a prone position to keep from being annihilated.  They would suffer 110 casualties in just a few minutes time.  At approximate 10:30 a.m., the entire reinforced Confederate line started forward.  Approaching Sturgis’ Federal line, the brunt of the attack would be received in the center of the Yankee line.  With many of the Federals laying on the ground, they were forced to fire from a prone position.  The tall prairie grass, and clouds of white smoke covered the battlefield making it hard for them to see their targets.  With artillery support from the Sharp farm, McCullough and Price’s soldiers pushed forward.  The musket fire became so intense that one Kansan said, “(it sounded like) hundreds of bunches of firecrackers going off.”  After about 45 minutes, Price once again called for his troops to retreat, and reform.  On the Federal side, the 2d Kansas had run out of ammunition, and moved to the rear.  With the Confederates retreating, Sturgis determined the battle was lost and started to pull troops from his right flank with Du Bois’ Battery and the 2d Missouri following the 2d Kansas to the rear.  Seeing the Federal right flank uncovered, Hebert pushed his 3d Louisiana into action.  They would be quickly overcome by the quickly dispatched Regular Battalion of Captain Frederick Steele.  Sturgis then ordered Totten to limber his artillery and retreat off Bloody Hill, with the 1st Iowa, 1st Kansas, Home Guards and the 13th Illinois quickly following.  Totten’s battery horses would be killed, in their retreat.  Quickly recognizing that the guns may be lost, Corporal Lorenzo Immell quickly went and cut the traces from the dead horses.  With help from Private Nicholas Bouquet, of the Burlington Rifles, a horse was found to pull the caisson to the rear.  Immell would receive a painful wound in his shin, from a spent minie ball.  Both soldiers would receive the Congressional Medal of Honor for their actions to save the caisson, removing any ammunition that could be used in their stranded guns, against them.  Steele’s Regulars were acting as the rear guard, on Bloody Hill.  Within a few minutes, Confederates were seen pushing towards their exposed position.  Racing to the rear, Steele returned with several companies from the 1st Iowa, 1st Missouri and 1st Kansas.  Forming his small line, Steele ordered them to fire into the approaching enemy.  The blistering fire, from this small group of soldiers, sent the Rebels in a mad dash back down the hill.  Steele wasted no time ordering his small defensive unit to the rear once his front was clear of attackers.  The retreating Federals reached Springfield around 5:00 p.m. – nearly 24 hours after they left.  After finding Bloody Hill had been abandoned, the Confederates did not pursue.  The Western Army was “fought out.”  Years after the battle, CSA Brigadier General Bart Pearce summed up the feelings of the Confederates, “We watched the retreating enemy through our field-glasses and were glad to see him go.”(xxvi)

Several factors contributed to the Federal defeat at Wilson’s Creek.

1. Lyon’s forces were significantly smaller than those he attacked.  Military protocol usually demands that an attacking force should be three times the strength of the enemy.  In this case, the attacking force was 1/3 the strength of their foe.
2. The adoption of Franz Sigel’s flanking plan was a poor decision by Lyon.  Even with his commanders (with the exception of Sigel) not supporting this plan, Lyon adopted it.  This inevitably discouraged his commanders as Lyon went against the will of his immediate lieutenants making the council of war a mockery.
3. Even if perfectly coordinated, from a tactical sense, Sigel’s small attacking force offered little chance of military success.  Unfortunately, due to defective placement of his forces, Sigel’s slim chance became impossible – leading to the rout of his command and an early retreat to Springfield.

This author does not agree with other scholars with regards to the impact of Lyon’s death.  Lyon at times was overwhelmed trying to command a disintegrating position.  He could not manage the actions of the south side of the battlefield.  Once he was killed, Major Samuel Sturgis performed very well in overall command (Sturgis would reach the rank of brigadier general in the regular army).  He had a better tactical sense of his surroundings and responded well to all exigencies that occurred – especially during the most dangerous portion of the fight – the withdrawal.

Campaign: Wilson’s Creek

Outcome: Confederate victory

Troop Strengths
Union: 5,400
Confederate: 12,000 (approximate)

Casualties (estimated):
Union: 1,235 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)
Confederate: 1,095 (killed, wounded or missing/captured)

Battle Aftermath:
The Battle of Wilson’s Creek was a significant defeat for the United States.  Still reeling from the Federal debacle at Bull Run, three weeks earlier, the country was mortified over the additional loss of life.  With the United States having no control in southwest Missouri, the Missouri State Guard, commanded by Sterling Price, would continue to raid Federal outposts, winning a stunning victory at Lexington, Missouri in a battle fought from September 13–20, 1861.  Additionally, with little Federal presence outside St. Louis, guerilla raiders became as much of a problem as the Missouri State Guard.  While the guerilla warfare would continue through the Civil War, in February 1862, US Major General Samuel Curtis would fight McCullough and Price at Pea Ridge, Arkansas.  The battle, also called Elk Horn Tavern, would be a complete Federal success, routing the forces commanded by CSA Major General Earl Van Dorn.  Brigadier General Ben McCullough would be killed in the fighting.  This would end the Confederate presence in Missouri, until 1864, when Sterling Price once again raided the state.

(i) Work, David, Lincoln’s Political Generals, published by the University of Illinois Press in 2009, Pg. 7.
(ii) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 36.
(iii) Work, David, Lincoln’s Political Generals, published by the University of Illinois Press in 2009, Pg. 21.
(iv) Work, David, Lincoln’s Political Generals, published by the University of Illinois Press in 2009, Pg. 37.
(v) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 144.
(vi) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 147.
(vii) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 199.
(viii) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 202.
(ix) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 203.
(x) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 215.
(xi) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 216.
(xii) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 218.
(xiii) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 337.
(xiv) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 235.
(xv) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 236.
(xvi) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 242.
(xvii) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 244.
(xviii) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 251.
(xix) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 253.
(xx) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 263.
(xxi) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 265.
(xxii) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 268.
(xxiii) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 270.
(xxiv) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 271.
(xxv) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 273.
(xxvi) Piston, William Garrett and Hatcher, Richard W. III, Wilson’s Creek: The Second Battle of the Civil War and the Men Who Fought It, published by The University of North Carolina Press in 2000, Pg. 286.

On July 24, 1864, commanding general, Ulysses S. Grant approved US Major General George Gordon Meade’s request to detonate a mine under the Confederate lines at Petersburg.  In his order, Grant stated, “If this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at that point in the enemy’s line we expect to penetrate.  All officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy’s present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through.”(i) 

Centered near Pegram’s Salient (also called Elliott’s Salient for the infantry brigade commanded by Stephen Elliott), the tunnels, and galleries took several weeks to build.  The 48th Pennsylvania was tasked with building the tunnels, adding supports and placing the galleries in the correct places.  Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants, many of the men of the 48th Pennsylvania were miners by trade.  With the mine excavations completed on July 27, Grant ordered the mine to be detonated at 3:30 A.M., on July 30.  Packed with 8,000 pounds of black powder, evenly placed in separate magazines in the galleries, they were connected with wooden troughs half filled with powder.  Common blasting fuses were used to light the explosives, and ran 98 feet to a wall, constructed of logs and sandbags.  This wall was designed to keep the powerful explosion centered under the Rebel line.(ii)

On July 30, Pleasants lit the fuse at 3:15 A.M., after which he walked calmly out of the shaft.  The mine did not explode at 3:30 A.M.  Deciding to give it one hour to detonate, Pleasants asked for volunteers when the mine had not exploded by 4:15 A.M.  Sergeant Henry Reese, and Lieutenant Jacob Douty, both of the 48th Pennsylvania, volunteered to enter the shaft.  Entering the shaft, they found that all three fuses had been extinguished at a splice.  The fuse was repaired, and the men quickly exited the shaft.(iii)

The mine exploded at 4:44 A.M., with devastating results.  US Captain Thomas W. Clark, describing the blast stated, “There flashed out a lily-shaped fountain of dark red and yellow fire, with brown streaks in it.”(iv)  The explosion was strong enough to lift many of the prone Federal soldiers off their bellies in front of the Federal lines.  It created a “crater” in the earth, 30 feet deep, 50 feet wide and 125 feet long that would be described as resembling “a long Irish potato.”(v)  It is estimated that between 275–300 Confederate soldiers were instantly killed in the blast – or buried alive while they slept.

Tasked with leading the infantry charge against Pegram’s Salient was US Brigadier General James H. Ledlie.  Commanding a division in US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps, Ledlie had a less than stellar reputation – having been found drunk during the action at the North Anna River.  Burnside had originally planned on using US Brigadier General Edward Ferrero’s Fourth Division, consisting of United States Colored Troops (USCT), for the attack, but was overruled by Meade.  Burnside’s reasoning was that Ferrero’s division was better rested than his other veteran divisions.  Meade was concerned with how the “green” USCT troops would react under severe pressure on such an important operation.  Grant sustained Meade and the matter was put to rest.(vi)

After an opening salvo of artillery fire, from US Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt’s batteries, Ledlie ordered his troops forward – approximately ten minutes after the blast. His division quickly pushed towards the crater.  Two brigades, commanded by colonels William F. Bartlett and Elisha G. Marshall, streamed into the crater.  Ledlie, not possessing the best communication skills, did not issue clear orders for his brigade commanders resulting in the brigades entering the crater and not pushing to the ultimate target - the high ground beyond the Confederate lines.  Confusion reigned within the crater as the soldiers had no way of scaling the wall on the Confederate side.  Following Ledlie’s brigade were portions of US Brigadier General Robert B. Potter’s Second Division.  These troops, aligned on the right of Ledlie’s division, pushed to the Rebel lines north of the crater.  Due to the confusion of battle, some of US Colonel Simon Griffin’s Second Brigade veered left into the crater – creating additional mayhem.  Following Ledlie and Potter’s division was a portion of US Brigadier General Orlando Willcox’s Third Division.  Forming a second line of battle, Willcox’s first brigade, commanded by US Colonel John Hartranft, entered the crater, further compacting the mass of men, while the remainder of the division pushed to the south of the crater.

Opposing the Federal troops were Confederate troops under the command of CSA Brigadier General Stephen Elliott.  Consisting of men from South Carolina, Elliott’s Brigade included the 17th, 18th, 22d, 23d and the 26th South Carolina infantry regiments.  South of the crater was CSA Colonel J.T. Goode’s brigade of veteran Virginians.  Elliott’s Brigade would receive the thrust of Potter’s Federal division, while Goode’s Brigade would defend against Willcox’s division.  While portions of Elliott’s brigade streamed to the rear, the 49th North Carolina, of CSA Brigadier General M.W. Ransom’s Brigade pushed to the face of the crater.  They quickly began emptying their muskets into the mass of men stuck in the crater.  The action was vividly described by North Carolina infantryman Thomas R. Rouhac, “Our men aimed steadily and true, and as each rifle became too hot to be used another gun was at work by one who took the place of the first, or supplied him rifles that could be handled.”(vii)

Meade, growing impatient with the stagnated fighting ordered Burnside to, “push your men forward at all hazards (white and black) and don’t lose time in making formations, but rush for the crest.”(viii)  Burnside immediately issued orders to all division commanders to push forward.  Meade, not directly witnessing the action in the crater, would become incensed when he learned of the confusion in the crater.  He further ordered Burnside to use troops from the V and XVIII Corps, as necessary. 

On the Confederate side, much of Elliott’s Brigade had scattered in the confusion of the blast, with the remaining troops all that separated Burnside from successfully penetrating the line.  These South Carolinians fought bravely holding back a much larger force.  Elliott, after ordering a charge around 6:00 A.M., was shot as soon as he stepped out of the trench.  Command of the brigade passed to CSA Colonel Fitz W. McMaster, of the 17th South Carolina, who placed the brigade in position north, and south, of the crater.  McMaster’s efforts were greatly augmented by artillery which poured a deadly fire into the crater, and its approaches.

About this time, CSA General Robert E. Lee learned of the action at Pegram’s Salient.  He immediately dispatched his staffer, Colonel Charles Venable, to CSA Brigadier General William Mahone, ordering two of his brigades to support Elliott and Goode.  Federal signal officers quickly noticed this movement and alerted Meade, who believed he might have an opportunity west of the Jerusalem Plank Road.  Ordering US Major General Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps to determine the feasibility of an attack south of Burnside, they quickly determined that it would be impractical.  Burnside was on his own and Mahone’s brigades now made their presence known at the crater.

Communication on the Federal front was terrible.  Meade felt that Burnside was deliberately keeping him uninformed, while Ledlie provided Burnside no communication.  When he sent his division forward, Ledlie quietly retired to a bombproof behind the lines.  Complaining of malarial symptoms, the surgeon of the 27th Michigan provided Ledlie with rum.  When he received orders from a Burnside staffer to send his division to the ridge behind Pegram’s Salient, Ledlie directed the staffer to spread word to his division.(ix)  Ledlie would later be cashiered for being intoxicated during the battle.

By 9:00 A.M. the Federals held roughly 300 yards of the Confederate trenches.  With all of his troops now in the fray, Ferrero’s Fourth Division, composed of the USCT’s troops, were leading the push towards the ridge, and the Jerusalem Plank Road.  With the tangled mass of men in the crater, only the 30th and 43d USCT regiments managed to break through.  Colonel Delavan Bates, of the 30th USCT, urged his men forward, “Remember Fort Pillow!”(x)  Bates, shot in the face, would survive his wound and be awarded the Medal of Honor on June 22, 1891.

Facing Ferrero’s USCT troops were Mahone’s two brigades which he took personal command of.  Leading his old brigade, commanded by Brigadier General David Weisiger, he would send them to support Elliott’s 200 soldiers north of the crater.  Much hand-to-hand combat took place between Weisiger’s Virginians and the US Colored Troops.  After about twenty minutes the Federal troops had been cleared from the captured trenches.  Meanwhile, south of the crater, Hartranft ordered his men back to a portion of Pegram’s Salient that was still intact.  With the arrival of Mahone many of the Federal troops in the crater retreated in disorder for the Union lines.  However, approximate 600 men remained in the crater, many of them black troops.  They would claw their way to the top of the precipice and would either be shot, or clubbed, inevitably rolling back down the face into the soldiers under them.  The men writhing in the bottom of the crater were mercilessly picked off by Mahone’s Confederates, with little means of defending themselves.

By this time, at Federal headquarters, both Grant and Meade had determined to call off the attack.  Between 9:30 and 10:00 A.M. Burnside received two orders to call off his offensive.  Determined to resurrect his plan, Burnside rode to headquarters to plead his case with Meade.  Meade was unmoved, but allowed Burnside to wait until dark to pull his men back.  Upon returning to his headquarters, at Fourteen Gun Battery, Burnside issued ambiguous orders for retreat, leaving the timing up to his division commanders.  Before these orders reached the field, Mahone issued orders to Hall’s Georgia brigade to attack south of the crater.  This proved a dismal failure as the Georgians, under heavy fire from the crater, pushed towards the left, behind Weisiger’s brigade.  Undeterred, Mahone ordered Sanders’ Brigade to attack south of the crater, at 1:00 PM.  While waiting for the arrival of Sanders, the Federal troops received their orders from Burnside.  Determining that it would be too dangerous to retire during daylight, they stayed in the crater.  Sanders attack started at 1:00 P.M., as planned.  They arrived at the edge of the crater, but advanced no further, for fear of falling into the mass of Federals in the hole.  Resorting to throwing their bayonet tipped muskets into the crater, or throwing dirt clods, they were ineffective.  Finally they pushed into the crater.  They immediately started killing the black soldiers – even after many of them had surrendered.  After about thirty minutes, the crater was completely commanded by Sanders’ brigade.  They captured 500 men and three regimental flags.  The debacle at the crater was finally over.(xi)

All told, the Federals suffered 3,800 casualties at the Battle of the Crater – over 500 were killed.  On the Confederate side, losses were approximately 1,500 of which there were 200 killed in action.  Grant clearly made his opinion known, “The effort was a stupendous failure.  It cost us about 4,000 men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault.”(xii)  For the next eight months, the combatants would continue to attempt to outmaneuver each other in front of Petersburg.  Finally, on April 2, 1865, Grant would break Lee’s lines at Petersburg, ending in the surrender of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865.

Earl J. Hess’ scholarly work on Petersburg, “In the Trenches of Petersburg,” was used to research this article.  This is a wonderful analysis of all the actions at Petersburg, during the ten month offensive.  For more information on this book, please read my review on the book by clicking here.  Included is an in-depth interview with Mr. Hess that is very enlightening.

(i) Grant, Ulysses S., Grant Memoirs and Selected Letters, published by The Library of America 1990, Pg. 611.
(ii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pgs. 84–85.
(iii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 90.
(iv) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 90.
(v) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 91.
(vi) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pgs. 87–88.
(vii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 92.
(viii) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 93.
(ix) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 97.
(x) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pg. 98.
(xi) Hess, Earl J., In the Trenches at Petersburg: Field Fortifications & Confederate Defeat, published by The University of North Carolina Press, June 2009, Pgs. 98–103.
(xii) Grant, Ulysses S., Grant Memoirs and Selected Letters, published by The Library of America 1990, Pg. 613.