This Mighty Scourge

With a short narrative of the Battle of Prairie Grove, Arkansas

I recently finished reading Professor William L. Shea’s newest book, “Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign.”  This is an excellent book on the little known Battle of Prairie Grove, Arkansas.  I am hoping to have a text based interview with Dr. Shea published in the near future.  While reading the book I came upon the heroic story of CSA Colonel Joseph C. Pleasants.  I was so intrigued by Pleasants that I decided to write an article on the Confederate hero.  It can be read by clicking HERE.  As a companion to that article, I decided to write the following narrative on another American hero, Lieutenant Colonel John C. Black, who commanded the 37th Illinois Infantry, of the Federal Army of the Frontier, at Prairie Grove.  Black would fight in the opposing lines against Colonel Pleasants’ Arkansas infantry.  Both of their stories are fascinating and deserve to be told.

Lieutenant Colonel John Charles Black

John Charles Black was born on January 27, 1839 in Lexington, Mississippi.  The family would move to Danville, Illinois in 1847.  His father, John, was a Presbyterian minister and would marry Josephine Culbertson.  She would bear him four children, with John Charles being the oldest.  His father, having died in 1847, would leave Josephine to raise the four children.  She would marry William Fithiane and continue to reside in Danville.(i)

With the outbreak of the Civil War, John and his younger brother William, would enlist in the 11th Indiana Infantry, commanded by future major general, and author, Lew Wallace.  Enlisting as a private, he would reach the rank of sergeant-major during his 90 day term of enlistment.  During his tenure with the 11th Indiana, Black would fight at Romney, West Virginia, earning accolades for his bravery.  After being mustered out of the 11th, Black would return to Danville where he would help recruit Company K, 37th Illinois Infantry.  He would be elected captain of the company, with William being elected first lieutenant.(ii)  With the formal organization of the 37th, John would be appointed major, with William being promoted to captain of the company.  Known as the Fremont Rifles, the 37th Illinois would be commanded by Colonel Julius White.  Officially mustering into service on September 18, 1861, at Chicago, Illinois, it would depart for St. Louis, Missouri the next day.  After arriving in St. Louis they would be reviewed by US Major General John C. Fremont, during which his wife, Jessie Benton Fremont, tied red, white and blue ribbons to the staff of their regimental colors.

From St. Louis the 37th Illinois would be sent to Boonville, Missouri in early October.  On October 13, the regiment, less two companies left at Boonville, would march with Fremont to Springfield, Missouri, where CSA Major General Sterling Price’s Missouri Home Guard was garrisoned.  By the time they arrived, the Confederates had retreated into northwest Arkansas.  The regiment would be reunited in southwest Missouri, in February 1862, where it became part of the newly christened Army of the Southwest, commanded by US Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis.

Curtis would waste little time, quickly pursuing the retreating Confederate army on the Wire Road.  Pushing through Cassville, Missouri, Curtis’ Federal forces would march into northwest Arkansas where they would be camped on Sugar Creek in early March 1863.  On March 7, CSA Major General Earl Van Dorn would launch a surprise attack against the Federal army at Pea Ridge, Arkansas.  During the first day’s fight, the 37th Illinois would be brigaded with the 59th Illinois and the Peoria Battery.  Commanded by Colonel White, the brigade would repulse a much larger Confederate force at Oberson’s Field, during the opening engagement of the battle.  Fighting in a woodlot, north of Leetown, Major Black’s 37th Illinois would perform bravely in the seesaw fight.  They would sleep on their arms that night.  The battle would resume the next day when Curtis would rout the larger Confederate force, that had little ammunition.  During the hard fought battle, the 37th Illinois would suffer 135 casualties, 21 being killed in action.  Colonel White would be promoted to brigadier general after the battle, and would be sent east.  Lieutenant Colonel Myron Barnes would be promoted to colonel with Black being promoted lieutenant colonel.

During the summer of 1862 the 37th was assigned guard duty in southwest Missouri.  Frequently fighting bands of guerillas, the regiment would endure significant marching during that hot summer.  Black would lead an independent command against a Rebel force at Neosho, Missouri successfully driving them into present day Oklahoma.  Over two days, Black would march his regiment over 100 miles, engage in a significant skirmish and capture over 300 prisoners.  Inevitably, this independent performance would garner much attention.

By late September the 37th Illinois was pulling out of their camps, near Springfield, Missouri.  With US Brigadier General John M. Schofield now in command of the Army of the Frontier, it contained two Missouri Divisions commanded by brigadier generals James Totten and Francis Herron.  Moving east to connect with Schofield was a mixed division of soldiers called the Kansas Division.  This division was commanded by Brigadier General James G. Blunt.  On September 30, some of Blunt’s forces were surprised by a Confederate cavalry attack at Newtonia, Missouri.  With the Confederates holding the village, Schofield and Blunt quickly sent reinforcements to the vicinity, launching a large artillery attack on the Confederate position on October 4. Offering scant resistance, the Rebel calvary quickly vacated the area.  One Texas cavalier aptly described the rout, “The men were panic stricken and nothing could be done with them, in fact I think the officers were in the forefront.”(iii)  The 37th Illinois, and the rest of the Missouri divisions, continued pushing after the fleeing Confederate cavalry.  Without a fight the Confederacy had given up their only lodgement in southwest Missouri.

Over the coming four weeks Brigadier General Francis Herron, now commanding the two Federal Missouri Divisions with Schofield on sick leave in St. Louis, marched his men across southwest Missouri and northwest Arkansas.  These foot sore soldiers had quite a journey: Cassville, Missouri, Pea Ridge Arkansas, Huntsville, Arkansas, Bentonville, Arkansas, Cross Hollows, Arkansas (near Pea Ridge), Osage Springs, Arkansas, Fayetteville, Arkansas and finally, on December 1, they arrived at Camp Lyon, near Springfield, Missouri.  Unfortunately, their stay would be quite short.  During the same period of time James Blunt had pushed his Kansas Division to the very entrance of the Boston Mountains, in northwest Arkansas.  After forcing the Confederate cavalry from the area of Cane Hill, Arkansas, Blunt bivouacked his men there.  This drastically changed the strategic situation for Confederate theater commander Major General Thomas Hindman.  With Blunt’s forces gathered at Cane Hill, they could easily flank his position, south of the Boston Mountains, by using any of five major roads in the area.  Hindman determined that the best action was offensive and would set his Trans-Mississippi Army in motion.  With Blunt in overall command of the three Federal divisions, he ordered Herron to bring the two Missouri Divisions to his aid with celerity.  They moved out of December 3, 1862.

Meanwhile, changes had occurred within the 37th Illinois.  Colonel Myron Barnes had retired.  Taking his place in command of the regiment was Lieutenant Colonel John Charles Black.  Black’s intrepid foot soldiers had earned the moniker “The Illinois Greyhounds” for their quick mobility.  They would get to prove it again during their forced march to Blunt’s relief.  As Shea describes in his book, “Fields of Blood,” Herron’s Missouri Divisions would be marching within six hours of receiving Blunt’s dispatch – “What followed was an epic of human endurance.”(iv)  Herron’s soldiers would endure a march of nearly 120 miles to reach Blunt.

On December 5 Hindman had his army on the move early.  They had been camped at Lee Creek, in the Boston Mountains.  Hindman believed that Blunt would expect the main assault to be on his position at Cane Hill.  Pushing north on Cove Creek Road, Hindman changed his mind.  Upon reaching the junction of Cove Creek and Van Buren roads, he decided to push the majority of his army north while sending only a small detachment northwest on the Van Buren Road, from Morrow’s.  His plan was to place the majority of his Trans-Mississippi Army between Blunt and Herron, and defeat the two wings separately.  To make his feint against Blunt he sent Lieutenant Colonel James C. Monroe’s Arkansas Cavalry and Brigadier General Mosby Parsons’ Missouri infantry brigade towards Reed’s Mountain.  Parsons was to remain in reserve as Monroe’s troopers pushed across Reed’s Mountain.  Facing them was US Lieutenant Colonel Owen Bassett’s 2d Kansas Cavalry.  Holding the high ground, the Kansans were able to repel the first Rebel attack, at which point Parsons’ infantrymen joined the fray.  With his cavalry in a rough position, Blunt ordered US Colonel Thomas Ewing, Jr.’s 11th Kansas Infantry to their support.  These troops were able to hold Reed’s Mountain and the two opposing forces held their positions throughout the day until Parsons pulled his infantry back to Cove Creek Road to rejoin the army.

Meanwhile, the rest of Hindman’s forces continued their march north on Cove Creek Road.  Hindman planned on pushing to the Fayetteville Road where his army would approach Prairie Grove on two parallel roads.  Once at Prairie Grove, he intended on pushing north, to the Illinois River, to attack Herron’s strung out Missouri Divisions.  Unfortunately, all did not go according to plan.  Upon reaching Prairie Grove, CSA Brigadier General Francis Shoup’s Division formed a defensive line on the north facing slopes of the hill that Prairie Grove occupied.  Instead of pushing north towards the Illinois River, in an offensive move to hammer Herron, he instead settled into a defensive position.  The stage was rapidly being set for a major confrontation.

After Herron’s two Missouri Divisions crossed the Illinois River, they entered Crawford’s Prairie.  Here they established a heavy artillery presence while the infantry began to assemble.  This made any Confederate offensive operations a very difficult proposition.  While Hindman’s forces commanded Crawford’s Prairie from the heights of Prairie Grove, the superiority of the Federal artillery would make an assault on their position very difficult.  Additionally, Hindman had received no significant information on any movement Blunt was making with his Kansas Division.  Instead of being the pursuer, Hindman suddenly found himself the pursued – two Federal divisions in his front and one lurking somewhere in his rear. 

While Herron’s two divisions were preparing in Crawford’s Prairie, there was a noticeable lack of preparation taken place on the slopes of Prairie Grove.  Perhaps it was due to a feeling of superiority that the heights provided or perhaps it was complacency amongst the Confederate high command.  Regardless, as 1:30 p.m. approached, General Shoup ordered Captain William D. Blocher to “stir things up.”  Blocher quickly ordered a howitzer fired which caused no damage to the enemy.  Captain David Murphy’s Battery F, 1st Missouri Light Artillery, responded to the single howitzer shot with a heavy barrage from his six guns.  These guns found there mark as described by a Confederate officer, “The enemy greatly outnumbered us and outranked us in the character of cannon, having the most improved rifle guns, and handled them with remarkable skill.”(v)

With the artillery duel continuing, Herron pushed his first wave of infantry towards the Rebel position along the hill.  This consisted of Major Henry Starr’s 20th Wisconsin, Lieutenant Colonel John McNulta’s 94th Illinois and Lieutenant Colonel Samuel McFarland’s 19th Iowa.  As these three regiments pushed through the cornfields, in front of the ridge, John Black’s 37th Illinois tensely waited on Crawford’s Hill supporting the Federal artillery posted there.  Posted to his left were Colonel John Clark’s 26th Indiana and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Leake’s 20th Iowa.  As they watched, from across the open prairie, the 19th Iowa and 20th Wisconsin pushed towards the Rebel line held by CSA Brigadier General James F. Fagan’s Arkansas Brigade.  McNulta’s 94th Illinois inexplicably broke off from the rest of the Third Division’s infantry, pushing further east towards the Rebel’s right flank, held by CSA Colonel Joseph Shelby’s Missouri Cavalry Brigade.  This would cause two things to happen.  First Shoup would pull Colonel Emmett MacDonald’s Cavalry Brigade from the bench in front of the ridge, sending it to reinforce Shelby’s dismounted troopers.  Secondly, he directed CSA Colonel Dandridge McRae to send three of his brigade’s five Arkansas regiments to reinforce the left flank of Fagan’s brigade.  These regiments would extend the Confederate left flank past the Fayetteville Road.  With Black’s Illinoisans watching from Crawford’s Prairie, the 19th Iowa and 20th Wisconsin slammed into Fagan’s Brigade.  After a severe fight, some of which was hand-to-hand, the two regiments would be forced back to their jump off point in the prairie.  An Iowan from the 19th regiment described the situation as the Rebels “raised up on three sides of us and poured an incessant fire into our ranks.  They were on one side of the fence and we were on the other.”(vi)  This fight at the Borden Orchard decimated the ranks of both the Federal regiments.  The fate of McNulta’s 94th Illinois was much different.  Described as remaining in the background, they suffered 34 casualties, only one of which was killed.  As described by William L. Shea, each of the companies of the 19th Iowa and 20th Wisconsin, that scaled the hill, suffered more casualties than the entire 94th Illinois suffered.

With the remnants of the Federal regiments retreating, several of Fagan’s Arkansas regiments quickly pursued them and were greeted by tremendous artillery fire, quickly forcing them to retrace their steps.  Brigadier General Herron would succinctly describe the Confederate counterattack, “The fighting was desperate beyond description.”(vii)

Around 3:00 p.m., General Herron ordered US Colonel Daniel Huston to make his division ready - including John Black’s 37th Illinois.  By this time, the division had been in reserve near Crawford Hill for several hours.  Many of the men had been lying on the ground for several hours and were quite cold.  With the the Third Division pulled back to Crawford’s Prairie and the Rebels back in line on the hillside, the tactical situation was similar to what the sides faced when the battle had started – with the exception of hundreds of wounded and dead soldiers between the lines!  Huston, having witnessed the repulse of the Federal Third Division, and the failed Confederate counterattack, had ordered Black’s 37th Illinois and the 26th Indiana forward to the Fayetteville Road.  After pulling down the fences that ran along the road, the path for attack was open.  However, from their position they would be marching across open ground and subject to enfilade fire from McRae’s Arkansans.  With the arrival of Huston’s Division in his front, Shoup pleaded for reinforcements.  His division had suffered severely in its morning battle with the Federal Third Division and may not withstand another attack.  Hindman quickly sent Colonel Robert Shaver’s Arkansas Brigade to his support.  Shaver was part of Brigadier General Daniel Frost’s Division and this would be the first of his troops sent to the north section of the battlefield.  This represented a significant change in Hindman’s mindset as he had kept all of Frost’s soldiers in reserve where they could be used to prevent a surprise attack from Blunt’s Kansas Division at Cane Hill.  Was this an act of desperation or was Hindman certain that his feint against Cane Hill had totally fooled Blunt?

At the time of the Battle of Prairie Grove, Lieutenant Colonel John Charles Black was 23 years old.  Well educated and ambitious, Black had been rapidly promoted in the volunteer army after his strong performance at the Battle of Pea Ridge.  Waving his sword and shouting out orders, Black’s presence on the battlefield was not lost on his soldiers, one of which remarked that his long hair “gave him rather a peculiarly grand appearance.”(viii)  On this early December afternoon, in 1862, Black would provide his most valuable service to his country.  Pushing his regiment southeast towards the Borden House, nearly parallel with the bench, the 37th Illinois would be closest to the Rebel line.  With the 26th Indiana on their left, the Illinoisans would receive enfilade fire from the Confederate position.  Upon reaching the Borden house, Black gave his men time to break ranks before dressing their lines on the other side of the structure.  Unfortunately the time expended reforming their lines caused them to be become separated from the Hoosiers.  Reaching the orchard, the men from Illinois were greeted with the horrible site of the day’s festival of death – soldiers from both sides sprawled out in every conceivable way – some dead, some dying and some severely wounded.  The 26th Indiana had briefly fought in the wooded thicket to their east, but were quickly repulsed with the men streaming to the rear.  Black formed his regiment along a fence line on the north side of the orchard.  With smoke from the guns reducing visibility, the Illinoisans peered towards the hill, while shadows were lengthening with the rapidly gathering blanket of dusk.  The men inevitably heard commands being yelled out along the hillside and watched as Fagan’s Arkansas Brigade “rose like a wall before us.”  Letting loose a volley of musketry, the Rebels advanced towards Black’s men along the fence.  Black’s soldiers, now veterans, held their line and returned fire, opening gaps in Fagan’s line that would quickly close.  Black noted that, “The enemy were in immense force immediately in my front, advancing and firing as rapidly as they came….(the hail of bullets) did not seem to check them at all in their advance.”  Another Federal officer described their return fire, “The leaden hail came in one continuous stream of fire, not unlike a severe hail storm.”(ix)  One of these hissing missiles found its mark slamming into the humerus bone of Black’s uninjured left arm.  The severely wounded officer did not move to the rear but remained in the saddle, providing a calming influence over his severely pressed troops.

Facing Lieutenant Colonel Black’s 37th Illinois, in the orchard, was Charles Adams’ Arkansas Infantry regiment.  Part of Shaver’s Brigade, most of his Arkansans had never been in battle.  With a continuous storm of musketry, most of Adams’ regiment quickly made their way to the rear, not stopping until they reached the Buchanan house, nearly a mile in the rear.  Unfortunately, the retreat of Adams’ regiment did little to ease the pressure Black’s Illinoisans were receiving from three sides.  Fearing his regiment would be captured, Black ordered his men to retreat with few wasting any time making their way to the foot of the hill.  From there they would need to cross an expanse of open ground to reach the main Federal line.  With musketry and the occasional artillery ordnance chasing them along, Black’s 37th Illinois finally made it back to the Federal lines.  Unfortunately they would return with nearly 20% less men than they had started the day with.  Fortunately for the Federal goal – securing Missouri – General Blunt would arrive from the west with his Kansas Division.  While they would attack the Confederates and be repulsed, they would survive a counterattack on their position.  The next day, Blunt would meet with Hindman and agree to a truce to remove the dead and wounded. Hindman would use the truce to retreat from Prairie Grove.  His Trans-Mississippi Army would spend the winter at Fort Smith, while Blunt would continue to press his Army of the Frontier, marching back and forth across southwest Missouri and northwest Arkansas.  The total butcher’s bill for the fight at Prairie Grove would be nearly 2,600 casualties evenly spread across the two armies.

With the advent of spring the campaign season of 1863 opened.  The 37th Illinois would take part in the Battle of Chalk Bluffs, near Cape Girardeau, Missouri, on May 2, 1863.  From southeast Missouri, Black would be sent, as part of Herron’s division, to Vicksburg where his regiment would be placed in the siege lines on June 13.  The proud 37th Illinois would take a prominent role in the Siege of Vicksburg and would march in to the town on July 4, 1863.  Over the coming months Black would lead his regiment during engagements in Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas.  By this time Black had been promoted to colonel and was commanding a brigade that included the 26th Indiana, 20th Iowa and 37th Illinois.  In February 1864 the men of the 37th would re-enlisted for three years, or the duration of the war.  Mustering back into service on February 28 they would receive a 30 day furlough before heading for Memphis.  From here they were ordered to pursue CSA Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry into central Tennessee.  Over the coming months they would again see service in Arkansas and Louisiana.  In January 1865 the brigade would be sent to Pensacola, Florida from New Orleans.  On March 13, Colonel Black received brevet promotion to brigadier general of volunteers.  In April the brigade would participate in the siege and storming of Fort Blakely and would enter Mobile, Alabama.  After returning Texas the brigade would slowly be mustered out of service, with the 37th Illinois mustering out on May 15, 1865, the 20th Iowa on July 8, 1865 and the 26th Indiana on January 15, 1866.  All told, the 37th Illinois, Black’s original regiment, would travel 17,800 miles during the war (14,600 miles by steamer and 3,300 miles by foot) while suffering 233 casualties from all causes.

After the war, General Black would practice law and would become U.S. District Attorney of Chicago.  He would be elected to the U.S. Congress, as a Democrat, and would serve Illinois in that capacity for six terms.  He would be elected president of the Grand Army of the Republic and serve in that capacity from 1903–1904.  From 1904 through 1913 he would serve as president of the United States Civil Service Commission.  Having received severe wounds to both of his arms, he was significantly disabled after the war.  He was recognized for his brave and gallant service by being awarded the Medal of Honor for bravery at the Battle of Prairie Grove.  His citation follows:

Gallantly charged the position of the enemy at the head of his regiment, after 2 other regiments had been repulsed and driven down the hill, and captured a battery; was severely wounded.”(x)

General Black would marry Adaline Livona Griggs in 1867.  Together they would have three children: Gracia Mildred (1870), John B. (1872) and Helene (1883).  He would die suddenly on August 17, 1915 in Chicago, Illinois.  He is buried at Spring Hill Cemetery in Danville, Illinois.  General John Charles Black is a true American HERO.

(i) John Charles Black, on Ancestry.com, was used to research this article.
(ii) See John Charles Black at the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States and the Illinois Civil War Regiment and Unit Histories.
(iii) Shea, William L., Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign, published by UNC Press in 2009, Pg. 28.
(iv) Shea, William L., Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign, published by UNC Press in 2009, Pg. 128.
(v) Shea, William L., Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign, published by UNC Press in 2009, Pg. 160.
(vi) Shea, William L., Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign, published by UNC Press in 2009, Pg. 176.
(vii) Shea, William L., Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign, published by UNC Press in 2009, Pg. 180.
(viii) Shea, William L., Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign, published by UNC Press in 2009, Pg. 189.
(ix) Shea, William L., Fields of Blood: The Prairie Grove Campaign, published by UNC Press in 2009, Pgs. 190–191.
(x) Proft, R.J. (Bob), United States of America’s Congressional Medal of Honor Recipients and Their Official Citations, published by Highland House II in 2006, Pg. 809.

Since last Thursday evening, I have been on somewhat of a sabbatical leading close to 30 men on a Catholic/Christian retreat.  I consider teaming on retreats to be the highest calling I have.  Helping a group of men become closer to our LORD satisfies me at a level nothing else can come close to.  There were many instances of “religious awakenings” during the Civil War – especially prior to the spring fighting campaigns.  What I took part in this past weekend can best be described as an awakening.  Many of the 30 men found something that had been absent for decades, others found something they never had before and still others just found a new appreciation for their faith.  Needless to say I am humbled to have taken part in such an important weekend for these men.  THANK YOU.

Before I left on Thursday, I had started to write a companion article to my recent article on CSA Colonel Joseph C. Pleasants – an article that was very well rated by my readers.  Pleasants who fought in the Confederate Army of the Trans-Mississippi, at the battle of Prairie Grove, is an American HERO – even though he fought for the Confederacy.  Pleasants exemplified what it means to be an American soldier.  The companion article, that I plan to finish tonight, is on an American HERO who fought against Pleasants at Prairie Grove.  It will make a nice companion to the article on Pleasants – which can be read by clicking HERE.

Today is an important day in Civil War history.  US Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant received the “unconditional surrender” of Fort Donelson.  Meeting him at the Dover Hotel, was his old friend, CSA Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner who surrendered his entire garrison – nearly 12,400 Confederate soldiers were surrendered and would make their way to Cairo, Illinois, in route to Federal prisons.  Buckner’s soldiers would suffer another 1,450 killed and wounded.  Grant’s Federal forces would suffer nearly 2,700 killed and wounded – a number that is understandable as they had to storm significant field works during a protracted battle on February 15.

To view a narrative on the Battle of Fort Donelson, that I wrote on last year’s anniversary of the battle, click HERE.

To view a photo essay on the Battle of Fort Doneslon, at my Flickr site, click HERE.

Today would be Abraham Lincoln’s 201st birthday.  Our 16th president went from the most humble beginnings, in northern Kentucky, to the highest office in United States.  With an insatiable thirst for knowledge, Lincoln was able to educate himself and eventually become an attorney, in Springfield, Illinois.  Before being killed, by John Wilkes Booth, he would guide his beloved country through civil war and abolish human slavery in the south.

While I am pleased to have a three day weekend, this weekend, I wish Abraham Lincoln’s birthday was a National holiday.  Not to take anything away from the other 41 presidents, Uncle Abe deserves it.

Click HERE to read an article I wrote, “What Abraham Lincoln Means to Me,” on his 200th birthday.

I recently finished reading Wayne Hsieh’s new book, “West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in War and Peace.”  Published by UNC Press, it is Mr. Hsieh’s first book.  Hsieh is Assistant Professor of History at the United States Naval Academy and teaches courses on 19th Century U.S. Military History and the Civil War.  He received his BA from Yale University and a masters and doctorate from the University of Virginia.  His research interests, as obtained from the Naval Academy’s web site, are “The boundary between “objective,” for lack of a better term, military expertise and “subjective” cultural factors in the mid-nineteenth century United States.  What aspects of military professionalism and effectiveness are not contingent on political, ideological and cultural factors?  How do these two different phenomena interact with one another?”  These are just the right research interests for a fantastic book on West Point officers during the Civil War.

Hsieh’s ground-breaking book covers West Point from its creation to the outbreak of the Civil War.  Particular emphasis is given to the evolving role of West Point after the War of 1812 – a war that the United States was totally unprepared to fight.  After the War of 1812, the United States sent military officers to France and Germany to bring back equipment and books on tactics.  Additionally Claudius Crozet was hired by West Point to develop its engineering school.  These developments inevitably changed the curriculum at West Point to something similar to the great military schools in Europe.  Additionally, the tactical studies would also mirror those being taught to French and German infantrymen.  As might be expected, with the hiring of Crozet, the Military Academy shifted much of its focus towards engineering – essential for the burgeoning Corps of Engineers, but at the cost of an emphasis on battlefield tactics.

With the outbreak of the Mexican War, West Point graduates would get the opportunity to put their studies to use, guiding a largely volunteer force against the Mexican Army.  What they had learned, they put to good use, defeating the Mexican Army and gaining thousands of square miles of ground in the west – a development that would inevitably lead the the upcoming Civil War.  Mr. Hsieh provides excellent details of the tactics used during the Mexican War and how they would impact the methods of warfare used during the American Civil War, just 15 short years in the future.

After the war with Mexico, West Point reverted to what Hsieh describes as the “status quo,” utilizing much of the same curriculum and programs that had been implemented after the War of 1812.  However, some things did change.  With the introduction of the rifled musket, some tactical training was provided in light infantry movements.  Additionally, during Jefferson Davis’ term as Secretary of War, future Confederate general, William J. Hardee, wrote a book on infantry tactics, “Infantry Tactics – Detailed Programme.”  This manual, after several revisions, was adopted by the Military Academy.  Also, another future Confederate general, Cadmus Wilcox, wrote a field manual on rifle training, “Rifles and Rifle Practice.”  These developments, asserts Hsieh, did not lead to the modernization of war, that has been previously put forth by scholars, but to minor changes in tactics, most notably the use of light infantry, that would impact the way the Civil War would be fought.

The rest of the book details the efforts, north and south, to field armies to fight each other.  Since my primary interests relate to the Civil War, these chapters were particularly fascinating for me.  Wayne devotes a great deal of energy developing his analysis on how West Point graduates performed during the Civil War.  This includes details on moving large formations of infantry on the battlefield, training volunteers, political motivations and managing quartermaster departments.  Additional pages are devoted to the use of light infantry and shock tactics – something that would be refined over the course of the war.  As well known by students of the Civil War, political war aims changed and the officers were influenced by their beliefs and how they squared up with the stated policies of each government.  This was especially true with George B. McClellan.  Hsieh details how McClellan’s conciliatory policies would influence his senior lieutenants and spread, almost like a virus, amongst the senior commanders in the Army of the Potomac.  This would hamper the Federal forces, especially in the Eastern Theater, for the remainder of the war – possibly causing the conflict to continue longer than necessary.  Finally, Mr. Hsieh develops his assertion that the Civil War was not the first “modern war,” but rather a war that still relied on old tactics and leadership with some modern components.  As an example, during the Overland Campaign, Grant still utilized operational plans influenced by old army training – such as frontal assaults on fixed defensive positions.  However, light infantry formations were employed, often as sharpshooters – this being the modern component.

The epilogue is quite informative and deals with the challenges faced by officers as the war effort wound down and military rule in the southern states, and frontier service, became the norm.  Corps and division commanders would face difficulties as they transitioned from the “glories” of the battlefield to the drudgery of peacetime.  These officers, many of which had held major general commissions in the volunteer army, would revert to their pre-war ranks, often commanding a regiment or battalion instead of a brigade, division, corps or army.  Many others would resign their commission and attempt a return to civilian life.  Whatever their path, the transition was tough and many successful officers had problems adapting.

“West Pointers in the Civil War” is an excellent book that was throughly researched by Hsieh.  It is technical in nature, perhaps geared more towards a serious student of the military, but written in such a style as to be a worthy read for anyone with an interest in the military, or the Civil War.  I would encourage my readers to add this to their Civil War collection.

I had the opportunity to speak with Wayne on February 1.  We had a most interesting “talk” that spanned nearly 90 minutes.  The conversation was very enlightening and I quickly concluded that Wayne is an expert on his subject matter.  As with all of my interviews, I have separated the interview into smaller parts so you can listen to them over a period of time and easily return to the next segment.  You can also download the entire interview in MP3 format and add it to your iPod or other MP3 device.

Details about “West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army in War and Peace”
Written by: Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh
Hardcover: 304 pages
Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press
Date of First Edition: October 15, 2009
ISBN-10: 0807832782

Click HERE for additional Civil War titles from UNC Press!

Wayne Hsieh Interview – 14 Parts
Interview Date: February 1, 2010
Total Time: 1 hour 27 minutes 57 seconds
Click HERE to download the complete interview.

Part 1:

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Time: 6:32
Contents: Welcome and introductions | How Wayne became interested in the Civil War | Why write “West Pointers in the Civil War?” | Relying on West Point officers during the Civil War – What was the impact?

Part 2:

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Time: 8:06
Contents: Why both sides suffered from the same deficiencies and strengths with similar learning curves | Why Civil War battles were often indecisive | The Mexican War and how it impacted the officers of the Civil War

Part 3:

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Time: 4:48
Contents: Light infantry and shock tactics during the Mexican War and Civil War | Two rank and three rank formations and their use during the Mexican War and Civil War

Part 4:

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Time: 6:46
Contents: The “status quo” at West Point after the Mexican War | The introduction of the rifle musket at West Point | Jefferson Davis as Secretary of War | The use of William J. Hardee’s infantry tactics manual and Cadmus Wilcox’s rifle musket training manual

Part 5:

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Time: 6:03
Contents: How age and antebellum rank impacted whether an officer remained in the army or resigned | How antebellum politics and sectionalism impacted “old army” officers | Did the use of West Point officers in training volunteer recruits impact the line officer ranks at the start of the Civil War?

Part 6:

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Time: 4:45
Contents: Both armies lacked training in handling large infantry formations – Did this affect one side more than the other in the Civil War? | Confederate operational tactics during the Civil War and their use of offensive tactics early on to bring the Civil War to a quick close

Part 7:

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Time: 8:14
Contents: The Bowie Knife versus the bayonet – myth vs. reality | The use of partisan rangers – Was it effective and did the Federal armies ever use partisan troops?

Part 8:

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Time: 6:51
Contents: West Pointers and “old army” officers and their use in the quartermaster corps | The impact of remote garrisons on the quartermaster departments | How journalists and diarists impacted public opinion of the fighting skills of West Pointers and the impact on each government

Part 9:

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Time: 5:57
Contents: Light infantry and shock tactics in the Western Theater – their use at the Battle of Fort Donelson | Shock tactics spread through the other theaters of the Civil War | Both sides suffered from poor fire discipline especially in the volunteer regiments – How did it improve throughout the war?

Part 10:

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Time: 5;37
Contents: The viral effects of US Major General George B. McClellan’s conciliatory tactics on the Army of the Potomac throughout the war | The officers’ perverse respect for seniority and its impact | The changing war aims for the United States and the ramifications of the Emancipation Proclamation on the Army of the Potomac

Part 11:

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Time: 4:46
Contents: Managing coordinated assaults by large formations against fixed field works | Difficulties in communication on the battlefield | The lack of coordinating “line wide” attacks at major battles

Part 12:

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Time: 5:16
Contents: Ulysses S. Grant’s ever evolving strategies in 1864 | Political considerations with regards to theater strategy

Part 13:

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Time: 8:06
Contents:  Hsieh’s conclusion on the generalship of U.S. Grant and Robert E. Lee during the Overland Campaign | Grant suffers from deficiencies in his corps and division command while Lee’s lieutenants are still very capable | By the summer of 1864 new infantry tactics and sharpshooters with rifled muskets changed the mode of warfare – Was this the advent of modern war?

Part 14:

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Time: 6:10
Contents: How did the stress of war impact the regular army officers, with the downsizing of the Federal army, after Appomattox Court House? | Wayne’s future plans and projects | Wrap up and closing

This past week, I had a business trip to Indianapolis.  As I do on many of my road trips, I took my camera gear with me.  While there are no Civil War battlefields in the Indianapolis area, there are many historical monuments.  Additionally, there are a significant amount of Civil War notables buried in the state.

Indiana would be one of the first states to respond to Abraham Lincoln’s call for 75,000 state militia troops, after the firing on Fort Sumter.  According to the Civil War Indiana web site, troops from Indiana saw action in every major engagement during the war.  She would send a total of 208,367 of her sons to fight for the Union.  They served in 126 infantry regiments, 26 artillery batteries and 13 cavalry regiments.  While over 75,000 Indiana soldiers would be seriously wounded, 24,416 died from all causes.

When I planned my business trip to the Hoosier state, I primarily wanted to get some pictures of the famous Soldiers and Sailors Monument in downtown Indianapolis.  It is the largest such monument in the country, towering 284 feet over Monument Circle.  The basement of the monument holds the Colonel Eli Lilly Civil War Museum.  Well conditioned visitors can climb the 331 steps to the observation tower and enjoy a wonderful view of the downtown area.

After investigating general officers buried in the state, I learned of Crown Hill Cemetery.  Overlooking downtown Indianapolis it contains the graves of several general officers, Colonel Eli Lilly and Colonel Benjamin Harrison, who would become our 23d President.  Additionally, a section of the cemetery was set aside as the Crown Hill National Cemetery with its evenly lined rows of soldier and sailor graves.  An interesting section of the cemetery houses a mass grave where over 1,700 Confederate POW’s were buried.  Recent efforts have marked the site with a modest monument and plaques that list the names of those buried under the mound.

On my drive back to Saint Louis, I planned on making a slight detour to Crawfordsville, Indiana where the General Lew Wallace Study & Museum is located.  Unfortunately, the museum was closed, but I was able to visit Wallace’s grave at Oak Hill Cemetery. 

My last stop was in Terre Haute, where I visited US Brigadier General Charles Cruft’s grave, at Woodlawn Cemetery.  Additionally, Terre Haute has a wonderful set of war monuments, at Vigo County court house.  The Civil War monument is quite impressive for a town of its size.

While I only was able to visit a handful of sites, Indiana has many more that I will have to visit at a later date.  If your travels take you to Indiana, make sure to plan some additional time to visit some of these wonderful memorials to her soldiers.

To view my photo essay, on my trip to Indiana, click HERE.

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The 5th New York Infantry regiment, also known as Duryée’s Zouaves was organized in New York City after President Abraham Lincoln’s call for the states to send 75,000 state militiamen “in order to suppress said combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly executed.”(i)  They were officially mustered into Federal service, on May 9, 1861, as a two year regiment.  Their commander, Colonel Abram Duryée, a wealthy New York businessman, was able to recruit the regiment, arm them and uniform them in less than a week.  Many of the soldiers in the 5th New York’s ranks were well educated and had served in the well known 7th Regiment, New York National Guard.  Their uniforms were modeled after the North African style of the French Zouaves.  These bright uniforms had become well accepted in the state militias after the 1860 tour of Captain Elmer E. Ellsworth’s U.S. Zouave cadets.  No less than fifty of these infantry regiments were established during the Civil War, but Duryée’s 5th New York would become one of the most famous.

After being mustered into the Federal service Colonel Duryée left New York City on May 23.  Their destination was Fortress Monroe, Virginia, where they would arrive several days later.  Assigned to US Brigadier General Ebenezer Pierce’s brigade, the 5th New York would be tasked with garrison duty at Newport News, Virginia, through July 1861.  On June 10, 1861, they would participate in the Civil War’s first infantry battle at Big Bethel, Virginia where they would suffer 17 casualties – six of which were killed in action.(ii)

In July they would be transferred to US Major General John A Dix’s division. Garrisoned in Baltimore, they would serve in the city’s defenses through March 1862 when they were transferred to the US Colonel Gouverneur Warren’s Third brigade, US Brigadier General George Sykes’ Second Division of US Major General Fitz John Porter’s V Corps – Army of the Potomac.  Arriving on the Virginia peninsula, in time for US Major General George B. McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign, they would initially see little action.  While not directly engaged in the Battle of Seven Pines (also called Fair Oaks), they were able to witness the battle from north of the Chickahominy River, as two divisions of CSA General Joseph E. Johnston’s Confederate army attacked the III and IV Federal Corps, commanded by brigadier generals Samuel P. Heintzelman and Erasmus D. Keyes.  After Seven Pines, with Joseph Johnston seriously injured, CSA General Robert E. Lee would officially take over command of what would soon be called the Army of Northern Virginia.  Thus ended the Peninsula Campaign and started The Seven Days battles.

Robert E. Lee quickly showed his aggressiveness, pushing McClellan’s Army of the Potomac from the very “Gates of Richmond.”  With McClellan starting a retrograde movement towards the James River, Robert E. Lee attacked Porter’s V Corps which was isolated east of the Chickahominy River, on June 27, 1862.  During the ensuing Battle of Gaines’s Mill, Duryée’s 5th New York would receive its “”baptism of fire.”  Positioned south of Boatswain Swamp, near the right-center of Porter’s 5th Corps line, Duryée’s Zouaves was supporting a Massachusetts artillery battery which had been raking the Confederate lines.  The 1st South Carolina Rifles, of CSA Major General A.P. Hill’s Light Division, were ordered to charge and silence the battery.  Charging across the creek, the South Carolinians issued their spine chilling Rebel yell.  To protect the battery, the 5th New York jumped into action, issuing their own unique yell, “Zou, zou, zou!”(iii)  They received the attack and a brutal hand-to-hand engagement commenced.  With the aid of some of Sykes’ Regulars, they were able to repel the fierce attack, holding onto their position and allowing the Massachusetts artillerists to continue their deadly work.  All told, the 1st South Carolina Rifles suffered a staggering 309 casualties that day -57% of their pre-battle strength.  Duryée’s “Red Legs” 5th New York Volunteers would suffer 162 casualties, of which 38 were killed – roughly 36%.  The entire “butcher’s bill” during Gaines’ Mill was a staggering 15,500.

After Gaines’ Mill, the entire Army of the Potomac pushed south, towards Harrison’s Landing on the James River.  With Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia on their heels, they would fight rear guard actions at Savage’s Station and Glendale (also called Frayser’s Farm), before they had created a very defensible position at Malvern Hill.  The Battle of Malvern Hill decimated the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and allowed McClellan to extricate his Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula.  The 5th New York would be help cover the retreat of the Federal army from Malvern Hill.

Duryée and the 5th New York would continue to be posted at Harrison’s Landing until August 15, when they moved by steamer to Fortress Monroe.  Meanwhile, Abraham Lincoln had created the Army of Virginia, which was commanded by US Major General John Pope.  While Robert E. Lee was pushing McClellan from the peninsula, Lee detached CSA Major General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s wing to harass the movements of Pope’s Federal army.  They would meet at the Battle of Cedar Mountain, on August 9, where Jackson’s forces, augmented by A.P. Hill’s Light Division would repulse US Major General Nathaniel Banks’ II Corps, Army of Virginia.  Over the coming days Jackson would push his two divisions north, capturing the Federal supply depot at Manassas Station, on August 26.  He would take the supplies he could use, and put a torch to the rest of the Federal supply depot.  By August 28, Jackson had his divisions arrayed north of the Warrenton Turnpike, near Groveton, Virginia.  Positioned in an unfinished railroad cut, he awaited the arrival John Pope’s Army of Virginia.  Meanwhile, Robert E. Lee, wanting to destroy Pope’s army, before McClellan could arrive to reinforce him, pushed the rest of his Army of Virginia north to augment the forces commanded by Jackson.

Arriving at Alexandria during the third week of August, McClellan detached Heintzelman’s III Corps, Porter’s V Corps and US Major General Jesse Reno’s IX Corps, sending them to reinforce Pope’s army for the inevitable battle near Manassas Junction.  On August 29, the Battle of Second Manassas would open when Pope’s I Corps, commanded by US Major General Franz Sigel, and III Corps, commanded by US Major General Irvin McDowell, attacked Jackson’s forces in the railroad cut.  The fighting would be intense with several attacks, and counterattacks, occurring throughout the day.  With darkness covering the battlefield, the two armies would hold roughly the same position they held at the start of the day’s fighting.

The 5th New York Volunteer Infantry would arrive, with Porter’s V Corps, during the afternoon of August 29.  Ordered to attack Jackson’s right flank, Porter slowly moved his corps along the Manassas Gap Railroad towards his objective, Gainesville, Virginia.  Unfortunately, Pope’s orders were unclear, stating that the army may need to pull back to Centreville, Virginia, which essentially halted Porter.  His corps would see very little action on August 29, other than some minor skirmishing with CSA Major General J.E.B. Stuart’s Cavalry division.

At 7:00 a.m. on August 31, Pope met with his senior lieutenants.  With overnight and early morning intelligence providing faulty information that the Confederate army was retreating, Pope determined to fall on the rear of the retreating column.  Porter’s V Corps would spearhead the attack, north of the Warrenton Turnpike.  This same ground had been fiercely fought over, on August 29, by US Major General Philip Kearny’s division of Heintzelman’s III Corps, Army of the Potomac.  Unfortunately, for the Federal cause, Pope was extremely indecisive on the morning of August 30.  While they agreed upon a plan to attack the retreating Confederates, no formal orders were issued.  As historian John J. Hennessy writes in his epic campaign study, “Return to Bull Run,” Pope’s “enthusiasm for the plan disappeared with the dew on the morning’s grass.”(iv)  After the morning meeting, with his V Corps arriving on the field, Porter had an extended conversation with Pope.  He attempted to convince Pope that Lee’s Army of Virginia not only remained on the field, but its right flank extended far south of the Warrenton Turnpike – probably all the way to the Manassas-Gainesville Road.  Pope dismissed not only Porter’s solid advice but the advice of US Brigadier General John F. Reynolds who fought the Rebels south of the turnpike, the previous day.  Pope would leave the meeting – allowing the commanders to act on their own – with no official orders.

Meanwhile, on the Confederate side, Robert E. Lee had masterfully placed CSA Major General James Longstreet’s right wing, from Brawner’s Farm, on the north, to the Manassas Gap Railroad, on the south.  The northern portion of Longstreet’s line, commanded by division commander Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox, connected with Jackson’s right flank, near the railroad cut.  Lee’s tactical plan was to have Longstreet’s entire wing pivot on Wilcox’s left flank pounding into the left flank of Pope’s position, held by Porter.  Essentially, Longstreet’s movement would be like a door swinging closed on the Federal position, with the right flank of his lines covering the longest distance.  This masterful plan would catch Pope unaware, as he believed Lee was retreating, and collapse his lines south to north.  Pope’s indecisiveness played right into Lee’s hands.

During the morning, and early afternoon, Porter arranged his troops.  Most of his corps were arrayed north of the Warrenton Turnpike.  Porter’s plan called for the attack to be made by Sykes’ division and portions of US Major General George Morrell’s division.  Sykes’ Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel Gouverneur K. Warren was posted on high ground east of Lewis Lane, but south of the turnpike.  Composed of the 5th and 10th New York Volunteer Infantry regiments, Warren’s small brigade was in a very exposed position on the far left flank of the Federal army.  Besides protecting the flank, they were to provide infantry support to US Lieutenant Charles “Cog” Hazlett’s Battery D, 5th  U.S. Artillery.  Posted behind Warren’s lone brigade was the brigade of US Colonel Nathaniel C. McLean of US Brigadier General Robert C. Schenck’s First Division, Franz Sigel’s I Corps Army of Virginia.  They were posted near Bald Hill, approximately 3/4 of a mile behind Warren’s brigade.

Fitz John Porter’s attack commenced at approximately 3:00 p.m.  Attacking towards the northeast, they slammed into the right flank of Jackson’s wing.  Directly in the Federals’ path were the veteran brigades of CSA brigadier generals William E. Starke and Alexander R. Lawton.  While experiencing some early success, Porter’s attack was not coordinated.  The first Federal troops to push towards the unfinished railroad cut were those of US Brigadier General Daniel Butterfield.  Porter originally planned to send in Sykes’ entire division to support Butterfield, but changed his mind as he observed the Confederate artillery action on Butterfield’s lines.  Posted between the two Confederate army wings were the large artillery commands of Colonel Stephen D. Lee and Major L.M. Shumaker.  They were well placed between the two army wings and were able to enfilade the path of Butterfield’s brigade.  Further to his right, Porter allowed US Brigadier General John Hatch’s division, of Irvin McDowell’s III Corps, Army of Virginia, to push forward with their attack.  They only needed to march over 300 yards of open ground – half what Butterfield’s brigade was traversing.  The piecemeal attack Pope initiated was easily repulsed by the veteran Confederate soldiers in the unfinished railroad cut.  The Federal soldiers would stream back quickly after facing heavy musketry to their front, and heavy artillery fire enfilading them from their left.

Longstreet and Lee could both observe Porter’s failing attack.  At one point Lee only planned to use Longstreet’s right wing as a diversion.  Now, Lee believed he had the opportunity to crush Pope’s Army of Virginia.  At 4:00 p.m., Longstreet ordered his five divisions into action.  Their objective was to reach the Henry House Hill, site of the first battle of Bull Run, from where they could push north into Pope’s unsuspecting Army of Virginia.  The only Federal troops positioned in Longstreet’s path were the two lone brigades of Warren, east of Lewis Lane, and McLean, on Chinn Ridge.

To say Warren was concerned about his forward position is an understatement.  After watching Porter’s attack and subsequent repulse, north of the Warrenton Turnpike, Warren expected to see the Confederates at any moment.  With six companies of his 10th New York deployed as skirmishers near Lewis Lane and Duryée’s 5th New York Volunteers posted about 200 yards behind Hazlett’s artillery, Warren faced insurmountable odds.  The 5th New York were in a position Hennessy describes as “calculated for comfort, not defense,” and were unaware of the imminent attack of Longstreet’s divisions.  After their hard fighting, during the Seven Days, the well drilled Zouaves numbered around 560 men – 60 of which were new recruits.  Commanding them today was Cleveland Winslow – a promising officer, but one the troops would consider a martinet.  Unknown to Winslow, and his troops, CSA Brigadier John Bell Hood’s division - and more specifically his Texas brigade - were approximately one half mile in their front.  The Texas Brigade was a battle hardened group and included the 1st, 4th and 5th Texas regiments, the 18th Georgia and the Hampton South Carolina Legion.

Shortly after 4:00 p.m., the 5th New York received some warning of the impending attack when a company of the 10th New York suddenly appeared on their left.  Alfred Davenport, a private in the 5th, recalled they were “huddled in a heap and much scared.”  They warned the enemy was coming and would be on their left at any moment.  Winslow wasted little time, making the order, “Attention battalion!”  The battle hardened Zouaves quickly grabbing their rifles and formed a line to receive the Hood’s onslaught.  Taking into consideration the 10th New York Infantry’s warning, the battle line was faced towards the left.  Before fully formed, however, the 5th New York’s line began receiving musketry.  One soldier described it well, “The balls began to fly from woods like hail.  It was a continual hiss, snap, whiz and sluck.”  The sluck being the sound of minie balls hitting flesh.(v)

Confusion reigned amongst the Zouaves as they leveled their muskets and prepared to return fire at the soldiers, barely seen, through the smoke, when someone yelled, “Don’t fire!  Those men below to the Tenth!”  Unfortunately, the men of the six companies of the 10th were between the enemy lines preventing the Zouaves from firing.  With the officers of the 10th New York trying to rally their troops, the men of the 5th were forced to wait for them to pass to the rear, before they could engage the Texas Brigade.  As Warren attempted to get the 10th pulled back, men in both Federal regiments were falling.  Two color bearers of the 10th fell in the rapidly unfolding melee while Hazlett’s 5th U.S. Artillery battery continued to fire into the rapidly advancing line of Texans.  By this time, Duryée’s Zouaves had pushed forward to offer support to “Cog’s” battery which was in serious jeopardy of being captured.  Unknown to the 5th New York, or Hazlett, was that the 1st Texas had fallen behind the rest of the Texas Brigade and were not yet upon them.  This gave Hazlett time to limber his guns and move to a safer place on Dogan Ridge – north of the Warrenton Turnpike.

Unfortunately, to Hazlett’s left were the unlucky men of the 5th New York Volunteers.  Having been caught unable to return fire, with the 10th New York retreating to their front, they suffered terribly in what John Hennessy described in his chapter the “Vortex of Hell.”  Men were literally falling inn rows as the Texas Brigade came upon them.  Forced to retreat towards Henry House Hill, nearly a mile to their rear, the few remaining Zouaves gathered around the regimental flag, which Warren had ordered jabbed into the ground.  As Hennessy described in his authoritative narrative on Second Manassas, “Warren sat immobile on his horse, looking back as if paralyzed, while a handful of his men, formed in files of four, blackened with dust and smoke, stood under the colors as silent as statues, gazing vacantly….A murmur of surprise and horror passed through the ranks of our Regulars at the fate of this brave regiment.”  With only sixty of its men filing under the regimental flag on Henry Hill, five hundred lay scattered - dead, wounded or missing - on the stubble field one mile to the west.  The scene of slaughter was not missed by the charging Confederates, with one of Hood’s men stating the scene was “a ghastly, horrifying spectacle.”(vi)  Nearly 300 brave Zouaves were shot, 120 killed.  This would endure as the largest single loss of life, in any one Federal regiment, during the entire Civil War – and it happened in only ten minutes.  Forty-five years later, when the survivors of the regiment gathered to dedicate their monument, one member was quoted as saying, “War has been designated as Hell, and I can assure you that where the regiment stood that day was the very vortex of Hell.”(vii)  Unfortunately, the Zouave blood of the 5th New York Volunteers, spread on the hill east of Lewis Lane, was shed in vain.  Longstreet’s scissor movement, into the left flank of John Pope’s Army of Virginia, was decisive – completely routing the Federal army and sending the army pellmell back towards Washington.  In the aftermath of the battle, Pope would be sent west to Minnesota and George McClellan would once again command all the Federal armies in the Eastern Theater.

Abram Duryée’s proud 5th New York Zouaves would continue to fight with the Army of the Potomac’s V Corps.  They were a shadow of their former strength, but would see further action at Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville before their two year term of enlistment expired.  They officially mustered out of Federal service on May 14, 1863 with their replacements being assigned to the 146th New York Infantry regiment.

The proud 5th New York Zouaves will always be remembered for their gallant actions at Second Manassas.  Today, their monument can be viewed by today’s generation of Civil War students, and future enthusiasts, on the ground they gave their “last full measure” to defend.  These proud Americans will always be remembered by me as true American HEROS!

(i) Donald, David Herbert, Lincoln, published by Simon & Schuster in 1995, Pg. 296.
(ii) For additional information, see 5th New York Volunteer Infantry Company C, by clicking HERE.
(iii) Sears, Stephen W., To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, published by Ticknor & Fields in 1992, Pg. 224.
(iv) Hennessy, John J., Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas, published by the University of Oklahoma Press in 1999, Pg. 312.
(v) Hennessy, John J., Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas, published by the University of Oklahoma Press in 1999, Pg. 369.
(vi) Hennessy, John J., Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas, published by the University of Oklahoma Press in 1999, Pg. 372.
(vii) Hennessy, John J., Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas, published by the University of Oklahoma Press in 1999, Pg. 373.