145 years ago, this week, US Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant would battle CS General Robert E. Lee in the Battle of the Wilderness.(i) After being brought east, in March 1864, to take command of all the Federal armies, Grant began to plan his spring offensive. His plan was simple, but would be difficult to coordinate. In a simultaneous thrust, multiple armies would attack the Confederate armies, in their front, preventing any of the enemy armies from reinforcing each other. In the east, US Major General George Gordon Meade’s Army of the Potomac’s objective would be Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Grant clearly instructed Meade, “Lee’s army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will also go.”(ii) Additionally, Grant would have US Major General Franz Sigel pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, while US Major General Benjamin F. Butler pushed east, towards Richmond, from the James River peninsula. It was Grant’s plan to converge on Lee, leaving him little change for reinforcement, while the main thrust, from Meade, pushed Lee into Richmond. At the same time, in the West, US Major General William T. Sherman was to push CS General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Tennessee, towards Atlanta. Grant set the first week of May as the time when all armies would be put in motion. In his order Grant advised, “So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre.”(iii)
In early May, Grant had the Army of the Potomac camped north of the Rapidan River. His plan, to be carried out by Meade, was to quickly cross the Rapidan and push through the “Wilderness” before Lee could move in and attack. The Wilderness was a dense forest of thick brush, mixed with newer growth forest and farm fields. In May 1863, US Major General Joseph Hooker was thrashed by Lee, during the Battle of Chancellorsville, in the same dense forest. Grant had that in mind when he planned his battle, not wanting to give Lee an opportunity to strike his army there.
Robert E. Lee had camped his Army of Northern Virginia, during the winter months, west of Chancellorsville. Anticipating Grant would make a move towards Richmond, Lee sent CS Lieutenant General Richard Ewell’s 2nd Corps, and CS Lieutenant General A.P. Hill’s 3rd Corps, to counter such a move. Lee knew it was in his best interest to engage Grant in the Wilderness, where his smaller army would have a better chance against the 100,000+ Federal troops. Additionally, Lee had ordered CS Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s 1st Corps, less CS Major General George Pickett’s Division, to join him west of Chancellorsville. Unfortunately, by the morning of May 5, Longstreet had not arrived.
Meade had ordered his three corps to cross the Rapidan River, on May 4. US Major Generals Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps, and John Sedgwick’s VI Corps crossed at Germanna Ford. US Major General Winfield S. Hancock’s II Corps crossed further east, at Ely’s Ford. On May 5, the two Confederate corps engaged the Yankee army. Ewell’s Corps attacked Warren’s troops, battling throughout the day, along the Orange Turnpike. Later in the afternoon, A.P. Hill’s Corps attacked Hancock’s II Corps, and a portion of Sedgwick’s VI Corps. Hill would be roughly handled along the Orange Plank Road. Grant would receive additional reinforcements, with the arrival of US Major General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps. Grant positioned him between the two wings of the army. Overnight, on May 5, the two armies held roughly the same positions. Grant, speaking to reporter Henry Wing, told him to relay to Lincoln, “(Grant) told me I was to tell you, Mr. President, that there would be no turning back.”(iv)
The battle would resume on May 6, with Lee still waiting for Longstreet’s Corps to arrive. To the north, Ewell would continue to contain Sedgwick and Warren’s corps along the Orange Turnpike. Further south, along the Plank Road, Hancock’s II Corps aggressively pushed Hill’s 3rd Corps nearly two miles west. Hill was again suffering large losses. Lee was in a serious predicament. He was in jeopardy of being flanked, on his right, and pushed against the Rapidan River. Fortune would once again shine on Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia when Longstreet’s 1st Corps arrived, around 12:00 noon. With Hancock’s corps fatigued by six hours of fighting, Hill’s troops would start pushing him back. Longstreet’s 12,000 troops were sent to the aid of Hill. Finding an unfinished railroad cut, south of Hill’s flank, Longstreet pushed his corps quickly towards Hancock’s left flank. There they would slam into Hancock, pushing him back to the intersection of the Plank Road, and Brock Road. After two terrible days of fighting, both sides were essentially at a stalemate. While Lee had momentum, and had taken the offensive, he was still badly outnumbered. Additionally, Lee once again suffered the loss of one of his most trusted lieutenants – James Longstreet – who was seriously wounded by friendly fire. He would recover several months later, but would leave Lee with a vacuum in his senior leadership. Grant held a strong position and could continue to battle Lee in the tangle of the Wilderness.
Overnight, on May 6, Grant made preparations to move around the right flank, of Lee, heading south for Spotsylvania Court House. After fighting for two days in the Wilderness, Grant told Lieutenant Colonel Horace Porter, “I do not hope to gain any decided advantage from fighting in this forest.”(v) As the Army of the Potomac disengaged from Lee, on May 7, many of the soldiers had resigned to another retreat. One Federal soldier stated it was not, “another Chancellorsville….another skedaddle…,” as the army turned south, “our spirits rose.”(vi) However, the carnage was terrific. Artillery shells set the forest ablaze. Porter recalled the terror of the battle, “Forest fires raged; ammunition trains exploded; the dead were roasted in the conflagration; the wounded, roused by its hot breath, dragged themselves along, with their torn and mangled limbs, in the mad energy of despair, to escape the ravages of the flames; and every bush seemed hung with shreds of blood stained clothing.”(vii) Indeed, many wounded soldiers could not escape the slowly advancing flames, and were burned to death. Some soldiers were able to load and fire their muskets, taking their lives before the flames could do their grizzly work.
In what would become known as the Overland Campaign, the carnage had only begun. Grant would continue to attempt flanking moves, around Lee’s right flank. Eventually, he believed he could reach Richmond before Lee.
Statistics for the Battle of the Wilderness(viii)
Combat Strength:
Federal: 115,000
Confederate: 60,000
Casualties:
Federals: 18,000
Confederate: 10,800
Result: Inconclusive
(i) The Battle of the Wilderness, at Wikipedia, was used to research this article.
(ii) Grant’s written order to Meade, April 9, 1864, Grant, Ulysses S., Grant Memoirs and Selected Letters, published by The Library of America 1990, Pg. 482.
(iii) Grant’s written order to Meade, April 9, 1864, Grant, Ulysses S., Grant Memoirs and Selected Letters, published by The Library of America 1990, Pg. 481.
(iv) Bonekemper III, Edward H., A Victor Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant’s Overlooked Military Genius, published by Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2004, Pg. 167.
(v) Rhea, Gordon C., The Battle of the Wilderness: May 5–6, 1864, published by Louisiana State University Press 1994, Pg. 436.
(vi) McPherson, James A., Battle Cry of Freedom, published by Oxford University Press 1988, Pgs. 635–636.
(vii) Rhea, Gordon C., The Battle of the Wilderness: May 5–6, 1864, published by Louisiana State University Press 1994, Pgs. 451–452.
(viii) Kennedy, Frances H., The Civil War Battlefield Guide, Second Edition, published by Houghton Mifflin Company 1998, Pg. 281.